THE NATIONAL INTEREST

LEDEEN ON SECRETS

U.S. AND ISRAEL: FRIENDSHIP UNDER STRAIN
by Ze'ev Schiff

NATO—TIME TO CALL IT A DAY?
by Colin S. Gray

Containment and the Logic of Strategy *by John Lewis Gaddis*
The Rise and Fall of the PLO *by Farid el-Khazen*
INF: The *NOs* Have It *by Robert W. Tucker*
U.S.–Japanese Trade: Yes, Blame America First *by Steve H. Hanke*
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Essays & Comments:
Alvin H. Bernstein, John Keegan, Robert G. Livingston, Daniel Pipes, Richard N. Haass and Kurt M. Campbell, Paul R. Wisgerhof, & Amos Perlmutter

NUMBER 10 / WINTER 1987/8 / $4.50

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Contents

ARTICLES

U.S. and Israel: Friendship under Strain
Ze'ev Schiff 3

NATO: Time to Call It a Day?
Colin S. Gray 13

Containment and the Logic of Strategy
John Lewis Gaddis 27

The Rise and Fall of the PLO
Farid el-Khazen 39

Secrets
Michael A. Ledeen 48

U.S.-Japanese Trade: Yes, Blame America First
Steve H. Hanke 56

Four Myths about Africa
Nick Eberstadt 61

Socialist Prisons and Imprisoned Minds
Paul Hollander 69

DEPARTMENTS

Books

Vietnam: A Military Post-Mortem
Alvin H. Bernstein 79

Right Man, Wrong Book
John Keegan 87

A Wounded Nation
Robert G. Livingston 90

Shorts

The Unacknowledged Partnership
Daniel Pipes 95

Dissent on Iran
Amos Perlmutter 99

South Africa: The Perils of Parallels
Richard N. Haass and Kurt M. Campbell 101

Look, No Ships!
Paul R. Wisgerhof 105

Exchanges

The War Colleges 109

Quarterly

The INF Debate: The *NOs* Have It
Robert W. Tucker 115

THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly, in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues, by National Affairs, Inc. EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 1112 16th Street NW, Suite 540, Washington DC 20036. (202) 467–4884. SUBSCRIPTIONS: $18 for one year, $32 for two years and $42 for three years (add $2 annually outside the United States). For subscription orders (prepayment required) please write: *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834; for credit card orders call toll-free 1–800–222–2990. Application to mail at second class postage rates is pending at Washington DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: send all address changes to *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834. "The National Interest" is a registered trademark of News Group Publications, Inc., and is used by National Affairs, Inc. under license; it may not be used without permission of News Group Publications, Inc. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life*. © 1987 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by the William Byrd Press, Richmond VA.

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U.S. and Israel: Friendship Under Strain

Ze'ev Schiff

THE NOTION that the Reagan Administration has been more sympathetic to Israel than any previous administration has attained the status of received wisdom in Israeli public opinion, media, and among Israeli politicians. Is it correct to say that during Reagan's tenure U.S.-Israeli relations have reached new peaks? It is true that during the last six years Israel has gained considerably in her relations with the U.S. relative to other Western countries. This period, however, has also witnessed serious mishaps. On balance, Reagan's term can be characterized as a period of impressive achievements for Israel and for the tightening of relations, but also one during which several serious problems combined to cast a shadow over these relations.

The Reagan administration has pushed economic and military aid to Israel to new heights. (Israel has been for some time the recipient of the largest amount of U.S. foreign aid.) Already in 1979, the Carter Administration increased economic aid from $785 million per year, of which two-thirds were a grant and one-third a loan, to an annual sum of $1.2 billion, all of it a grant. Under Reagan, Washington has granted Israel special economic aid of $1.5 billion for the 1986-87 fiscal year to assist Israel in extricating itself from its severe economic crisis. The $1.8 billion annual military aid package to Israel allows it to convert $300 million to Israeli shekels, permitting the Israelis to use the money in Israel rather than in the U.S. This sum had been used primarily for the development of the Lavi aircraft, a project the Pentagon believed damaging to Israeli security and one which would compete with American aircraft industries.

The Reagan administration also signed a memorandum of strategic cooperation with Israel on November 30, 1981. Strategic cooperation consists of several joint committees, joint maneuvers, and contingency plans to deploy U.S. military and medical supplies in Israel. Cooperation between the two countries on intelligence matters has been in place for some time. The Reagan administration has declared Israel a non-NATO ally, making it eligible for commercial benefits, research endowments, and more favorable conditions for exporting goods and bidding on U.S. government contracts. President Reagan also has declared that if Israel were expelled from the UN the U.S. would leave the organization. Israel was the only Middle Eastern country invited by the U.S. to participate in research on the Star Wars program, and was one of the first countries to accept the invitation. In addition, during Reagan's second term, the two countries

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signed a free trade zone agreement and Israel agreed to construct a Voice of America station in Israel. Finally, in a step that has symbolic as well as economic significance, Israel "loaned" the Marine Corps 25 Israeli-made Kfir jet fighters for training purposes (the Kfirs simulate Russian MiGs). The Kfirs were leased to the Marines but have not been paid for yet.

These developments, which Israel justifiably sees as significant achievements, were accompanied by several incidents casting a shadow on the relations between the countries. The administration that responded favorably to former Prime Minister Menachem Begin's request for strategic cooperation did not hesitate to suspend the agreement a month later when Begin's government surprised Washington by imposing Israeli law on the Golan Heights. The Reagan administration also did not hesitate to suspend shipment of F-16 fighter planes to Israel following a massive Israeli bombardment of PLO targets in central Beirut. When Israel's war in Lebanon exceeded its proclaimed goal of defending border settlements, Washington condemned it, especially the heavy bombardment of Beirut, and suspended the sale of cluster bombs and cluster artillery shells to Israel. This suspension is still in effect, although Israel now manufactures these armaments. The Jonathan Pollard spy scandal is but the most recent of these incidents.

In order to appreciate Israel's considerable achievement in strengthening its ties with the U.S., it is important to realize that until several years ago the relationship between the two countries was not especially close. In 1973, on the eve of the Yom Kippur war, U.S. military aid to Israel did not exceed $300 million, all of it in loan form. Few remember that the military ties between the two countries began with a U.S. embargo on the sale of arms to the young country in the midst of its war of independence. The U.S. was the first country to recognize Israel, but it also adhered to the arms embargo decision made by the UN security council. When Washington discovered that Czechoslovakia permitted American citizens to use Czech territory to deliver to Israel airplanes illegally procured in the U.S., it promptly filed a pointed complaint with Prague. Even after the war of independence Washington continued to maintain the embargo. The Israeli Defense Ministry's acquisition and procurement mission in New York was limited in the 1950s to the purchasing of non-military equipment. Israel submitted requests every year to purchase weapons and other military equipment, but with very few exceptions the response was always negative. There were very few U.S. military courses open to Israeli officers. The hostile attitude culminated in a U.S. refusal to allow the Israeli Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, to visit U.S. army bases in 1953.

Only in 1961 did things begin to change, as David Ben Gurion persuaded President Kennedy to sell Israel several Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to defend itself against bombers that Egypt had received from the Soviet Union. It was stressed that the weapon systems were defensive, and the Pentagon insisted on a thorough examination of Israeli security arrangements to prevent leaks of the system's secrets. The U.S. official position at the time was not to become a major arms supplier to the Middle East. Thus, when the U.S. was convinced in 1964 of the need to strengthen Israel with offensive weapons—tanks—it did so through a third country, West Germany. Three hundred used tanks were taken from an American unit deployed in Germany and given to the German government to deliver to Israel. The real turning point, however, took place in late 1965, when the PLO opened its terror campaign against Israel, and Arab countries, led by Syria, decided to embark on the diversion of the waters of the Jordan River. President Lyndon Johnson agreed to sell Israel fifty Skyhawk A-4 airplanes (they reached Israel only after the 1967 Six Day War).

Following the Six Day War, Johnson suspended all arms deals with the Middle East, hoping to elicit a reciprocal action from the USSR. When the Soviets refused, the

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suspension was lifted. What followed was one of the most important arms deals in U.S.-Israeli relations—the sale of F-4 Phantom jets. This deal, authorized by President Johnson on the verge of his retirement from office, enabled Israel to initiate the deep strategic bombing of Egypt during the 1970 War of Attrition. However, it became clear that the Pentagon wished to use the deal to impose exceptionally harsh restrictions on Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's ambassador to the U.S., recalls that at first the Pentagon was plainly delaying the implementation of the deal. Later, Israel was asked to sign a document Rabin termed as "shameful," demanding that Israel agree to American supervision of and presence in each and every installation of Israel's military and aircraft industries, as well as in any other installation engaged in research or the manufacturing of defense related items, including civilian research facilities such as the Weizman Institute and the universities. Needless to say, Israel rejected these demands at the outset and eventually received the Phantoms unconditionally.

STRATEGIC COOPERATION between the two countries is a different story altogether. Until the mid-1970s, military cooperation between the U.S. and Israel was focused on tactical, technical, and military intelligence fields. The upgrading of that cooperation to what Israel termed a "strategic dialogue" took place during the terms of Shimon Peres as Israel's minister of defense and Donald Rumsfeld as U.S. secretary of defense. Peres persuaded Rumsfeld that in addition to routine consultations the two sides ought to create teams which would meet regularly to discuss various strategic issues. These contacts continued regularly throughout Carter's presidency, even after the Likud party took office in 1977.

In Israel, and especially in the U.S., this increasing closeness raised questions. Israel was satisfied with the strategic dialogue, but questions were raised about Israel's ultimate goal. The debate over whether Israel should strive to sign a defense pact with the U.S. was revived. As always, Yitzhak Rabin vigorously opposed this notion, maintaining that Israel should be satisfied with the existing military relationship between the two countries, since it already provided a defensive umbrella against possible Soviet aggression. A military alliance would limit Israel's political and military independence and compel it to agree to position American officers in sensitive areas in its defense establishment.

In the U.S., the opposition to the broadening of strategic ties was concentrated in the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was not enthusiastic about the strategic dialogue with Israel and issued instructions to slow down the process. He feared that closer military ties with Israel could harm American strategic interests in the Arab world, especially in Saudi Arabia. In May 1980 Brown was ready to freeze the strategic dialogue completely following Begin's revelations concerning Israel's previous contacts with King Hussein of Jordan. Brown was afraid that Begin would expose the details of Israel's strategic dialogue with the U.S. A routine meeting between U.S. and Israeli representatives scheduled for that month was cancelled. A debate ensued in the Pentagon concerning how to continue the strategic dialogue. The dialogue was renewed eventually and was even broadened during the Brown years at the defense department due to external reasons, especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion convinced Brown that strategic ties with Israel and any other country willing to side with the U.S. in the region should be strengthened.

From his first day as Israel's prime minister, Menachem Begin exerted pressure on the U.S. to transform the strategic dialogue into a formal agreement. The strategic cooperation agreement, signed in 1981, was not even brought up for discussion in the Cabinet. It produced bitter opposition among many Knesset members, especially because of its pronounced anti-Soviet tone. It became evident that the two sides differed in their

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interpretation of the agreement. The U.S. emphasized cooperation as an instrument for containing the Soviet threat in the Middle East. Although Begin and Ariel Sharon were more willing than other Israeli politicians—before or after—to espouse this anti-Soviet theme, it was clear that Israel's prime goal in signing the agreement was to achieve stronger deterrence vis-à-vis the Arabs. There were those in the Begin-Sharon cabinet who also assumed that the agreement would provide Israel with a cover under which it would have greater freedom of regional maneuver. Those in the U.S. who expected the agreement to provide the U.S. with greater leverage over Israel were soon disabused. After the signing of the agreement Begin's penchant for surprising Washington with unexpected moves did not change. In May 1981, before the signing, he had surprised the U.S. with the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Immediately after the signing, in December 1981, he followed by annexing the Golan Heights. Later, in June 1982, came the greater surprise of the expansion of the war in Lebanon to Beirut. The U.S. reaction to the annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981 was cautious. Begin, however, responded with irritation and anger, accusing the U.S. of treating Israel as a "vassal state." The strategic agreement was suspended. It was renewed in the last months of 1983 when Shamir and Moshe Arens succeeded Begin and Sharon as the prime minister and defense minister respectively.

It seemed as if those who were most relieved when the agreement was suspended were the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs. They wanted a low profile for the agreement from the beginning; Secretary Weinberger insisted that the agreement's signing ceremony take place almost secretly, outside the Pentagon. The main argument against the agreement was that extensive U.S.-Israeli military cooperation would jeopardize U.S. strategic interests in moderate Arab countries. Those who voiced this criticism stressed the need to emphasize the anti-Soviet component in the agreement. Others opposing the agreement stressed the risk of the agreement being used by an extremist government in Israel to drag the U.S. into a military confrontation with an Arab country. One scenario stressed the possibility of an Israeli-Syrian confrontation, in which Syria would in all probability receive aid from various Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. Israel, relying on the strategic agreement, would then ask for American assistance to meet a threat from a Soviet client and the U.S. would thus find itself in a conflict with the Saudis. The argument that Israel may serve as a base from which American assistance could be extended to moderate Arab countries exposed to a Soviet direct or indirect threat, or experiencing internal upheaval, was rejected at the outset. Those who opposed the agreement said that the last thing the U.S. should do is assist Arab countries from bases in Israel. As these arguments make clear, the renewal of the strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. under Shamir and Arens was not greeted with great enthusiasm in the Pentagon. The White House had to issue a special instruction to the Pentagon to speed up the strategic cooperation.

Another source of objection from the Pentagon, and a recurrent bone of contention between Israel, the White House and the State Department, is that such an agreement would complicate even further the U.S. supply of arms to moderate Arab countries. Israel's stance on this issue is quite adamant. In principle, Israel cannot agree that sophisticated weapon systems be supplied to Arab countries who are in a state of war with it. Israel contends that these modern weapon systems can accelerate the regional arms race, add to Israel's economic burden, and erode the balance of power between it and the Arab states. At the same time, the Pentagon expresses its concern that too close a cooperation with Israel will tend to increase the flow of secret and sensitive technologies to Israel. It is not the case that the Pentagon or the Joint Chiefs oppose *any* strategic cooperation with Israel. Rather, they do not want the

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cooperation to be so broad as to undermine good relations with moderate Arab states.

IT APPEARS that there are nuances of opinion among the different American services concerning the scope of strategic cooperation. The Navy is more supportive of such cooperation than other services because of its need to secure friendly Mediterranean ports for the Sixth Fleet. It is interesting to note that combined exercises with Arab armies are given much publicity, and that when such exercises are not made public the reason is usually the Arab country's reluctance. The opposite is the case when an Israeli-U.S. exercise takes place. These are often veiled in an exaggerated shroud of secrecy, and it is invariably the U.S. that insists that this be done. Those rare exercises that are publicized usually have to do with medical evacuation. Israel, too, has its reservations concerning publicity. For despite the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) strong support for cultivating strategic ties with the U.S., apprehensions exist. There is a reluctance to conduct combined exercises in every area because of the fear that sensitive tactical secrets may find their way to Arab armies which the U.S. trains and with which it holds joint exercises. Therefore, the IDF, and especially the Israeli Air Force, often hesitates before agreeing to a joint exercise. This sensitivity also exists with regard to American defense industries. Israel has found that certain weapon developments based on battle field experience made by Israel have been made available indirectly to Arab armies.

With all these reservations it is clear that in recent years strategic cooperation has reached heights Israel had not dared hope for. Progress, slow and quiet, is also steady and promising. It now seems certain to lead to the positioning of American equipment and oil reserves in Israel. American policy makers believe that the strategic cooperation agreement not only strengthens an ally, but also gives Washington a greater degree of influence—and surveillance—over Israel. In my opinion, the major Israeli achievement is the strengthening of its deterrence posture vis à vis its adversaries. The strategic cooperation with a superpower reinforces and lends new credibility to Israeli deterrence, which had suffered some erosion. Moreover, the experience of strategic cooperation with Israel has shown that the United States can benefit from it without harming its relations with Arab countries. Washington's ability to maintain good relations with both Israel and the Arab countries obviously increases its freedom of maneuver in the region. The Soviet Union does not enjoy such freedom, since it does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it is clear that full strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. is not possible as long as it is not regional in scope—a cooperation that would include several Arab countries in addition to Israel. This will only be possible when and if the regional peace process includes at least one other Arab country, such as Jordan.

The deepening of these strategic ties, together with the growth in aid, has created, perhaps inevitably, a sense of over-confidence in many Israelis, the belief that what exists between the two countries today can be taken for granted, and that Israel will always receive huge economic and military aid from the U.S. Even if Israel were to shun friendly advice from Washington and ignore U.S. interests, according to this belief, there would be no American reaction. This indicates a considerable lack of sensitivity, absent in the past, toward the relationship between the two countries. There are some extremist groups in Israel who believe that the U.S. cannot afford to desert Israel, regardless of what the latter does. These groups include the Jewish settlers in the West Bank, some of whom are motivated by religious beliefs, others by a belief in the importance of the West Bank to Israel's security. Other right wing groups, such as the Greater Israel Movement, the Tehia ("Revival") party, and segments of the Likud bloc at times give expression to the belief that Israel is in the

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vanguard of Western civilization, now led by the United States within which decadent and effete forces are gaining influence. Some of these groups emphasize the notion that Israel is an important component in the global anti-Communist struggle. Many in these groups thus propound the view that Israel knows better than Americans themselves what is in U.S. interests, and that Israel should act resolutely since there are defeatist attitudes not only in Israel but also in the United States. U.S. punitive measures against Israel, these people believe, would always be symbolic, and everything would quickly return to normal.

Some of these elements were to be found in the spy case involving Jonathan Pollard and his wife. This sorry affair could not be defined as an accident resulting from poor supervision of the intelligence services by the political echelon. It was proof that among Israeli leaders, and more specifically in the bureaucracy, there are those who take U.S.-Israeli relations for granted, or as something that needs no nurturing and care since it was achieved almost effortlessly.

It is true that even among very friendly countries there is independent collection of information. However, the rules of the game in those instances differ greatly from routine espionage. In the Pollard scandal, Israel broke all these rules—it does not matter if the initiative was Pollard's own—when it operated a paid spy to gather information in a most sensitive area of U.S. intelligence. This affair was harshly criticized in Israel, as well as by American Jewry. But some elements in the Israeli right busied themselves with the question why Israel was willing to hand American investigators information that helped to convict Pollard even before he confessed.

The two inquiry commissions set up in Israel to investigate the Pollard affair had the full cooperation of all levels of government, although at the political level there was considerable unhappiness concerning the decision to establish the commissions, especially the parliamentary one. Only a portion of the commissions' findings were published, and the Knesset Committee on Intelligence was dissuaded from preparing a final report following harsh attacks on it and its chairman, Abba Eban. These attacks resulted in a confrontation between Labor and Likud members of the committee. It is unreasonable to expect Israel to make these findings public. A country does not commit suicide and sacrifice its intelligence services, even if those services committed an egregious error. Israel would undoubtably prefer to forget this painful incident, but it is likely to remain as a scar on the relationship, especially as many loose ends remain. Intelligence cooperation continues, but everyone remembers the case, even if it goes unmentioned.

There were those who also saw the debate over the development of the Lavi fighter as an example of Israel's lack of consideration for the U.S. position, especially as the latter financed the fighter's development. Perhaps some in the Israeli government regarded the American financing as "easy money," received with little effort on Israel's part. Such a negative attitude was not shared by all, however, as evidenced this September by the decision of the Israeli government, passed by one vote, to shelve the project. At the same time, it is important to note that American pressure was not the major factor in the decision to terminate the Lavi project. The main reason was the position taken by top military officers and economists. The fact that the IDF expressed its reluctance to continue with the project and voiced its preference for other priorities, contending that the Lavi would weaken the military, was much more a factor in the decision than American advice.

So also was the position of the treasury minister and leading economists that the continuation of the project would endanger a hard won economic stability. Israel, they claimed, could not finance the project and a high quality IDF at the same time. Those who demanded that the project be continued, among them most of the Likud ministers, contended that abandoning the project would

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amount to capitulation to foreign pressure, and that the project's continuation would not entail a halt to U.S. financing. The decision finally taken was painful. It was not only a blow to prestige that might be interpreted as a sign of weakness but also a severe setback to Israeli aircraft industries, one of the largest defense industries in Israel. The brain drain that will ensue may affect Israel's technological level. There is also the fear that Washington may not keep its promise to help Israel once the project is shelved. The fears notwithstanding, no one suggested that Israel should use its own resources to finance even a part of the project. Those proponents of the project's continuation stressed that funds for development came from the U.S. anyway, and that Israel did not really invest her own resources in it. They viewed the killing of the Lavi as a tragedy, but they did not advocate raising the money for its continuation from Israeli citizens. The controversy focused on how to allocate U.S. aid funds.

THE TERMINATION of the Lavi project will cost Israel millions of dollars in compensation to American companies with whom the Israel Aircraft Industries signed contracts, and to thousands of engineers and laborers laid off as a result of the decisions. In the next two years, therefore, Israel will not be able to enjoy the cancellation of the Lavi project, since most of these funds will be absorbed by these compensations. Israeli requests for additional military assistance will concentrate on reducing the development costs of those weapons systems, such as the F-16, that Israel will buy in the U.S. to replace the Lavi. Israel now hopes to benefit from reduced charges similar to those enjoyed, for example, by Greece as a member of NATO. Israel also hopes to be permitted to compete with European companies on the provision of goods and services to the U.S. forces in Europe. Several American promises in the matter have not been realized. When and if they are, it will be of great help to Israel and its defense industry.

Another serious source of tension in the relationship has been the part played by Israel in the Iran–*contra* affair. Israel's involvement in trading arms for hostages in Iran should not be viewed as an act directed against U.S. interests. On the contrary. The sense of regret about the affair prevalent in the U.S. is not shared by Israel. The Israeli government still believes it was the right thing to do. This is Israel's strategic concept and it survives intact to this day. The Israeli advice to the U.S. to try to free the hostages through the sale of arms was never meant to trick America. Israel really believed that it was in the best interests of both the United States and Israel. Israel believed that it was a mistake for the U.S. not to have relations with both sides fighting in the Persian Gulf, as the Russians do. As for Israel's part in diverting funds from the arms sales to the *contras*, the Israeli government insists that it was not an accessory to such plans, and that its representatives never took part in misleading Congress. This position has been elaborated in a detailed report Israel submitted to Washington, a report Jerusalem insisted be kept secret so it could not serve as an instrument in the American domestic debate.

It should be noted that as early as 1980 Israel toyed with the idea of exchanging arms with Iran for hostages. It brought the idea to the attention of members of Congress, but negative administration reaction put an end to the matter. Several years later the idea found support in the National Security Council. Israel wanted to be an active partner in a strategic cooperation process that could evolve from U.S.-Iranian contacts, but Israel also hoped to gain indirect American approval for its arms deals with Iran. Although Israel meticulously avoided sales of weapons or equipment containing American components, it is obvious now that arms sales to Iran, however indirect, constituted a considerable portion of Israel's arms exports. Ariel Sharon, in an interview in the United States in May 1984, confirmed the sales, explaining that they were made in order to prevent an Iraqi victory in the Gulf war.

This policy encountered criticism from within Israel itself. As long as the policy was

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secret, the debate was held behind closed doors. There was hardly any opposition to it within the Israeli government. When the first reports on arms for hostages became common knowledge, public debate ensued with criticism coming largely from the media, experts and scholars on Iran and the Middle East, and wider academic circles. The argument that Israel must not neglect its ties with Iran, and that selling arms to that country provided Israel with the hope of influencing moderates in Tehran, evoked the response that it was a mistake to think that Israel could ever restore the old relationship which had existed in the Shah's time.

A second, strategic line of argument opposing the policy was even more weighty. It is true that Iraq has participated in past wars against Israel and was a leader among the Arab countries opposing the peace agreement with Egypt. Despite that, it was maintained, Israel should strive to achieve some form of understanding with Iraq. For a confrontation with fundamentalist Islam may prove to be a far greater danger to Israel in the long term. Assisting Iran would raise suspicion in Egypt and Jordan, while aiding Iraq might strengthen the Egypt-Jordan-Iraq axis. The choice between Iraq and Iran is for Israel a choice between two evils. From the purely strategic point of view it would have been preferable to cultivate contacts and relations with Iraq, which is positioned at Syria's back, to make it a buffer between Iran and Syria—who shares a front with Israel. For Israel, this configuration is preferable to a united block. Criticism also pointed to the fact that while Israel allowed arms exports to Iran, Iranian revolutionary guards intensified their activities in Lebanon, training the Hezbollah (Party of God) faction to attack Israel's northern border.

THE IRAN-*CONTRA* affair has raised anew the question of whether Israel and the U.S. necessarily share common interests regarding every single issue in the Middle East. The answer, of course, is no. There exists true and deep friendship between the two countries, a considerable degree of mutual understanding in various fields, strategic cooperation, and a common dedication to democratic values. But there is no necessary identity of views with regard to regional interests.

One example, mentioned earlier, is the selling of American arms to moderate Arab countries who are in a state of war with Israel. Another more recent one is the question of Israel's commercial and military links to South Africa. Israel's relations with South Africa have developed since the mid-1970s, after most African countries severed their diplomatic relations with Israel. Exports to South Africa increased and Israel was reported to have assisted Pretoria in developing various weapon systems. Israel imports mainly steel and coal from South Africa. Although Israeli exports to South Africa amount to a miniscule percent of Pretoria's foreign trade, for Israel it has economic significance. Congress's decision to condition U.S. aid to foreign countries on their giving up military ties with South Africa put Israel in a difficult situation. Severing these ties would mean damaging many industries, especially defense related ones, and forcing them to lay off many workers (in addition to those who will be let go as a result of the Lavi project's cancellation). On the one hand, there is a deep sentiment that a Jewish state cannot support, however indirectly, a racist apartheid state. On the other hand, there is a powerful group of ministers in the government—prominent among whom are former defense ministers Sharon, Weizman, and Arens, and the current minister, Rabin—who oppose sanctions against South Africa. They agree that Israel should refrain from signing new defense related contracts and should abstain from engaging in conspicuous cultural, sport, and economic exchanges; but they oppose the breaking of signed contracts, including multi-year agreements. Such a policy may lead to confrontation with the U.S. Congress and administration, as well as evoke resentment among American Jews.

THERE ARE DIFFERENCES between the two countries concerning the peace process. These differences also

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exist with the Reagan Administration, which, like Israel, opposes the creation of a Palestinian state and rejects any negotiations with the PLO as long as it adheres to terror and refuses to recognize UN resolutions 242 and 338. Israel thus opposed the Reagan peace plan. The Likud bloc opposes not only an international peace conference, but has nothing to offer King Hussein in the event of negotiations with him. It supports what is termed "creeping annexation." Supporters of annexation are not unaware of the negative demographic implications annexation would produce for Israel. Some in that camp hold that a solution to the demographic problem may be attained through the voluntary transfer of the Arab population from the West Bank and Gaza to Arab countries, as has been suggested by the Deputy Minister of Defense Michael Dekel. It should be stressed, however, that this extreme idea, which is in agreement with Rabbi Kahane's views, was criticized within the Likud bloc.

The second major political party, Labor, supports an international conference, at times more enthusiastically than Washington does. Its weakness lies in the fact that it cannot realize its plan in the current government structure. Labor's plan to break the national unity coalition and force early elections failed due to tactical political mistakes and the fact that the Likud can offer the small religious parties greater political benefits than Labor. As a result there appears to be a growing American realization that the Likud and its views cannot be ignored in the peace process, that somehow it has to associate them with the planning of the political moves that would lead to a peace arrangement with Jordan. There is therefore a need to seek support for such a plan among the more pragmatic leaders of the Likud, even while recognizing that their support would be limited by the internal consensus in the Likud that territorial compromise in the West Bank is out of the question.

There is a measure of bitterness towards the U.S. in the Labor Party. Had the U.S. been more energetically involved in promoting peace negotiations, some Labor leaders argue, it would have been possible to begin talks with Jordan, and generate greater political and public support for Shimon Peres and his plan. For the first time one hears voices within Labor claiming that Gorbachev shows more initiative in the Middle East, and that the Soviet Union cannot be ignored in the peace process, and that Israel ought to seek direct contacts with the Soviet Union.

During the Reagan Administration's term and Israel's unity government, no sharp changes in the bilateral relationship should be expected. Evaluating the nature of relations following the 1988 elections in both countries is contingent upon who will occupy the White House and which party in Israel will succeed in forming the next coalition. Until then, and presumably thereafter, the tight cooperation between the two countries will continue and Israel will continue to be America's most reliable regional ally. Increasingly though, Israel's dependence on the U.S. will grow. This increasing dependence may have negative ramifications for both countries. This dependency itself is a result of secular developments, some having to do with Israel's economic situation, others with the regional arms race which itself is encouraged by Washington through the sale of arms to Arab countries. Clearly, Israel's over-reliance on U.S. aid creates fertile ground for misunderstandings and frustrations when opinions and policies differ. Considering U.S. economic problems it would be an achievement to maintain the current level of aid.

Against this background, it is important for the two countries frankly to clarify where their interests are identical, where their interests are merely close, and where they conflict. For many years now the leadership of both countries have lacked the courage to discuss these issues thoroughly. The more Israel's dependence on the U.S. increases, the more important this clarification becomes, even if we assume that Israel's contribution to U.S. strategy in the Middle East is substantial.

There are those in Israel and the United States who maintain that it is better to leave

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certain things unclear and thus avoid unnecessary commitments. From the strategic point of view, however, it is better to clarify the issues so that the two countries know exactly what risks both have to face within the special relationship they have developed. The risks are mostly borne by the smaller partner, Israel, but not by it alone. The United States finances the partnership and benefits from it. It is thus assumed that it dictates the direction of the relationship between the two countries and influences Israel's position and conduct. In actuality this is not always the case. Especially but not only in the case of Israel, we have witnessed the ability of the smaller partner to push the bigger to engage in policies the latter did not want to engage in, and to adopt positions contrary to its basic policies.

The most vivid example of this is the creeping Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the continuing settling of these territories by Jews. Although Washington opposes this annexation, it is clear that the U.S. finds itself supporting Israel on this issue. It does so, if not directly, then indirectly, through support in the security council or through economic and military assistance that finds its way, indirectly, to the territories, by forcing Israeli funds for investment there. Here is an example of the bigger partner being forced to adopt policies which it would not otherwise choose; and this even while it is clear to it—and to many Israelis—that no good will come out of this annexation. What are likely to result are riots, civil war, a major new war, or Israel's loss of its democratic character.

THE RISKS TO ISRAEL stem mostly from the increasing and exaggerated economic and political dependence on the United States. This dependence grows parallel to the increasing costs of the new weapon systems. Israel indirectly saves the United States much expenditure in the Middle East; it is clear, however, that Israel cannot alone finance its defense requirements while facing a coalition of Arab countries who receive at least partial subsidy from the Soviet Union, or who use their oil revenues for the purchasing of sophisticated weapons systems in the west. This growing Israeli dependence is likely to cause stress and misunderstanding just as it is likely to prove tempting for the exertion of pressure on Israel in the event of disagreement between it and Washington.

There are thus some a priori obstacles in the present state of affairs for a strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel. Despite the close relations between the two countries this cooperation cannot be full until the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be broadened.

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This is the second in a series of articles examining the Western Alliance, the assumptions on which it has been based, and the changes it is likely to face. The first article, "France: Preparing for European Leadership," by Robert Rudney, appeared in Issue 9, Fall 1987.

II. NATO: Time to Call It a Day?

Colin S. Gray

IT IS FAIR to say that NATO is living on borrowed time. The material basis (or lack thereof) of its present strategy reflects a very different era of assumptions about the military balance. The theories of deterrence that undergird flexible response and controlled escalation resolved the dilemma the United States came to face in the early 1960s, namely, the assumption of risks to its survival on behalf of merely vital, as opposed to existential, interests. But these theories did so by presuming, wrongly as it turns out, a permanent margin of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority. The failure to reform NATO's force structure means that the mismatch between plans and expectations, on the one hand, and prospective crisis or wartime reality, on the other, grows ever wider. If the Alliance does not manage a process of purposeful change, it is likely to find itself the victim of a process of rapid change that it neither endorsed, nor could easily survive.

It is a premise of what follows that containment of Soviet power is a geopolitical necessity for the United States. A Soviet Union no longer contained in a landlocked condition by severe balance-of-power distractions within Eurasia, would pose a very severe threat to U.S. interests in the wider world.[1] The Soviet Union is a distressingly acquisitive, if anachronistic, *imperial power*, by contemporary Western standards. Neither emerging conventional weapon technologies nor new strategic defensive devices will magically exorcise the Soviet military threat. There are no panaceas to the U.S.–Soviet problem—the Soviet Union will not evolve rapidly into an ordinary *status quo* power.

Geopolitically, containment is the correct guiding concept for U.S. national security policy. The concept of containment, and the ideas underpinning it, have not been overtaken by changes in weapon technologies or by the limited Soviet geostrategic success in establishing a handful of outposts in Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia, the Caribbean and Central

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America. However, containment as a policy, rather than as a concept, is in serious danger of being overtaken by political, economic and military change. What is at issue is the political viability under stress, and the plain military feasibility, of U.S. military strategy as an expression and implementation of containment.

Two concepts have been offered as an alternative to containment: devolution and fortress America. These two concepts of disengagement, presented and analyzed here, enjoy support on the Left and the Right of the American political spectrum. Either could become policy over the next several decades, by purposeful political design, or under the pressure of events.

Devolution

DEVOLUTION is intended strictly to describe a process of major restructuring of the terms of U.S. alliance ties. It is consistent with the basic concept of containment, but if pursued rigorously it could very easily amount, *de facto*, to a change in concept and a major shift among policy means. The central idea of devolution is that the United States would devolve upon its principal security partners many, and perhaps most, of the forward military power-balancing duties that are currently U.S. responsibility. It is important to identify the probable motives behind such a hypothetical shift in U.S. policy.

First, devolution would restore flexibility, or freedom of action, to U.S. foreign policy that long has been absent. Depending upon the variant of devolved posture, the United States would continue to be an ally of countries in Europe and Asia. But as in the case of Great Britain with respect to France in 1914 and again in the late 1930s, those allies would not be able to assume any automaticity of direct U.S. military involvement in their local defense.

Second, the United States would change the terms of alliance to a condition wherein its more or less full, and certainly immediate, military support could not be taken for granted. NATO-Europeans always have assumed that the United States has no practical security alternative to having its military frontier in Central Europe. Devolution would correct this (allegedly false) assumption. It would say, and mean, that U.S. support of a kind that carried very high risks to the American homeland would have to be *deserved* by local countries and would be considered as an option in Washington in light of global security factors.

Third, devolution would transform security dependents into true allies and security partners. Security dependency is a fundamentally unhealthy relationship which places undue burdens on all parties to the relationship.

Fourth, devolution would mark a U.S. determination to effect a more accurate match between risk and the calculated worth of foreign interests. The terms of the NATO Alliance, as interpreted over the years, require the United States to regard an attack upon any of its members as an attack upon the United States. This formula rests upon very shaky geopolitical grounds. NATO's strategy is a compromise among its geopolitically distinct members who define their survival and vital interests differently. As a result, NATO is incapable of designing and effecting a defense strategy which makes much operational sense.

Fifth, devolution would express an American determination no longer to subsidize the preferences of others. U.S. defense expenditure, strategy and force structure are affected very significantly by the military mission of containing Soviet military power in and around Europe. NATO-European countries are able to indulge in extravagant social welfare provisions because the United States has agreed to function as their security blanket. NATO-European countries have also chosen to strengthen their domestic economies by trading with Warsaw Pact states, a pattern creating a dual cost for the United States. The Pact states partially finance their anti-NATO military preparations from the benefits of their trading relations with Western Europe. The United States shoulders the lion's share of countering

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these preparations. NATO-European countries increasingly become political hostages to the domestic economic benefits that flow from these trading relations, thereby greatly complicating the U.S. task as alliance leader in proposing, coordinating, and effecting Western security policy.

A potentially very serious, even terminal, political problem in alliance relations lurks in the realm of "burden-sharing." The U.S. has chosen to live for more than three decades with the perception, accurate or not, that its European allies are persistent underachievers.[2] European politicians and officials probably believe that in company with death and taxes, American complaints about allies' defense contributions are a permanent feature of the human condition. To date, the results of American complaints and exhortations have been very modest. Declarations of good faith, promises to do better in the future, and, above all else, deft maneuvering by Atlanticists in Washington, have sufficed to keep U.S. irritation within manageable bounds.

American critics of NATO-European countries' defense efforts notice that apparent European under-achievement has practical implications for the quality of risks the United States runs in Europe. Those critics, however, rarely notice that free riding, if such it be, is the logical expression of a quite rational perspective upon security. European governments do not simply choose to "pass (some of) the buck" of security production to the United States in order to liberate national resources for more attractive purposes, such as domestic welfare. These governments believe that their national security is maximized by purposeful underinvestment in regional defense. The combination of European underinvestment and dependence on the U.S. makes Soviet leaders confront a NATO that lacks a plausible regional defense capability, except the essential abilities to deny options for *coups de mains*, but has the ability to compel an invader to wage war on a very large scale.

Finally, devolution would require that the U.S.'s NATO allies take what many American, and some European, commentators view as a more mature and responsible view of their own security needs. In the context of devolution, those allies who failed to make adequate provisions for their national security would know that they could not count on somebody else to step in to take up the slack. Free goods are rarely appreciated appropriately. NATO-European countries would be likely to place a correct value upon their security if they had to provide it and pay for it almost entirely themselves. Moreover, the help the United States would provide in time of dire need would also be assayed accurately in the new security context.

THE ARGUMENTS specified above contain a measure of truth. They reflect a generally dormant American attitude that few NATO-Europeans have elected to take very seriously to date. It may be argued that because contemporary variants of isolationist sentiment are likely one day to achieve political dominance in Washington, it is preferable that that event be anticipated, if it cannot totally be precluded, by means of a careful and deliberate restructuring of the terms of the Atlantic Alliance in the direction of greater local self-reliance. Such a restructuring could defuse American isolationist impulses and prevent a wholesale American withdrawal, conducted in such a way that no security arrangement worthy of the name would be available to help manage a transition.

But while these arguments for devolution are not without merit, they are still fatally flawed. First, the present structure and defensive arrangements of the Western Alliance work well enough in peacetime, although the quality of their likely performance in time of crisis and war should be improved. Second, there is no credible alternative structure for the security of the Eurasian Rimlands to an alliance led by the United States. Third, the United States cannot be a full-fledged member, let alone the leader, of the Western Alliance unless it is present militarily in the zones of Soviet pressure. Finally, it is a geopolitical fallacy to believe that the United States can enhance its security either by washing its hands of its

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current Eurasian security responsibilities, or by altering dramatically the military terms of many of those responsibilities.

Although devolution is not intended to be a near–synonym for the concept of an isolationist fortress America, in practice it would be likely to precipitate political circumstances in the United States and abroad that would lead inexorably to an isolated stance. In principle, however, devolution, or alliance restructuring, certainly is intellectually compatible with the proposition that the United States should be altering its strategy and military posture, but not its basic national security concept. If the idea of devolution were to guide U.S. policy, it would not mean that the United States had decided it was no longer concerned to contain Soviet power and influence. Rather, it would mean that the United States had decided that in the future containment would be effected differently. A wide variety of policy options could be accommodated by devolution.

For example, the United States could announce that it would withdraw all of its armed forces from current forward deployment in and around Eurasia on a set schedule. The schedule could be protracted over a five to ten year period. The United States would offer to remain politically allied, as at present, but it would regain freedom of action with respect to the level and nature of future military involvement in foreign conflict. In conception, this would be American Gaullism. As with France today, the United States would proclaim simultaneously its steadiness as a firm ally and its determination to control its own destiny and protect its own interests.

THIS MOST RIGOROUS variant of devolution would express a determination not to have a large fraction of the U.S. armed forces locked into an overseas garrison status, or tied to the need to sustain, reinforce, and, if need be, rescue garrisons in particular predetermined locations. In conception, at least, the United States would not be retreating; it would not be analogous to Constantine's legions leaving Britain to its fate in 407 A.D. America would rather be recognizing that the potential for regional self-help in general purpose forces can never be tapped appropriately so long as she continues to assume the burden of regional defense to the extent that she has in the post-war period. The U.S. armed forces would be organized, equipped, and trained so as to pose a more formidable global threat to Soviet power and influence. Those forces would emphasize maritime/air strength for amphibious flexibility, against the backcloth of a first-class strategic forces posture.

An all-too-obvious prerequisite for this form of devolution would have to be a U.S. determination to carry through its military redeployment design regardless of regional consequences.[3] Devolution would be a gamble that the allies would choose to accept the additional regional security responsibilities that the United States would be relinquishing. It would be the American hope that these duties would devolve upon regional powers, but the risk that the allies might decline to pick up the baton that the United States would be laying down would have to be recognized.

A second possibility would be a very substantial thinning out of U.S. forces deployed in and about Western Europe, Korea, and Japan, short of a total withdrawal. The U.S. force withdrawals would be sufficiently large (on the scale of a half or perhaps two-thirds) to make a noteworthy adverse difference—absent local compensation—in the strength of the allied order of battle. This second possibility, however, might produce the worst of all security worlds for the United States. Rather than responding by filling the preparedness gap left by the large U.S. force withdrawals, the forward-placed allies might prefer to believe that the residual American military deployment would be sufficiently large that the extant military strategy and tactics of the Alliance could still obtain, even with no European (or Japanese) gap-filling. NATO's defenses would be thinner, but that fact may not trouble Europeans who have never defined their security in relation to the putative ability of the Alliance actually to defend their territory. As we mentioned ear-

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lier, NATO-European governments have opted for a combination of regional weakness and dependence on the U.S. This combination, and its appeal to NATO-European governments, might not be jeopardized by the thinning out of U.S. forces.

West Germany would argue that its manpower pool for military service is shrinking and that it cannot provide additional standing forces (though it is certainly the case that it could greatly increase the effectiveness of its reserves). France, apart from being predictably unenthusiastic about any large-scale increase in the size and effectiveness of the *Bundeswehr*, would respond to partial U.S. devolution by reaffirming its current defense policy, particularly the nuclear theme in that policy. Britain could fill a part of the gap left by the devolving Americans, but only by reintroducing the draft and shifting resources from social welfare to security functions. In practice, it is very likely that Britain, far from assuming new continental burdens, would prefer to follow the American example and begin a process of continental disengagement. Rather than send additional forces to Germany, Britain probably would prefer to invest in the modernization of its national nuclear deterrent, in the revitalization of its grossly inadequate home air defenses, and in the strengthening of its navy.

THE ARGUMENTS presented above merely skirt the field of probable developments that would not meet with American favor. However, a potentially very important point has been omitted from the discussion so far. In contrast to a condition of total military withdrawal from Western Europe, a United States that retained as many as half its current military assets in that region would have those assets as a large bargaining chip for leverage over the allies. Furthermore, the fact that perhaps half of the U.S. garrison had been withdrawn, would demonstrate a determination to restructure the military arrangements of the Alliance that could not be matched by any number of speeches.

NATO-Europe has come very much to take the United States for granted as a net security guarantor. If the United States ever should decide to proceed down the path of measured devolution, it will be able to persuade the allies that they do need to assume additional regional duties only by actually withdrawing forces on a non-token scale. With half or so of its forces remaining, the United States could link the continued forward deployment of those forces to the actions taken, or not taken, by the European allies.

A third possibility would comprise U.S. retention of strictly token force elements in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. They would symbolize American commitment, and hence should have a deterrent value out of all proportion to their military significance. But they would be sufficiently small (some tactical air squadrons, an armored brigade or two, and a small permanent naval presence) to free the hands of U.S. defense planners to design a truly global strategy that would emphasize the American long suits of maritime and air power.

The potential benefits to the United States of devolution options cannot be doubted. Clearly, it would be very desirable for Americans if the local defense of Western Europe were to repose almost entirely in Western European hands. It would be in the U.S. interest for its military commitments to NATO-Europe to be so modest that a military defeat in that theater would not compromise fatally the ability of the United States to wage war effectively elsewhere, and so on. However, the United States cannot select a particular national security concept unless it believes that it could live tolerably well with its failure.

The dissolution of the Western Alliance would be a highly plausible consequence of total, or even substantial, U.S. force withdrawals from Western Europe and North-East Asia. Furthermore, the degree of local confidence in the strength of U.S. security commitments is a large barrier to nuclear proliferation. A NATO-Europe deprived of the support of a U.S. security commitment could evolve in three basic directions: "super-

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power Europe"; "*Europe des patries*"; or "accommodationist Europe," contracting what Walter Laqueur has termed the malady of "Hollanditis."

The evidence favoring the proposition that a "superpower Europe" is lurking in the wings waiting to be born once the United States removes the security blanket, is less than overwhelming. "Superpower Europe" is certainly feasible in terms of resources, but history suggests that Europe lacks the creative political assets and sense of essential common interests to reorganize in its own defense. The second direction, "*Europe des patries*," is security nonsense. The idea that a non-communist Europe comprising proud, well-armed (meaning *nuclear* armed) states, willing and able to resist Soviet intimidation on an individual basis, is sheer fantasy.

In addition, the nuclear armament of West Germany is problematic. Very few events plausibly might provoke a deliberate Soviet military lunge into West Germany, but a whole range of scenarios can be composed for such an eventuality should Bonn announce an intention to acquire truly national nuclear forces.

"Accommodationist Europe" is the most likely outcome of total or very substantial U.S. military withdrawal. The real action in the Soviet-American rivalry in Europe is taking place in the minds of Europeans. Faced with the realities of American military withdrawal, French material weakness and rigorous self-regard, German anxiety concerning its military vulnerability and dreams of reunification, and British weakness and insular yearnings, it is not too difficult to conclude that the policy preference of an average European would be *sauve qui peut*. There would be no principal guardian to organize and direct the Western end of the European security order.

Some, perhaps many, Americans will not be unduly disturbed by this analysis. They believe that should a U.S. troop withdrawal reveal a NATO-European willingness to accommodate the Soviet Union, then it is better that Americans discover this now rather than in the midst of some terrible military crisis. But Western Europe does not have sufficient political assets to organize itself as a unitary state or regional security pact with sufficient military muscle to withstand Soviet intimidation.

PROPONENTS of the variants of devolution have to consider the meaning for security of trends in contemporary European political culture. Overall, it is by no means obvious that the societies of Western Europe have the moral vitality necessary to sustain themselves in a condition of political independence *vis-à-vis* Soviet hegemonism.

The experience of a sustained prosperity in the wake of two devastating protracted wars, set against the backdrop of nuclear fears, may have so completely debellicized the welfare democracies of Western Europe that they no longer possess the cultural attributes necessary for self-defense. European countries adhere to NATO not because the function of NATO is preparation for war in the service of deterrence, order, and peace. Instead, the mere existence of NATO, and particularly the generally comforting security connection to the off-shore superpower, is itself viewed as a guarantee of peace.

The major immediate source of popular anxiety in Western Europe over its security condition is a local mirror image of the principal neoisolationist concern in the United States. A trans-Atlantic difference is that in some European countries alienation has attained the character of a mass movement, whereas in the United States alienation from the NATO enterprise is largely confined to a handful of intellectuals and policy commentators. The European peace movements express both the belief that Europe has a right to peace, and the perception that the current U.S. direction of Alliance security policies comprises a threat to the exercise of that right.

It is certainly true that nuclear defense questions have been the catalysts for popular protest in Western European countries. But

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one should not neglect the implications of the fact that some of the societies of the NATO allies have come to reject war as an instrument of policy, possibly even in the strictest conditions of self-defense. Prosperity and an understandable nuclear dread have completed the process of debellicization that was far advanced by the nightmares of 1914–18 and 1939–45. By this logic, war has become unacceptable and unthinkable for the complex, densely populated, and enormously vulnerable societies of Western Europe.

The visible trends concerning the capacity for sufficient collective action in self-defense on the part of Western Europe are not comforting. If it is true that NATO-Europe at the popular level is more disturbed by its perceptions of U.S. belligerence than by the course of Soviet imperialism, there have to be serious grounds for doubt concerning the European political ability to effect functional substitutes for the American legions that could be recalled.

For the near-term future at least, this author believes that the societies, and certainly the governments, of NATO-Europe prefer to live with what they discern as their American problem rather than to launch the bold venture of trying to live without that problem. Americans, secure in their political and strategic culture, and, one hopes, clear-eyed about the geopolitical realities of the global contest with the Soviet empire, understandably fail adequately to see themselves as others see them. American policy-makers should recognize the potential for damage of a politically significant, strongly negative strain in European attitudes towards the United States.

These attitudes are not really a rejection of distasteful and allegedly dangerous American policy traits, but rather a rejection of the distasteful and certainly dangerous enduring facts of international politics. By virtue of its power position in the international system the United States has been inoculated by responsibility against rejection of power politics in favor of fantasies of perpetual peace. Devolution, as a conceptual guide for national security policy, must meet one or two requirements. The first is that European, and perhaps Japanese, societies respond to a far more conditional, and certainly less locally visible, *Pax Americana* by meeting regional security challenges with suitable regional effort. No amount of careful historical research, however, can reveal beyond a reasonable doubt just how Western Europe and Japan would behave with respect to regional organization and provision for military security, in the face of a cumulatively dramatic shift in U.S. strategy along one or another of the devolutionary tracks identified here. If this first requirement is not met, then there has to be a persuasive theory explaining how vital American interests can be protected in the context of a security-defaulting Eurasian Rimland.

ANALYSIS of the concept of devolution suggests that it has some merit as a means for the United States to effect some desirable changes in its national military strategy, changes designed to secure a better fit between means and ends within the ambit of containment. But in some key respects devolution, or military withdrawal, is puzzling in the context of an intended continuation of containment. A United States liberated from very heavy garrison duties in the direct defense of Western Europe should indeed have regained much of its freedom of strategic action. But what would a United States so liberated wish to accomplish? Certainly, it would be better prepared to conduct an essentially maritime strategy, but where and to what purpose would U.S. military power be applied in the event of a military conflict in Europe? Would it be the U.S. intention to rush forces to Europe in the event of an acute crisis there? Is it the idea that a United States free, or substantially free, of European defense burdens would enjoy freedom of action to threaten the Soviet Union elsewhere? In which case where, and for what purpose?

There is a sensible case to be made for the United States to seek some substantial relief from those forward defense duties in

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Europe that could be assumed by continental European allies, and adopt a national military strategy more suitable for the prosecution of a genuinely global conflict. The benefits of a greater freedom to act strongly in regions aside from Central-Western Europe, however, would be purchased too dearly if the geostrategic advantages conferred upon the United States by the current security structure supporting non-Soviet controlled Eurasia were to be placed at very severe risk as a consequence. Devolution is sensible to the degree to which it points to the desirability of strategy adjustment and postural evolution, rather than to the merit in wholesale change.

In debating the future course of U.S. national security policy, one should not permit confusion to emerge between means and ends. To debate the desirability and feasibility of the United States devolving some of its forward defense duties upon regional allies is to debate policy instrumentalities. The ultimate purpose of the policy is not to seek relief from unwanted burdens, but to contain Soviet power and influence.

Fortress America

PROPONENTS OF strategic withdrawal from containment concerns to a fortress America have to address the question of how the vital interests of the United States should be defined in geographical terms. Would the U.S. defense perimeter be strictly the coastal defense of U.S. territory? Would fortress America embrace the "quartersphere" of the United States, Canada, Central America and the Caribbean? Or, would the United States view as its security domain the bicontinental hemisphere from the Drake Passage to the Arctic Ocean? An expansive definition of the domain of fortress America most likely would include Greenland, Iceland and the Azores, as well as the Marshall and Mariana Islands in the Western Pacific. The core of the idea of fortress America is plain enough, but operational questions concerning its prudent implementation in defense policy raise a host of practical difficulties. For example, in terms of U.S. military security, the current "barrier allies" of Eurasia—preeminently Norway, Britain, Turkey, and Japan—are vastly more important and worth supporting against Soviet hegemonic pressure than are the countries of South America below the equator.

The concept of fortress America, however, should not be dismissed too lightly as an archaic idea that has been overtaken by a new American maturity as well as by the alleged facts of global security interdependence. Its proponents contend that although the interests of the United States inevitably are impacted by shifts in the security structures of Eurasia, the United States cannot, should not, and fortunately need not attempt to afford to pay the price of global guardianship. They argue that U.S. forward military diplomacy around the Rimland of Eurasia has generated threat perception in the Soviet Union that belies the true, defensive character of U.S. foreign policy; has reduced vastly the local European and Asian incentives to construct and pay for security structures and policies well adapted to local needs; and, most important of all, has generated potentially fatal dangers to U.S. survival interests.[4]

The core features of the fortress America concept comprise these principles: First, the United States should protect the survival interests of the American people, if need be at the expense of vital and lesser interests. Second, the United States explicitly would eschew a global, indeed any extra-hemispheric, military guardianship role on behalf of international order. Third, the United States would have no alliance ties beyond the Hemisphere of a kind that carry, or might encourage, expectations that military assistance would be provided. Fourth, the United States would be moved by a determination to achieve the maximum feasible measure of freedom of international action (or inaction). Fifth, a critical corollary to the others, the United States would be determined not to play any security role, unilaterally or in

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bilateral and multilateral contexts, outside the Western Hemisphere that would be likely to generate or fuel political antagonism towards itself.

A United States seeking to practice the fortress America concept as policy need not foreswear all political or military interests in Eurasia. Indeed, given the values of the American people, the cultural and sentimental ties that many feel for the homelands of their forebears, and the facts of economic interdependence, such denial would be unrealistic. Fortress America need not resemble very closely an isolated, let alone an isolationist, America. The United States could remain militarily a very strong power and could state its willingness, indeed its determination, to defend its most important interests when and where those interests might be threatened. However, those interests would not include the territorial integrity of countries around the Rimland of Eurasia from Norway to South Korea, or the security of oil supply from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe and the Far East.

The term *fortress* America is probably as misleading as the term isolationism. A United States embarking upon this policy course need not evolve a siege economy, nor would the American people need to be mobilized and regimented after the fashion of a beleaguered garrison. Even in the event of Soviet domination of virtually the whole of the "World-Island" of Eurasia-Africa, in Mackinder's conception, the United States would be protected by vast oceanic distances from the newly expanded base of Soviet power. A very heavily nuclear-armed United States need have no fear of Soviet invasion.

It has been argued that an interventionist geopolitical logic spoke more to the constraints imposed by U.S. political culture and national ethos than to strategic realities, that the domestic debate in the United States in 1940–41 was constrained culturally to the all-or-nothing choice between global interventionism to "save" the Old World, or a very muscular defense of the New World (and its trans-Pacific holdings) after the Monroe Doctrine. Geostrategically, though not culturally, the United States could have considered very seriously the policy option of permitting the wars in Eurasia to run their courses. It is thus probably true to claim that in theory the United States had policy options intermediate between a hemispheric fortress America and a crusade of intervention to defeat the Axis powers in Eurasia. In practice, however, the intermediate options would have required the United States to behave imperially in a very un-American manner, moved by considerations of prudential strategic advantage (or disadvantage to be avoided).

The debate over isolation and intervention in 1940–41 is of some enduring significance in that it showed American democracy capable of contemplating seriously only two concepts for national security policy. There was a missing middle to the debate. American political culture today is not different in its essentials, and the same tendencies are evident. This means that strategically more rewarding options than the stark policy alternatives of global forward (and multilateral) containment and what would amount to fortress America may not find support in the reality of domestic political environment. Americans can understand and empathize with a mission of global resistance to Soviet hegemony, as they can the concept of the United States standing aside from the sullying disputes of unworthy foreigners. The idea of the United States intervening very selectively, on an as-needed basis, to protect strictly vital U.S. interests, simply would be to ask too much, or too little, of the American people.

AT ROOT, a United States opting for a national security concept of fortress America would be saying that henceforth it would accept the most dire of risks only on behalf of the most important of its national interests. In practice, though not in principle, a rigorous policy of forward security-duty devolution and fortress America could be close to indistinguishable. A pure application of fortress America would have no formal U.S. security connections whatso-

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ever in Eurasia. It could be argued that the security shock of U.S. military withdrawal would be softened were political alliance connections to remain in place. Such a diplomatic lifeline could affect negatively the determination likely to be shown locally to design and pay for a new security framework. According to this line of thought, the only security shock likely to be sufficient to trigger the creation of local defense communities plausibly capable of resisting Soviet intimidation would be local recognition that Europeans and Asians unambiguously were on their own.

Several major uncertainties pertain to fortress America: Would the former allies of the United States attempt to organize themselves in such a way that Soviet hegemony could be prevented? If the attempt were made to organize regionally for defense, would it be likely to succeed? Could the American people live with the distinct possibility that the unintended consequence of such a radical shift in their national security policy would be to donate the whole of Eurasia to Soviet imperialism?

How strong a case can be presented for the concept of fortress America?

THE ADOPTION OF a fortress America concept could not fairly be characterized as an American retreat, or as evidence of an American failure of will or nerve. On the contrary, adoption of a fortress America concept would constitute a return to the traditional and most genuinely American national security policy, the policy pursued from the time of George Washington until Franklin D. Roosevelt's third term of office. The most probable consequences of a fortress America policy would be consistent with the underlying U.S. foreign policy intention in the early years of the NATO Alliance. Adoption of the concept of fortress America would not be so much a rejection of the global guardian role of the past forty years, but rather long overdue action in recognition of the substantial success of that policy. People today tend to forget that the U.S. military commitment to, and in, Europe was not intended to be permanent. U.S. allies in Eurasia now have all the economic and political assets needed to evolve from a security adolescent to a security adult.

The forward security commitments of the United States in Europe and East Asia also have the quality of long familiarity about them. But is it really a very radical suggestion to propose that the United States should not deploy well in excess of 400,000 military personnel abroad *prospectively forever*? Do opponents of the several variants of fortress America propose that the American taxpayer should subsidize the national security of Western European countries and of Japan forever? What is the ethical, political, economic, or military basis for the proposition that wealthy Europeans and Japanese should not foot the full bill for their own defense?

The United States needs freedom of action in order to define and protect its own interests in the world. NATO-Europe perennially is distressed by the consequences of the fact that the United States is a power that has truly global security roles to play. For example, European officials have been very critical of what they discern as a "Pacific tilt" to U.S. grand strategy in the 1980's. The difficulty lies in the structure of the situation. On the one hand the United States is a global power which faces security problems close to its own border to the South, projects power across two oceans, and has inherited guardianship duties from Britain in South Asia and the Middle East. On the other hand, the European allies of the United States are regional powers who do not want the political stability achieved in Europe to be threatened by the consequences of tensions elsewhere in the world. It is a geopolitical fact, however, that alliance with the United States provides an unwanted connection with security problems in distant parts of the world. The burden of this argument is that NATO-European countries should be released to design and conduct the security policies for Europe that they believe best meet their local needs.

Proponents of fortress America need not

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profess indifference to the security of Europeans and Asians, though many undoubtedly would. They need say only that their concern stops short of a willingness to commit the United States, in advance, to go to war on behalf of other countries. Also, they could argue that Western Europe is more likely to design and sustain a lasting and effective regional security structure than is a NATO Alliance permanently riven with political tensions among its current, geopolitically unduly diverse, members. The opinion could be offered that the Germans, Frenchmen, Britons, Spaniards, Norwegians, and others, are not exactly natural candidates for appeasement roles on the evidence of their histories. Once the first shock of being cast adrift had worn off, these old, socially and ethnically homogeneous countries would realize that they had ample resources with which to thwart Soviet hegemonial ambitions.

Some Western Europeans may believe that although the United States has been both their last line of defense and even a notable contributor to their first line of defense, it also may well have been an important part of the European security problem. Some part of the Soviet motive for its ever-renewed political offensive against the coherence of NATO may have had less to do with any desire to dominate Western Europe for its own sake, than with the ambition to separate the United States from its European allies. While it is not in the nature of Soviet/Russian political culture to be a good neighbor, the Soviet Union may adopt a more relaxed defense posture towards a Western Europe that was no longer a Trojan horse for the real enemy across the Atlantic. Indeed, it is possible that the Soviet Union would ask of a Western Europe bereft of plausible American military support, only that it stand on the sidelines with respect to the Soviet-American competition.

The United States would like Western Europe and East Asia to continue to provide continental military distraction on a major scale for Soviet imperialism. Americans attracted to disengagement concepts should recognize that while it may be beyond the ambition and political strength of Western Europe to create a superpower quality of defense capability, some widespread functional analogue of Swiss, Yugoslav, and Swedish deterrence may well be entirely feasible. Provided its neutrality were not unduly benign towards the Soviet Union, a relatively militarily weak, though nuclear-armed, Western Europe that would not add its economic strength or its strategic geography to the Soviet imperium, would be distinctly tolerable for a fortress or otherwise thoroughly disengaged America.[5]

Finally, people of a fortress-America persuasion may argue that even should the pessimists be proved correct, in that the Rimland countries of Eurasia would fail to reorganize effectively to provide alternative security structures to a defunct NATO, the consequences need not be so terrible. It could be argued that the Soviet Union lacks the material strength to achieve hegemony over all of Eurasia. As they expand, empires acquire more and more of the seeds of their own destruction. While the Soviet Union could intimidate and even physically coerce any country or countries in Eurasia that it found to be unacceptably uncooperative, it could not possibly occupy Western Europe, and/or China, and so on, *and profit by the deed.* Even if the Soviet Union enjoyed substantially unchallenged strategic primacy throughout Eurasia, the value of that primacy as an asset would be far less than might be supposed in the correlation of forces with a United States strategically excluded from the "World-Island."

Policy Appraisal

THERE IS SOME abstract merit in the fortress America argument, but not enough to warrant very serious public interest. For six major reasons fortress America and its close affiliates should be rejected.

First, a U.S. withdrawal on the scale and of the quality under discussion here would constitute a geopolitical revolution in the structure of international security in favor of

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the Soviets. Although the Soviet Union defines the United States as its principal enemy, as it must on grounds of capability, Soviet strategy appears to have the proximate goal of expelling U.S. power and influence from the Rimland of Eurasia and, *ipso facto*, isolating the United States from potential sources of support. Devolution or fortress America, while it would pose the Soviet Union some difficult problems to solve, plainly would provide Soviet leaders with strategic opportunities of historic dimensions. The United States would be withdrawing voluntarily from many of the fields of greatest economic and strategic significance, and effectively would be inviting the Soviet Union to exploit the newly created imbalance of power in Eurasia to strengthen itself for the long-term struggle against a United States that chose to stand alone.

Second, it is not at all obvious that the United States would want to remain militarily isolated under all circumstances. Far from purchasing peace, and nuclear peace in particular, through disengagement, the United States instead would be encouraging an upheaval in Eurasian security structures of a kind that quite plausibly could lead to war. A responsible proponent of fortress America is unlikely to be totally indifferent to the prospect of *aprés moi le deluge*. Repeatedly in this century the United States has permitted events to teach that it does have interests in Europe and Asia worth fighting to protect. There is good reason for anxiety that a United States which disengaged, through a thoroughgoing devolution or through adoption of the fortress America concept, could trigger sequences of events in Eurasia which would greatly reduce deterrent effect in Soviet minds and hence would place vital U.S. interests at severe risk. Moreover, one can predict that the United States would still want to intervene militarily, if and when traditional friends and former allies were subject to aggression or even to severe political pressure. However, the United States would be intervening late, it would lack a regional logistics infrastructure, and it might confront a military task more of an offensive-liberation than of a defensive character.[6]

It should be recalled that there has not been a resolution of the German problem. The dilemma posed by Germany is that, united, it would be too powerful for the peace of mind of most of its neighbors and near-neighbors, while divided, it constitutes the major item of unresolved security business in Europe. The prospect of West Germany bereft of American, and probably British, military deployments or commitments, essentially let loose from the NATO framework to see to its own security, has potentially catastrophic implications for the peace of Europe.

Third, the geopolitical realities of Eurasian security are such that the security-producing potential of NATO-Europe is far less than is the sum of its several columns of national assets. This is not just a matter of will, let alone courage; it is a matter of history and particularly of the strong national particularisms that have matured over the centuries. NATO without the United States would have no leader, and there are no likely European candidates to play that role effectively. The degree of Franco-German reconciliation has been remarkable, but neither country could accept a clear leadership role for the other. Similarly, Britain would veto either French or German leadership, yet would lack the strength, not to mention the confidence and trust of others, to assert leadership itself.

Fourth, disengagement on one of the fortress-America models would not be viable as a policy theme in American political culture today. An American politician usually can secure a hearing for claims that Uncle Sam is being exploited by free-riding, overly self-regarding and ungrateful foreigners. Also, an American politician probably could attract a following for the proposition that the United States should declare peace with the outside world and retire to its well-defended island continent, or bi-continent *à la* James Monroe, to pursue virtuous American pursuits. Day by day in normal times these

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sentiments could well dominate policy consideration. But how well would these sentiments play if and when South Korea were overrun by North Korea? Or if Israel faced a military catastrophe? Or if Soviet forces intervened in West Germany?

INTERVENTIONISM in truly worthy causes and security guardianship overseas has taken sufficiently deep root in the U.S. world–view and in Americans' views of themselves, that firm and truly rigorous disengagement is simply not viable in U.S. domestic politics, at least once the consequences of that policy were brought home. The United States has been changed as a country by the events and trends of the twentieth century. Although an isolationist and certainly a unilateralist impulse remains, and should not be dismissed lightly by foreigners, in practice Americans would demand that their government *do something* were Soviet and North Korean tanks to celebrate the American departure from Rimland Eurasia in a traditional Soviet or North Korean manner.

Fifth, trite though it may sound, history does teach that predatory countries abhor a power vacuum. It is as certain as anything in politics can be that the Soviet Union would hasten to exploit the American withdrawal. There would be good reason for haste on the Soviet part. The U.S. policy action would be so foolish in geopolitical terms that Soviet leaders probably would anticipate a U.S. policy reversal following the next general election. Any proponent of any of the variants of fortress America whose position rests on the belief that the Soviet Union would behave in a more benign fashion towards its regional neighbors in the absence of local U.S. security complications, should be reminded of the enduring cultural and stylistic features of the Soviet imperial system. All that would change in the geopolitical structure of Soviet security policy as a consequence of American disengagement would be the absence of the only power capable of organizing effective collective resistance to Soviet ambitions around the periphery of Eurasia.

One is reminded of the security arguments that were advanced retrospectively in defense of appeasement of Hitler over Czechoslovakia in 1938. American disengagement would be a retreat from the dangers of war which are believed to lurk in foreign entanglements. The United States today, as with Britain in 1938–39, cannot achieve "real peace," because such a condition, requiring a general and possibly lasting settlement of political differences, is not possible with the character of adversary that we face in the Soviet Union. In 1938 Britain chose to buy peace, meaning a postponement of war, by abandoning a well armed friend. As the *Leitmotiv* for policy, fortress America would not achieve peace, because the United States affronts the Soviet Union by its very independent political existence. What it would achieve would be the deletion from the American column of a large number of wealthy and, in many cases, heavily armed allies. The pertinent question is whether or not these allies contribute more to American insecurity than security.

Sixth, in fact fortress America, devolution, disengagement, America First—whatever rhetorical preference is exercised—would be a policy rooted in fear and would constitute an historically unprecedented American defeat in geostrategic terms. If a fortress America concept truly were implemented as a policy on the terms advocated by its more logically rigorous proponents, it would amount to the United States granting the Soviet Union a free hand in Eurasia.

The central geostrategic point is that the United States is locked into a long-term, potentially deadly struggle with the Soviet Union, and it is not in the U.S. interest vastly to simplify Soviet security problems in Eurasia. Furthermore, it cannot be in the U.S. interest knowingly to risk creating an insecurity condition in Europe and East Asia, which virtually would invite the Soviet Union to press for unilateral advantage over the economically well-endowed former security clients of the United States.

Some readers may wonder why the family of disengagement concepts discussed here

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under the headings of devolution and fortress America have been analyzed in such detail, given the strength of judgment expressed in their disfavor. The reasons are that these concepts can be presented with a superficially acceptable face; they are enjoying a resurgence of public attention (if not widespread popularity) at the present time; they do have an enduring appeal to some deeply American cultural traits; and they are very dangerous. Fortress America merits serious discussion for much the same set of reasons that a study of U.S. security problems must focus more than passing attention upon the prospects for general nuclear war. The low probability of occurrence is more than counterbalanced by the prospective horrors of the hypothetical, if admittedly unlikely, event.

Notes

1. See Colin S. Gray, "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America," *The National Interest*, No. 4 (Summer 1986), pp. 24–36.
2. For a carefully reasoned and computed analysis challenging this perception, see Klaus Knorr, "Burden-Sharing in NATO: Aspects of U.S. Policy," *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 517–36. Knorr finds that: "With one exception (extended nuclear deterrence), any careful analysis will find it hard to conclude that the United States has been carrying, relative to national economic capacity, an inequitable share of the burdens that the major members of NATO (Class I and II) have assumed for purposes of military deterrence and defense vis-à-vis the USSR. Even a comparison limited to budgetary data cannot show inequity once allowance is made for the high cost of military manpower in the United States, and for the proportion of American forces earmarked for missions outside Europe and the Atlantic," p. 534. For the contrary view, see Melvyn Krauss, *How NATO Weakens the West* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
3. This is not strictly true, but if the United States resolved to experiment on a "try it and see" basis with military disengagement, the allies would be motivated strongly to ensure that the experiment failed.
4. A forceful discussion of the actual and potential costs of global containment policy is Robert W. Tucker, *The Purposes of American Power: An Essay on National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1981). Tucker has a discomforting knack of framing questions that threaten the jugular of orthodox thinking. For example: "Why should we persist in commitments whose sacrifice would not risk our physical survival but whose retention does?" p. 121.
5. This author is not persuaded that even a well-armed and neutral-intending, or neutralist, multinational Western Europe, would be able over the long run to avoid functional cooperation as an agent of Soviet *Weltpolitik*. The Soviet Union could not venture forth on the high seas in quest of a greater and greater measure of imperial security, leaving a powerful and potentially hostile Western European garrison in its rear. While a Western Europe independent of direct Soviet control must always have some considerable continental-distraction value, one should assume that the Soviet Union would strive to achieve the necessary degree of *contrôle*.
6. In 1914 Germany was encouraged by the absence of formal alliance ties between Britain and France to hope, if not quite believe, that the former would stand aside. In 1940 the absence of alliance ties between the United States and Britain, France, or the Netherlands, fed a belief in Tokyo that Japan might have a Southeast Asian option for expansion that would not require the conduct of war with the United States. Fortunately for Western civilization, Japan decided not to gamble on the possibility of U.S. neutrality in the event of an attack confined to British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia. The point is that while the existence of formal commitments can never guarantee a sufficiency of deterrence—witness Hitler's invasion of Poland—the absence of such commitments must function to breed hope in the minds of statesmen considering adventure, that one will choose to stand aside.

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Containment and the Logic of Strategy

by John Lewis Gaddis

ONE of the most difficult dilemmas in the making of strategy—as in the writing of history—is how to balance the need for precision against the temptation to simplify. The good strategist, like the good historian, will strive for a level of generalization sufficient to facilitate comprehension and to forestall intellectual stagnation without at the same time neglecting, or distorting, or trivializing the body of empirical evidence upon which it is based. But that is a very fine line to walk, as I have had occasion to find out recently.

Some years ago, in the course of attempting to sort out my own thinking about the history of containment as practiced by the United States since World War II, I suggested that there had been two distinct versions of it: a "symmetrical" approach, which involved countering adversary challenges in the same manner, at the same location, and at roughly the same time that they appeared, without either escalation or capitulation; and an "asymmetrical" approach, which involved choosing preferred means, locations and moments for resisting such probes, even though the result might run the risk of failure or of expanding the conflict beyond its original theater of action. I had advanced this thesis *only* as an interpretive framework for understanding a series of past events. I had not meant to express any particular preference for one approach over the other; I certainly had not meant to suggest that I regarded this scheme as constituting some deep and profound "strategic 'logic' transcending time and circumstance," to use an excessively grandiloquent formulation my own book had employed in a different context.[1]

It has come as a surprise, therefore, to find the book now characterized* as a single-minded defense of "asymmetrical" containment, reflecting not only a remarkable degree of woolly-mindedness about the Russians but, even more unsettling, the dangerous assumption that a relationship necessarily exists between "quality of strategic analysis" and "quality of policy outcome." What goes in, I have been reminded, has little bearing on what comes out. Naturally these criticisms have induced a long period of self-examination, reflection, and prayerful reconsideration on my part.

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*See Whittle Johnston, "The Containment of John Gaddis," *The National Interest* No. 6 (Winter 1986/7), pp. 85–94.

[1]John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York 1982), p. 308. The distinctions between "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" containment are perhaps most clearly set out on pp. 352–353.

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The effect has been to get me to thinking about whether there really is such a thing as a general "logic" or "science" of strategy that we can separate from the specific circumstances in which individual strategies are devised and put to use. Given the revival of interest in "grand strategy" that is taking place these days in both official and academic circles,[2] it seems important to try to resolve this question; otherwise we may all be wasting our time. Whether, if the answer turns out to be that strategic "logic" does exist, we will then be able to locate it along the banks of the Potomac is, of course, another matter.

MUCH of the confusion over whether strategic "logic" exists or not stems from the fact that we have never made the criteria for "success" in strategy—and particularly in "grand strategy"—very clear. The problem traditionally did not arise on the battlefield: one either won, lost, or produced a stalemate; strategies could then be evaluated in terms of those obvious results. But the realm of "grand strategy" is much wider than that: it requires the integration of military strategy with such non-military considerations as politics, economics, psychology, law, and morality, and it involves doing so over indeterminate periods of time. Specifying what constitutes success under those conditions is indeed no easy task.

One might, of course, take refuge in the famous legal ruling about pornography: "I'll know it when I see it." But that approach is not likely to get us very far. One might define success as "the correspondence of intentions with consequences," but that only raises further questions: Over what period of time, for example? Bismarck's efforts to make a unified Germany the pivot of European diplomacy certainly succeeded during his lifetime, but how well has that strategy worked out since? Within what limits? The United States failed to achieve its strategic objective in Southeast Asia—a viable, non-communist South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—but our overall influence in East Asia today is probably greater than at any time in the past four decades. By what means? "Victory" in World War I came at such great cost to both victors and the vanquished alike that it soon became difficult to distinguish between them; the same would very likely be true, today, of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Edward Luttwak has pointed out that "the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic of its own" which appears to confound what we would normally consider to be straightforwardly logical action, and to reward its opposite.[3] Consider the ancient maxim: "if you seek peace, prepare for war." Or its modern variant, the concept of deterrence, which accumulates armaments to ensure that they are never used. Or, to move to a recent and lower order of events, the unexpected demonstration that public support for questionable policies can be enhanced, at least temporarily, by candid admissions of lying, deception, and the shredding of documents, if delivered on television, in full uniform, and in a sufficiently "winning" manner.

What sense are we to make of a subject in which "up" seems to be "down," "right" seems to be "left," "forward" seems to be "backward," "failure" is "success" and vice versa? Does this not leave us more in the hands of George Orwell—or perhaps the Mad Hatter and the March Hare—than of Clausewitz?

Strategy is, of course, an indeterminate realm. Outcomes depend, not only upon the

[2] I have in mind here, in particular, the recent Congressional mandate for a presidential "state of strategy" report, and its initial result, the publication "National Security Strategy of the United States," released by the White House in January, 1987. For the resurgence of academic interest, see Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, 1986), and Stephen M. Walt's insightful review of it, "The Search for a Science of Strategy," *International Security*, XII (Summer 1987), pp. 140–165.

[3] Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass. 1987), pp. 4–5.

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quality of one's thought, or the efficiency of one's actions, but upon circumstances not wholly under one's control, most notably, the actions of adversaries and the role of the unforeseen. But what else is new? All one has established with such an observation is that strategy is not much different from life itself.

Problems of paradox, indeterminacy, and unpredictability do not relieve us of the obligation to learn from previous experience, if for no other reason than to avoid repeating past mistakes. They do not preclude the possibility of thinking critically about how to make intentions correspond with consequences in what is still admittedly an unpredictable world. The management of uncertainty, I would have thought, is precisely what "strategy" is all about.

To be sure, we are not apt to discover "laws" of strategy that work with the same precision as those in physics and chemistry, and it would be foolish to try to do so. No one can anticipate the precise course of future events; hence rigid and arbitrary principles for dealing with them are absurd. But, alternatively, to deny the possibility of strategic "logic" altogether is to insist that we start from scratch each time, feeling our way as we go. It ignores the fact that general guidelines can be useful, even if they fail to prescribe specific courses of action in specific situations. It is the geopolitical equivalent of self-induced amnesia.

What one is really talking about here is the distinction between theory and practice, and on this subject, as on so many others, there is no better guide than Clausewitz. "Theory exists," he wrote, "so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life."[4]

It is in that spirit, then, that I should like to advance some propositions about strategy in general, and about postwar American "grand strategy" in particular, that seem to me to hold up as distillations of past experience and that might—if kept in mind in the way Clausewitz suggested—increase the chances for strategic "success" in the future.

Risk versus Cost Minimization

BEFORE DOING SO, though, I should like to attempt a definition of "strategy," but in such a way as to avoid the unnecessary complexity that normally accompanies such exercises: strategy, as I understand it, is nothing more than "the calculated relation of ends and means." As noted earlier, simplicity can be dangerous, so several qualifications should accompany this definition. First, it is meant to be generic: it can apply to any situation in which you face the task of getting from where you are to where you want to go on the basis of the resources and the determination you have available, but in the face of resistance in some form. Second, it refers to ends and means in general, not exclusively to military ends and military means. It therefore encompasses—and indeed can hardly be separated from—the realms of politics, economics, psychology, law and morality mentioned above; those dimensions of strategy are every bit as important as its military components. Third, the inclusion of the adjective "calculated" is meant to imply a deliberate as opposed to an accidental, inadvertent or fortuitous connection between ends and means: luck may enhance or impede the attainment of strategic objectives, but it is not strategy itself.

What, then, is "grand strategy?" To my mind, it is simply the application of "strategy" as here defined, by states acting within the international state system, to secure their interests: it is what leads, if all goes well, to "statecraft." But of course things do not

[4]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton 1976), p. 141.

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always go well. This can stem from many causes, but one in particular recurs with such frequency as to make one wonder whether it is not an inherent structural dilemma: it is the difficulty, in strategy, of balancing the risks against the costs of securing vital interests.

Anyone who has ever tried to devise a strategy will recognize the problem: you will want to do everything possible to minimize the risk of defeat, or humiliation, or embarrassment; but you will also want to minimize the costs of doing so, lest you destroy what you are trying to defend in the process. Destruction, after all, can come *either* from the actions of adversaries or from what you do to yourself. These two priorities compete, because the things you do to minimize risks tend to drive up costs; but the things you do to minimize costs tend to drive up risks. That paradox, I think, brings us as close to a usable "logic" of strategy as we are apt to get.[5]

EXAMPLES from military history best illustrate this "risk versus cost" dilemma: Grant's strategy of attrition during the American Civil War emphasized not so much sophisticated generalship as a slow wearing down of the Confederacy, designed to ensure a Union victory no matter how much it cost or how long it took. The strategy minimized risk, but at great expense. So too did the strategies followed by the Germans, the British and the French in the trenches on the Western Front during most of World War I: there both sides locked themselves into repeated attempts to wear down each other across a broad front, with little regard for manpower or material costs and with no clear indication of how long it would take. Eisenhower's slow and steady "broad-front" advance into Germany in 1944–45 was also a "risk-minimizing" strategy, selected in preference to Patton's call for quick and deep *Blitzkrieg*-style attacks in an effort to force a rapid German surrender. Finally, Ridgway's strategy in Korea after MacArthur's relief in 1951, which involved holding the line against North Korean and Chinese Communist attacks until the latter simply wore themselves out, also sought to minimize risk, but without any assurance as to what the ultimate costs would be or how long one would be required to sustain them.

These "risk-minimizing" strategies had several things in common: they placed a premium on massive military presence as opposed to maneuver, thus implying less of a role for surprise, or for brilliant military leadership; they relied heavily on technology as a means of sustaining that military presence and wearing down the other side, but not for making dramatic breakthroughs; they operated under no particular deadlines by which objectives had to be met; and above all they assumed *unlimited resources* and *steady political support*, regardless of the costs incurred.

Examples of "cost-minimizing"—but therefore "risk-maximizing"—strategies would include the war of maneuver that Lee and Jackson conducted against the North, using skillful generalship to compensate for the Union's advantages in manpower and industrial strength, but running great risks in the process, as Gettysburg showed. Germany's pre-World War I Schlieffen Plan also illustrates the pattern: it had been intended to minimize costs by knocking France out of the war before Russia could mobilize, but it accepted the risk of bringing Great Britain in by violating Belgian neutrality. German *Blitzkrieg* operations in 1940–41 also qualify as "cost-minimizing" but "risk-maximizing" strategies: there the objective was to compensate for the adversary's probable long-term superiority in manpower and resources by achieving surprise and exploiting new techniques of land warfare. American "high technology/low manpower" strategies in World War II also sought to minimize costs: notably the original "arsenal of democracy" concept and its subsequent variation, Lend-Lease, which were designed to leave the bulk of actual fighting to allies; strategic bombing, also

[5]Does a "paradox" constitute a "logic"? A precise answer is best left to the semanticists, but it is worth pointing out that both the disciplines of "logic" and "science," as we normally understand them, are full of paradoxes. See also Luttwak on "paradoxical logic," cited above.

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seen as a way to avoid manpower commitments on the ground; and of course the development of the atomic bomb, the chief objective of which really was to save lives on both sides. Likewise MacArthur's Korean War strategy—which involved using American naval and air superiority to compensate for ground force inferiority, achieve surprise at Inchon, and make possible a *Blitzkrieg* advance into North Korea—minimized costs, but at risks that soon became painfully obvious.

What did these "cost-minimizing" strategies have in common? They sought to exploit the benefits of maneuver, of surprise, of imaginative military leadership; several of them relied heavily on technology to avoid prolonged stalemates or debilitating losses of manpower; most of them operated out of a sense of urgency to conclude the wars in question quickly; and above all else they assumed *limited resources* and *limited political support*, and so saw no alternative but to run risks.

This distinction between "cost-minimizing" and "risk-minimizing" strategies is hardly original with me. Clausewitz himself pointed out the costly nature of offensive strategies and the risky nature of defensive ones.[6] Liddell-Hart's advocacy of the "indirect approach" in strategy grew largely out of what he saw as its advantages in minimizing costs.[7] Russell Weigley's interpretation of the two traditions in American military strategy has become widely accepted.[8] And the distinction is implicit in recent work by Luttwak and John Mearsheimer as well.[9] But the "risk versus cost" dilemma does, I think, provide a hypothesis from the realm of military strategy that may apply as well to the realm of "grand strategy" or "statecraft"; certainly the proposition that when one minimizes costs one maximizes risks, and vice versa, provides an opportunity to test possibilities for the existence of strategic "logic" at that level.

Risks, Costs, and Containment

"GRAND STRATEGY," I argued earlier, encompasses more than what happens on battlefields. If there had ever been any doubt about that, the onset of the Cold War quickly resolved the matter, because its effect was to combine a perpetual state of insecurity requiring "strategic" thinking with unprecedented constraints on the actual use of military force. Americans responded by devising the various strategies of containment: primarily defensive approaches to the problem of international insecurity that have had obvious political, economic, and psychological as well as military dimensions. But while the realm of strategy had expanded to incorporate these non-military considerations, the classic dilemma of balancing risks against costs remained. Indeed, it became all the more central to determining the strategies actually chosen.

This, I believe, is where the debate between advocates of "symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" containment comes in: the "risk versus cost" dilemma provides a larger context within which those disagreements can be understood. Symmetrical containment, which seeks to counter challenges to the balance of power as they occur, in the locations where they have manifested themselves, and at the same level of activity as the original provocation, falls squarely within the tradition of "risk-minimizing" strategies in that it seeks to achieve its objectives without the danger either of escalation or capitulation, regardless of how long this takes or how much it costs. Asymmetrical containment, which seeks to counter such challenges at times and places and in ways we ourselves choose, falls in turn within the tradition of

[6]Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 381–383.

[7]B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (New York 1954).

[8]See Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York 1973); also Weigley's essay, "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War," in Paret, *op. cit.*, pp. 408–443.

[9]Luttwak, *Strategy*, especially pp. 99–106; John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca 1983).

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"cost-minimizing" strategies in that it is willing to risk expanding the conflict, or even having to withdraw altogether, in the interests of keeping down its costs and of terminating it within a reasonable period of time. One strategy expends resources in order to "play it safe"; the other takes chances to avoid expending resources.

THE FIRST of the postwar approaches to containment, that of George Kennan as implemented within the Truman administration between 1947 and 1950, was a "cost-minimizing" strategy because it proceeded from the assumption that the United States could never provide the manpower or military equipment necessary to safeguard all exposed interests against all perceived threats: pressures of demobilization, budgetary limitations, and the lingering influence of isolationism were thought to preclude anything like that. Instead Kennan's approach to containment sought to accomplish its objectives in an "asymmetrical" manner: by being selective about where vital interests lay in the first place; by being parsimonious in the identification of adversaries; and by being flexible about the means chosen with which to act, with preference given to those forms of competition where we could reasonably expect to prevail. This meant, in Kennan's mind, focusing containment primarily upon the defense of Western Europe, Japan, and the lines of communication that connected them to the United States. The strategy relied heavily upon inducing self-confidence through economic rehabilitation; it also sought to exploit adversary vulnerabilities, notably the unlikelihood that the Soviet Union could continue to dominate the international communist movement, together with the probability that, in time, internal changes would moderate its own external behavior as well.

But minimizing costs meant maximizing risks, or at least appearing to. Kennan's strategy provided no mechanisms with which to counter a Soviet military attack on Western Europe or Japan, should the Russians have chosen to launch one; NATO, which came into existence in 1949, originated as an initiative taken by nervous Europeans, and was embraced by the Truman administration over Kennan's strong objections. Kennan also argued against any permanent American military presence in Japan. Nor did Kennan's strategy provide safeguards against the possibility that successive losses of peripheral areas to Soviet control might cause psychological demoralization in more vital ones; this was why Kennan himself, in apparent defiance of his own strategy, supported American military assistance to Greece in 1947 and to South Korea in 1950. There was little short-term reassurance in his argument that the "loss" of China to communism in 1949 constituted no long-term "gain" for the Russians; no one could say how long Sino-Soviet differences might take to develop. Nor did his insistence that the Russians would eventually change their morbidly-suspicious approach to the outside world seem very persuasive while Stalin was still alive.

In the end, Kennan proved to be right on every one of these points: the Russians did not launch a direct military attack; the Chinese did split with them; Stalin died, was buried, and quickly repudiated; the Soviet Union in time became a very different place from what it was under his rule. But there could be no guarantee at the time that any of this would happen. Kennan's strategy appeared to its critics to be running dangerous risks with the nation's security in a misguided effort to keep down costs.

NSC-68, conversely, can be seen as a "risk-minimizing" strategy, because it proceeded from the assumption that the United States had the resources to defend its interests wherever they existed; hence there was no need to run the risks involved in differentiating those that were vital from those that were not. Paul Nitze and the other authors of NSC-68 sought to minimize risks: by increasing American and allied military capabilities across the board, both in nuclear

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and conventional weapons; by making it clear that wherever threats to the international balance of power manifested themselves, the United States would respond; by calibrating response to offense, so that the act of countering such threats would not create new risks either by spreading the conflict or by allowing aggression to succeed; and by insisting that the non-military instruments of containment—particularly economic assistance and the search for a diplomatic resolution of outstanding issues—would come into play only after what Dean Acheson called "situations of strength" had been created.

But if this "symmetrical" approach to containment minimized risks, it also, as one might have expected, increased costs. The determination to respond wherever aggression took place but not to go beyond the level of provocation encountered placed the United States at the mercy of its adversaries in determining how and under what circumstances it would expend its resources; loss of initiative is always a costly business. As growing public frustration with the Korean War showed, the prospect of indefinitely high expenditures of men and material was costly in domestic political support as well: the administration was unable to say how long such expenditures would be necessary, or when a favorable resolution of difficulties with the Russians might be expected. Finally, the strategy of placing diplomacy on the back shelf until "situations of strength" had been created precluded taking advantage of non-military opportunities to resolve outstanding issues. The most important of these, many historians now agree, was the intriguing offer the Russians made in March, 1952, that might—one cannot say for certain because Washington refused to explore the proposal—have allowed free elections throughout Germany and the formation of a unified but neutral German state.

The architects of NSC-68, in short, played it safe. But in the process they relinquished the initiative to the other side, saddled the nation with expenses it was not prepared to sustain, narrowed the range of instruments available with which to deal with the Russians, and in the process neglected what may have been opportunities to lower Cold War tensions.

SUBSEQUENT approaches to containment have reflected either these "cost-minimizing" or "risk-minimizing" approaches. The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look" strategy fell into the first category, as was clearly acknowledged at the time. Its basic premise was that although the United States had vital interests throughout the world, it possessed only limited resources with which to defend those interests, and hence had to regain control over how and where it did so even if this entailed increasing risks. An explicit willingness to run risks became the hallmark of the "New Look," with its conspicuous reliance on the deterrent effect of nuclear threats, together with its relative de-emphasis on conventional military forces and a shift toward what would later become known as a doctrine of "sufficiency" in calculating the desired military balance with the Russians. Predictably, criticisms of the Eisenhower approach centered around its risk-taking: Was it responsible to inflate minor crises like Quemoy and Matsu into situations that might require the use of nuclear weapons? Was it prudent to respond to apparent Soviet breakthroughs in missile technology by holding the line on defense spending? Was not all of this carrying the cause of economy too far?

The Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, in its turn, responded to the perceived deficiencies of the Eisenhower approach with a renewed emphasis on minimizing risk, regardless of cost. Proceeding from NSC-68's original assumption that the United States had undifferentiated global interests but also unlimited capabilities for defending them, it reintroduced the idea of calibrating response to offense and thereby avoiding the twin dangers of escalation and humiliation. To sustain this strategy, it increased both nuclear and conventional military capabilities at a time when it perceived no comparable increases on the part of the Russians, while at the same time enthusiasti-

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cally building up the resources for unconventional warfare as well. Vietnam demonstrated the costs of this approach even more painfully than Korea. Once again loss of initiative and mounting casualties eroded domestic support for the war effort. The Russians quickly exploited Washington's resulting distraction by attaining, almost unnoticed and within a remarkably short period of time, approximate nuclear parity with the United States.

The Nixon-Kissinger "asymmetrical" strategy of "detente" shifted the emphasis back to taking risks in order to minimize costs. This was the central purpose of the Nixon Doctrine, which sought to impose at least part of the burden of containment on allies; the administration's participation in strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians, the opening to the People's Republic of China, the use of "linkage" to facilitate negotiations, and the effort to build great-power mechanisms for managing Third World crises all proceeded from a determination to lower the costs of containment, even if this meant taking risks. Again, though, some risks soon became apparent; the strategy failed to save Southeast Asia from communism, and as a consequence appeared to create new vulnerabilities in other Third World areas for the Russians to exploit. Negotiations on arms control produced as many problems as solutions, with the result that by the mid-1970s some of its former supporters had come to see it as a more dangerous process than a continued arms race. The technique of "linkage," upon which much of Kissinger's strategy depended, became ensnarled in domestic politics; and of course Nixon himself felt obliged, in defense of his foreign policy, to take certain risks with constitutional procedures at home that ultimately ensured the collapse of his presidency.

The Last Twelve Years

BECAUSE I viewed it chiefly as a framework for historical interpretation, I made no real effort in *Strategies of Containment* to carry the distinction between "symmetry" and "asymmetry" beyond the end of the Nixon and Ford administrations. But if the argument advanced here has any merit—that the "symmetrical/asymmetrical" distinction only reflects the larger problem of balancing risks against costs in strategy as a whole—then the analysis should hold for more recent events and may even give us some basis for anticipating the future. I will venture the unsurprising argument that it does.

First, with regard to the Carter administration: its actions appear to fit the "asymmetrical" or "cost-minimizing" model. Despite conspicuous superficial departures from the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy—the campaign for human rights, the attempt to stress "North-South" over "East-West" issues, the preference for openness rather than secrecy in conducting its affairs—the continuities linking Carter and his advisers to their predecessors appear, in retrospect, to have outweighed the differences. Like them, the Carter team believed that the United States was operating from a position of relative weakness that would not allow vastly increased expenditures for defense. The emphasis then, as it had been since 1969, would have to be on minimizing costs.

The Carter administration therefore continued earlier Nixon-Ford-Kissinger efforts to secure a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Russians, and indeed finally attained that goal with the unratified SALT II treaty of 1979. Nor did the Carter Administration modify Nixon's policy of *rapproachement* with the People's Republic of China, to which it extended formal diplomatic recognition that same year. In keeping with the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States under Carter remained cautious about intervening in Third World countries, even where favored clients—as in Iran and Nicaragua—were on the verge of collapse. And the administration continued to work for cooperation with the Russians in managing Third World crises.

But the risks that had been inherent in the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach became

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all the more striking under Carter. The Russians after 1975 appeared to have abandoned whatever interest they might have had in joint Third World crisis-management, opting instead for an opportunistic—and, as it turned out, profoundly short-sighted—effort to exploit perceived American weakness in the wake of the Vietnam defeat; Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, and of course Afghanistan can all be seen as part of that pattern. Arms control efforts continued to appear to produce Soviet military buildups rather than Soviet restraint. Revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran resulted in significant losses of American influence; and with the 444-day Tehran hostage crisis, events in the latter country brought about a humiliating American loss of face as well. Compounding all of these difficulties was one painfully clear departure from the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy: Carter's apparent inability to enforce consistency or coherence upon his quarreling subordinates.

THE REAGAN administration, I believe, will be seen in contrast as having pursued a "risk-minimizing" strategy that has maximized costs. Fundamental differences of viewpoint distinguished the current administration from its immediate predecessor when it came into office in 1981. The new President and his advisers rejected any assumption that one could expect cooperation from the Russians in limiting strategic arms, managing Third World crises, or anything else that might help cut the costs of containment; indeed, an excessive concern with costs, they asserted, had got the nation into the dangerous position of lacking sufficient military power to make itself respected, whether in Moscow or in the world at large. As had been the case with NSC-68 and the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, Reagan and his advisers assumed the nation's capacity to rearm without bankrupting itself: economic growth—this time in the form of "Reaganomics"—would provide the means.

The chief elements of the Reagan "risk-minimizing" strategy were: an impressive buildup in both nuclear and conventional warfare capabilities, with the greatest emphasis going to the 600-ship Navy;[10] an uncompromising position on strategic arms control that has made progress almost entirely dependent upon Soviet concessions; the Strategic Defense Initiative, a striking attempt to use the *prospect* of superior American technology either to induce such concessions or to weaken the more primitive Soviet economy by exhausting it in an arms race; the Reagan Doctrine, which seeks to counter Soviet Third World intervention wherever it takes place, but by aiding local resistance fighters rather than by sending in American troops; and, finally, negotiations with the Russians, but only from Acheson's favored "situations of strength," situations to be created by the combination of American rearmament, American technological prowess, and the weaknesses the Soviet Union creates for itself in attempting to sustain at home and to impose on others a defunct economic and political system.

How well has it worked? With regard to the Russians, remarkably well. Blatant Third World "adventurism" akin to what happened in the late 1970s has not recurred; and unlike some of its predecessors, the Reagan administration has so far succeeded in resisting more subtle forms of Soviet influence in such areas without costly direct military interventions and without relinquishing the initiative. The Russians took SDI far more seriously

[10]Critics have seen the Navy's current "maritime strategy"—which emphasizes the wartime capability to attack the Soviet fleet in its own home ports—as maximizing rather than minimizing risks, and that it would certainly do if literally implemented. The real question, which cannot be answered short of war or (preferably) the eventual declassification of war plans, is whether the strategy's functions are declaratory or real. Since governments do not normally publicize war plans, but since the Navy has chosen to give extensive publicity to this one, a chiefly declaratory function is not implausible.

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than anyone else did (excepting of course the President himself), with the consequence that chances for actual arms reductions now look better than at anytime in the past fifteen years; "negotiation" from apparent "strength," it seems, has produced results. And, most important, profound changes have taken place inside the Soviet Union itself since 1981. But whether these favorable developments have occurred because of, or in spite of, Reagan's strategy is difficult to say; his incumbency coincided with a long period of internal disarray and introspection from which the Soviet Union is only now emerging. How well his strategy will hold up against energetic, sophisticated and physiologically-functioning Kremlin leadership remains to be seen.

In terms of management, the Reagan strategy has been much less successful. Massive military budgets have yet to increase military effectiveness, as events in Beirut, Grenada, and the Persian Gulf have shown. Indeed, the very generosity of military appropriations since 1981 may well have induced lack of coordination, duplication of effort, and an unwillingness to assume responsibility for making tough decisions. Similar difficulties appear to have afflicted the Strategic Defense Initiative, where the assumption seems to be that if one throws enough money at the program and crosses one's fingers, it will all work, laws of physics, economics and mathematics notwithstanding. And, of course, the recent Iran–*contra* affair has demonstrated just how shallow—adolescent, even—the administration's management skills have been at the level of the National Security Council. It can only be chalked up to the remarkable luck of this President that these problems have not produced much more serious consequences than they have.

THE CURRENT administration's greatest failure, though, is what one would expect from the working of the "risk versus cost" dilemma: in its effort to minimize risks, the administration has neglected the problem of costs. It is worth making the point again that defeat in strategy can come in two ways: from what one's adversary does, to be sure, but also from what one does to oneself in the process of countering that adversary. Here there is serious reason for concern.

Consider, first, the problem of efficiency: what inducement is there, in an era of budgetary plenty, to use one's resources wisely? Why go through the unpleasant business of establishing priorities when one has the luxury of expandable means? Why close off ineffective or unworkable programs when appropriations for them continue to flow? Profligacy, after a certain point, can become the enemy of effectiveness, and stringency its ally.[11]

This leads, in turn, to the question of solvency. "Reaganomics" was supposed to be Keynesianism for conservatives: tax cuts were to stimulate economic activity, thus generating the means to sustain economic growth without increasing the deficit. But that did not happen: what has kept economic growth going—and, therefore, until recently, the military buildup—has been a cheerful toleration of budget deficits that have more than doubled the national debt in the course of a single administration.

Experts differ on the implications of this debt. As a percentage of total gross national product, it does not seem all that alarming. But when one considers the fact that the nation now owes more abroad than is owed to it, and that much of our economic future depends, as a result, on decisions that Americans will not be making, the question has to arise: has not our lack of concern about

[11]Although, as Lawrence Korb points out, the assumption of indefinitely-expandable means has become so deeply engrained in the Pentagon that Congressionally-mandated reductions in appropriations over the last several years have yet to force any fundamental reconsideration of strategy. See "Spending Without Strategy: The FY 1988 Annual Defense Department Report," *International Security*, 12 (Summer 1987), pp. 166–174.

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solvency compromised our sovereignty? Have we not, in our effort to remain a superpower, neglected one of the chief determinants of superpower status, which is self-reliance?[12]

This leads to a still more basic question: if the effect of our short-term strategy is to induce such long-term changes, and if the effect of those changes is, as it might well be, to weaken our capacity to act effectively as a world power, then what is it that we have gained? Self-destruction, in such a situation, can be about as effective as destruction by adversaries.

BUT WHAT of the future? Is there anything in the rudimentary strategic "logic" outlined here that can help ensure strategic "success"? The main thing we can do is to be aware of, and to begin to allow for, the workings of the "risk versus cost" dilemma: the probability that strategies seeking to minimize costs—as did those of Nixon, Ford and Carter—will run risks; but that strategies seeking to minimize risks—as Reagan's has—will increase costs. The dilemma itself is probably an inescapable one: costs and risks are inherent in any situation in which one needs a strategy in the first place; that is, any situation in which one is seeking to attain objectives in the face of resistance. Some expenditure of effort will always be required; some dangers will always have to be faced; and somebody will have to make the decision as to which of these unpleasant alternatives one most wants to minimize. An "optimal" minimization of both risk and cost may exist in decision-making theory, but it is apt to be extremely elusive in the real world.

What we can do, though, is recognize that too exclusive a concentration on minimizing one is almost certain to produce the other. This fact places a premium on the skill with which one can learn at least to *balance*—if not optimally minimize—costs *and* risks. And one of the best guides to doing this is to learn from the experiences of one's predecessors. There are occasional instances in which this has been done:

- Despite the fact that they embraced what was in general a "cost-minimizing" strategy that was prepared to run risks, and despite having campaigned on a platform that called explicitly for this, Eisenhower and Dulles never attempted to "liberate" Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. Their judgment, in the end, was what Truman's had been: that the existence of injustice was not in itself sufficient justification for risking a third world war, even if we were certain to win it. The costs of this particular risk, in a nuclear age, would have been too great.
- Despite the fact that he embraced what was in general a "risk-minimizing" strategy that placed a considerable premium on building military strength, Kennedy saw that to avoid negotiations with the Russians altogether could itself be a risk. Building on important precedents set by Eisenhower, he was willing to take the short-term risk of signing a Limited Test Ban treaty with the Russians, a decision all but the most extreme observers now acknowledge minimized risks over the long-term as well.
- Despite the fact that they embraced what was in general a "cost-minimizing" strategy, Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to reverse immediately the Johnson administration's over-commitment of manpower and resources in Southeast Asia. Instead they sought a gradual withdrawal from the war in a way that would not weaken American "credibility" as a great power. One can argue about whether the costs thereby incurred were worth it or not, but it is the case that the nation got out of Vietnam without anything like the long period of self-flagellation that followed the more abrupt collapse of our much less extensive efforts in China in 1949.
- Despite the fact that the Reagan administration has opted in general for a "risk-minimizing" strategy—and despite its highly anti-communist rhetoric—it has been willing

[12]See, on this point, Paul Kennedy, "The (Relative) Decline of America," *Atlantic*, CCLX (August 1987), pp. 29–38.

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to accept the risks, as had Nixon, Ford and Carter also, of dealing on a friendly basis with the world's most populous communist state. It has even gone beyond that point in its emerging realization that the Soviet political and economic example is that country's own worst enemy; it seems on the verge of accepting the once risky proposition that the Russians can be counted on to defeat themselves through their own combination of arrogance and incompetence, provided we are wise enough to avoid deflecting to ourselves—through many of those same characteristics—the hostility their effects are bound to produce.

More often, though, administrations ignore the experiences of their predecessors, with the result that they fail to maintain the critical "risk versus cost" balance. Kennedy and Johnson failed to learn what the experience of Korea could have taught them, which was to avoid relinquishing the initiative to adversaries. The Nixon, Ford and Carter strategies failed to give sufficient attention to a problem that had plagued Eisenhower and Dulles, which is how to provide the reassurance that must accompany risk-taking strategies if they are to be sustained. The Reagan administration learned little from the experiences of Johnson and Nixon about the unwisdom of centralizing intelligence assessment and operational control in the White House staff (especially if one lacks a Kissinger to do it), or from Carter's experience with the dangers of letting emotion govern responses to hostage crises, which after all are created for no other purpose than to exploit emotions.

THEORY, Clausewitz said, does not hold you by the hand and tell you what to do at every moment in every crisis that you are likely to encounter. The last thing I would want to claim, therefore, is that the strategic "logic" I have identified here provides any guarantee of success if followed. The realm of strategy, like the fog of battle, is too unpredictable an environment for that. But strategic "logic" is preferable to trying to find your way through such an environment blindfolded. It can provide warnings about the pitfalls that are likely to lie ahead: a kind of "intellectual minesweeper," if you will. It can function as a checklist, reminding you to make sure the flaps are in the proper configuration before you proceed at full power down the runway. It can certainly be a way of extending your own range of experience to incorporate that of others who have had to deal with comparable situations. And it can make you think more critically than you might about just what "success" in strategy is in the first place, and how you recognize it once you get there.

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The Rise and Fall of the PLO

Farid el-Khazen

THE RISE OF A MILITANT and apparently powerful Palestine Liberation Organization was made possible by the 1967 war and its aftermath. In the years that followed, the PLO achieved unprecedented levels of political sophistication, international recognition, wealth and influence. Two decades later, the most ambitious goals its leaders can aim for with any hope of realization is the preservation of minimal unity within the organization. At the eighteenth session of the Palestine National Council, recently held in Algiers, some success in that respect assumed the proportions of a landmark achievement. Five years after its exodus from Beirut, the PLO's attempts to get close to where it was before the summer of 1982 appear hopeless. How did the PLO rise so rapidly and why did it collapse so early, quickly and decisively?

The post-1967 PLO helped create a distinct Palestinian national identity and mobilized Arab, and, to a certain degree, international public opinion in support of its cause. Such achievements, important and impressive as they might be, were the product of a certain era in Palestinian history, one in which the Palestinians were transformed from homeless refugees to a people with a national cause. Paralleling this was the transformation of the PLO itself in the early 1970s from an inefficient and insignificant bureaucracy to an organized, well-funded and credible guerrilla movement with an alternative base. All this was brought to an abrupt end in 1982. A decade of Palestinian accomplishments was rendered obsolete almost overnight, as the entire edifice crumbled at the hands of Israel's powerful military machine.

The PLO defeat in 1982, however, was not just another setback impeding the struggle for Palestine. Unlike previous Arab-Israeli wars, the 1982 war did not result in the loss of Arab territory or in a stunning military defeat of one or more Arab regimes. Rather, the 1982 war was the first one fought between the two real adversaries—the PLO and Israel. Consequently, it was the first such military confrontation to leave hardly any lasting scars on the Arab-Israeli scene. Aside from the devastation inflicted on Lebanon, the damage was confined mostly to the PLO and, to a lesser degree, to Israel. Clearly Arab regimes wanted no part in the Palestinian defeat. This time, whatever *Naksa* (setback) the war brought, it was one with an unambiguous Palestinian coloring.

Regardless of the controversy over the "balance sheet"[1] of the 1982 war, one thing is certain: the PLO was not only the major loser in the war but also the only party to suffer

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[1]For a detailed overview of the Israeli invasion and its aftermath, see Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

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irreparable damage. While the 1982 Palestinian-Israeli confrontation was not the first setback in the history of the Palestinian national movement, it was clearly the first one to have repercussions affecting the very fabric of Palestinian society and to call into question the survival of a functioning revolutionary force. There had been one diaspora of Palestinians in the aftermath of the 1948 war. 1982 resulted in another, one involving not a mass of frightened civilians but a leadership mobilized in the name of Palestinian nationalism.

Not only did the debacle strike the PLO at the height of its power and prestige, but the responsibility for it was inescapable. In the past, Palestinian losses could be blamed on "the generation of defeat" *(Jil al Hazimah)*, as the pre-1948 leadership was labeled; or on corrupt and shortsighted leaders (like Ahmad al-Shugairi, the PLO leader from 1964 to 1967) doing the bidding of Arab regimes; or on the irresponsible adventurism of Nasser in the 1960s. In 1982 the blame could not be shifted; it fell squarely upon the shoulders of the leaders of the post-1967 PLO, the men who had launched their political careers by attacking the deficient policies of their predecessors. Like Nasser in the aftermath of the 1967 war, Palestinian leaders after 1982 could find no handy scapegoats, no easy way to explain or dismiss the defeat. The loss was more than a military defeat and more than merely a political or diplomatic setback that could be redressed under more favorable circumstances. It left the Palestinians off-balance, unable even to face fully the significance of what had happened to them, and therefore incapable of shaping a coherent policy to meet their predicament.

That having been said, it would be quite wrong either to treat the war of 1982 as an isolated, catastrophic event or to regard it as a sufficient explanation of the PLO's collapse. The war came as the culmination of a process of change occurring simultaneously within the PLO and on the regional scene. At the core of this transformation were contradictory developments that have shaped Palestinian politics since the early 1970s, whereby the PLO accumulated the trappings of power and status while at the same time it experienced gradual marginalization in regional politics. This inherent gap between the appearance of strength and the inability to exercise real power that has marked Palestinian politics since the late 1960s was suddenly laid bare in 1982.

WHAT ENABLED the PLO to build an impressive political structure and enjoy the appearance of power, particularly outside Lebanon, was not only a Palestinian decision to pursue armed struggle to achieve national objectives, but also the presence of favorable conditions in the region, created in large part by the vacuum in Arab leadership following the 1967 war. Arab leaders like Nasser tolerated a weak and amateurish PLO, which they saw as playing the role of the "irresponsible arm" of Arab armies.[2] Most Arab regimes were willing to tolerate and support the PLO, but only as long as it was kept in line with the regional policies of the Arab host regimes. Once the PLO became a threat to the existing order, state authorities resorted to military action to curb it. While this happened in one form or another in all countries where the Palestinians were present in strength, the response in Jordan was the most harsh. The termination of the political and military base of the PLO in Jordan in 1970–71, culminating in the 1971 "Black September," marked the first full-scale military confrontation between the PLO and an Arab army.

Defeated, divided and dispersed after that confrontation, the PLO would have ceased to exist as a militant organization pursuing Palestinian national objectives were it not for the presence of a country such as Lebanon. Not only did Lebanon provide a refuge for a homeless PLO, but it was the ideal place for relaunching a more militant and more autonomous Palestinian guerrilla movement. In it, the PLO was able to exploit

[2]Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 64.

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circumstances that could not be found in any other Arab country. Of all Arab countries, Lebanon alone lacked an authoritarian state, and it was this "deficiency" that made it the most vulnerable and penetrable Arab country. Moreover, internally, Lebanon had the Arab world's most diverse communal and social makeup. This combination of the most open political system and communal diversity enabled the various factions of the PLO to find local allies with whom to make common cause, in the name of pan-Arabism and an impending revolution that promised to rid Lebanon of its internal problems.

The other comparative advantage offered by Lebanon concerned the nature of the Palestinian presence there. Since the loss of Palestine in 1948, it was only in Lebanon that an integrated Palestinian state and society in diaspora emerged in the decade between 1972 and 1982. It was only during that period that all layers of Palestinian society coalesced to form a more or less integrated whole. All components of Palestinian society were linked together in an interdependent structural continuity: a popular leadership in direct contact with a diversified power base representing all segments of Palestinian society; a large refugee population ("camp dwellers") from whose ranks could be recruited the bulk of the PLO's fighting force; a resourceful civilian population bringing together the political elite, the intellectuals, and the business community; and finally a whole network of political, financial and social institutions located in a freewheeling and cosmopolitan city like Beirut.

In addition, in Beirut the Palestinian received an international exposure that could not be matched in any other Arab capital. It was in Beirut that the Palestinian cause was discovered by the international community, and it was there that Arafat became a world celebrity, thanks in part to extensive coverage by Western news media. Not only was Beirut the PLO's window to the outside world; it made it possible for Palestinian organizations, particularly Fatah, to establish its own diplomatic and political channels by providing protection to diplomatic missions in West Beirut and by rendering valuable intelligence services to many foreign governments, including the United States.

LEBANON OFFERED the PLO one other important benefit not existing in most other Arab countries: an accessible enemy along the country's southern border. The PLO could engage in guerrilla warfare against Israel, claim military victories, and mobilize Palestinian and Arab support in the name of the ongoing struggle to liberate Palestine through the no-man's-land in the south. In short, it was only in Lebanon that the PLO *could* become what it actually *had* become by 1982: an organization possessing all the elements of a nation-state in exile.

But despite these impressive achievements the strength of the PLO position was largely illusory. Less than 72 hours after the war started, the Palestinian guerrillas were besieged in Beirut. By the time they recovered from the shock they found themselves dispersed in distant and inconsequential places. While few doubted Israel's military capability to overrun Palestinian strongholds, many, including Palestinians and Israelis themselves, were stunned at the pace and scope of the sudden reversal in the PLO's fortunes. What happened is largely explicable in terms of the configuration of forces that helped shape Palestinian politics in the 1970s.

One important characteristic of the situation was the gap between the PLO's strength in Lebanon and what power it commanded elsewhere. Palestinian achievements and successes in Lebanon were built on a weak foundation, created by Lebanon's increasing marginality in the regional order. This marginality began in the late 1960s and became pronounced with the disintegration of state institutions in 1975–76. While this disintegration provided an opportunity for the PLO at a time when its existence was seriously endangered (after its expulsion from Jordan), in terms of regional influence it also made Lebanon a weak base from which to operate.

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An asymmetrical process was thus underway. The PLO's power continued to grow vis-à-vis the Lebanese state. But whatever power it mustered could be exercised only against the weakest state in the Arab state system and the one most vulnerable to external intervention. Beyond its Lebanon shelter, the PLO was no more immune to fragmentation and no less vulnerable to divisive external forces than Lebanon itself. Thus the price the Palestinians paid for their base in Lebanon was that as the country increasingly became marginalized, so did the PLO itself.

What hastened the divorce between Palestinian and Arab concerns was the 1973 war, which, unlike previous Arab-Israeli wars, left Arab self-respect undamaged. Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy resulted in a step-by-step disintegration of Arab alliances, on the one hand, and a divergence of Arab and Palestinian objectives on the other. The divide took on a strategic dimension in 1979, with the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

While the Camp David accord led to the most drastic reshuffling of Arab and Israeli objectives and priorities, other changes also widened the rift between Palestinian and Arab priorities. First, the supremacy of the nation-state, as opposed to the unionist and integrationist schemes of the 1950s and 1960s, became clearly evident in the Arab world in the 1970s. The 1967 defeat and subsequent death of Nasser, the leading figure in the pan-Arab movement, deflated the drive for regional goals and deprived the Arab world of a leader who could mobilize a frantic pan-Arab "street." A corollary of the ascendancy of *etatism* was an increasing pragmatism in Arab politics. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Syria under the Assad regime. While in the past Syria set the pace for military coups and was the model for adventurist radicalism, Assad's calculated and cautious policies have been the embodiment of political realism in more recent Arab politics.

Another new element since the early 1970s has been increased political stability, the absence of radical regime changes and bloody military takeovers. This can be attributed to the efficient resort to repressive measures by ruthless regimes and to the depletion of Arab ideological resources. Those parties and leaders who carried the banner of Arab unity in the past are now in power and are at odds with one another over the very tenets of Arab nationalism.

A third transformation, more difficult to demonstrate in concrete terms, has to do with the saturation of regional political and geographical space, giving less room for the emergence of new causes. Although this could be regarded as a sign of "political maturity," it is in reality a high point in political paralysis. In the absence of alternatives that are both attractive and feasible, most Arab countries have concentrated on preserving the status quo, itself an achievement of no small magnitude. Who could be better for the stability of the consortium of Arab rulers than a Saddam Hussein in Iraq, (as opposed to a pro-Khomeini Shia regime) or a Hafiz al-Assad in Syria (as opposed to Sunni Muslim fundamentalists preaching revolution in the Arab world). All Arab leaders are better served by avoiding high-risk policies, since the slightest wrong move by one regime would set off a chain reaction endangering the survival of others.

THE CUMULATIVE OUTCOME of these qualitative changes affecting the core of Arab politics has been to reduce the importance of the Palestinians in the Arab system. This process remained concealed so long as the PLO was entrenched in Lebanon; but once the organization was dislodged from that base, the full extent of its marginality and vulnerability became apparent.

The situation was all the more difficult since the Palestinian national movement itself, like the Arab regimes, had undergone sweeping changes at the political, economic, and social levels. In more than twenty years of activism, the PLO has come a long way. Having progressed from refugee status to a revolutionary movement and then to a quasi-

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state in Lebanon, it could boast of impressive achievements. But its success was a mixed blessing. The more powerful it became, the more threatening it was to Arab regimes; the less dependent on their support, the less attractive an instrument. After gaining unequivocal Arab recognition in 1974 as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as well as international recognition, and extensive political, military and financial support from Arab governments, the PLO was able to undertake a more aggressive and independent course of action. But once it did so, once the client threatened to become a rival, the attitudes of its erstwhile sponsors started to change.

Aside from indispensable Arab support in the case of an actual war against Israel, by the late 1970s the Palestinian-Arab relationship had exhausted almost all its positive potential. After the 1973 war and the ensuing Camp David accord in 1979, there was little Arab regimes could do to advance Palestinian national objectives. Similarly, the PLO by then was no longer in a position to offer the kind of "services" that would qualify it for unconditional Arab support. Arab regimes were no longer dependent on the PLO to enhance legitimacy at home. Nor did they have the same need to use Palestinian factions to further foreign policy objectives as in the past. Syria, the most active Arab country today in internal Palestinian politics, uses Palestinian factions principally to blackmail Arafat rather than as instruments of pan-Arab politics.

The basis of Arab-Palestinian relations that prevailed since the late 1960s has therefore changed drastically. Just as Arab support is no longer indispensable for the survival of the PLO, Palestinian pan-Arab politics have ceased to serve the interests of Arab regimes. Whatever ideological functions the PLO served in furthering the idea of common Arab destiny, today neither the Palestinian cause nor Arab nationalism can rally mass support or enhance the popularity of Arab rulers. Both Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause are captive to another force, far more potent and appealing to the grass root instincts of Arab society: that of fundamentalist Islam in its most radical forms. For those now seeking to liberate Palestine by launching raids from South Lebanon, Palestine is not the homeland of a nationalistic Palestinian people. Nor is the PLO viewed any longer as having an undisputed monopoly over the struggle to liberate Palestine. Rather, for those Muslims believers—be they Arabs or Persians, Shia or Sunni—Palestine's "national" identity is Muslim, and the war in Palestine is waged to root out the "infidels" who occupy the land of the holy shrines of Islam. This Iranian-inspired reading has added yet another claimant to the Palestinian cause.

While it has sought to maintain a secular political orientation, the PLO is not a stranger to the Muslim core of Palestinian society. Fatah, Arafat's power base and the largest and most credible grouping within the PLO, has always flirted with Islamic symbolism.[3] Today, it cannot afford to remain outside the bazaar of sectarian politics. Indeed, it is heavily involved in the larger state-sponsored Islam of the predominantly Sunni Arab political elite.

PALESTINIAN ALLIANCES in post-1982 Lebanon clearly reveal the working relationship that exists between Islamic fundamentalist groups (Sunni and Shia) in Lebanon and Fatah. This relationship unfolded in several phases. What began as military support for yet another client group in Lebanon—Harakat Al-Tawheed, based in the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli and led by fundamentalist cleric, Sheikh Sa'id Sha'aban—ended up in the conversion of that group into a front organization for pro-Arafat forces fighting the Syrian army in 1983. The bloody battles in Tripoli resulted in the highly publicized ousting of Arafat from the city.

[3]Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *Commentary*, Vol. 61, January 1976, p. 42.

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But that was only one dimension of Fatah's tacit understanding with fundamentalist groups. The other, perhaps more interesting alliance was Fatah's early "merger" with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah (Party of God). This began in 1982, following the evacuation of Palestinian forces from Beirut, when they handed fighters and weapons over to their newly-found allies. Although the relationship was not always smooth, especially after the PLO's espousal of the Iraqi position in the Gulf war, both the Palestinians and the Hezbollah stood to benefit from the exchanges. For the PLO, a Shia movement like Hezbollah was a convenient ally in the battle against the Shia Amal movement in Beirut and the south. For Hezbollah, an alliance with the Palestinians validated its universal message of Muslim unity to face the enemies of Islam, and brought a counterweight to Syria's hegemonic practices in Lebanon.

The PLO's dealings with fundamentalist groups in Lebanon have implications that go beyond the Lebanese scene, affecting the larger sectarian political map of the Arab world. Despite all the claims of Muslim unity, the rift between Sunni and Shia Islam has not incited as much tension and controversy for many centuries as it does today.[4] Having a well-established network of operation in Lebanon, the PLO is the best equipped party to contain Shia radicalism there, particularly Amal and its main backer, the Alawite-dominated regime in Syria.

This would be a valuable contribution to an Arab Sunni front faced with Iranian-sponsored subversion in the name of Islam. It is also in line with the predominant trend sweeping Arab politics. Just as secular Arab nationalism gained currency in the 1950s and 1960s, today norms of political conduct have to be adjusted to take into account the growing politicization of radical Islam.

Discussion so far has centered on the Palestinian and Arab dimensions of the changing Palestinian problem. If the overall picture on that side of the divide is negative, the outlook is no less bleak for the Palestinians on the other, Israeli side. Since 1967, Israel has had to grapple with its homegrown Palestinian problem more assiduously than with the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. The problem in the occupied territories has undergone a fundamental mutation: from a buffer zone necessary for the security of the post-1967 Israeli state, the occupied territories have become an internal obsession, putting into question the very nature of the Israeli state and its democratic political processes.

Over the years, Israel has grown stronger and more secure, but this has not made its Palestinian problem any more manageable. The dilemma thus exists: an incapacitated PLO unable to deliver its version of a solution to the Palestinian problem on one side, and a stronger, though divided and radicalized, Israel unable to deliver a solution to the problem on its own terms. If on occasion in the past it appeared that the two protagonists had the will to reach some sort of accommodation today, even if the will still exists, there is hardly any room left for peaceful settlement.[5]

Part of the disarray has to do with the absence of an identifiable target against which to wage war or a credible enemy with whom to broker peace. The pre-1982 Arab-Israeli-Palestinian scene gave uncertain Palestinians and undecided Israelis room to maneuver without having to opt for a decisive course of action. But now, despite the demise of the PLO and the unquestionable military superiority of Israel, no one seems to be better off. The PLO is in an unprecedented bind, drawing on past achievements that have been rendered obsolete; Israel is trying to reconstruct an idealistic vision of the past, in the

[4]For a penetrating account of the unfolding consequences of Sunni-Shia collision in today's Arab politics, see Fouad Ajami, "The Silence in Arab Culture," *The New Republic*, April 6, 1987, pp. 27–33.

[5]For an elaboration on this theme, see Farid el-Khazen, "The Middle East in Strategic Retreat," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1986, pp. 140–160.

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hope of escaping the confusion and frustration of the present.

In historical terms the Palestinian problem, with its Arab and Israeli dimensions, is a product of a particular era in the evolution of inter-Arab politics, Arab-Israeli politics, and domestic Israeli politics. The hospitable environment that gave the PLO a breathing space in Arab politics since the late 1960s has radically changed—as have the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israeli security perceptions and national priorities.

Amidst these turbulent changes, the PLO was the greatest loser. The favorable conditions—internal, regional, and international—that elevated the PLO to an equal, if not privileged, status in the Arab state system and gave it international recognition have all but vanished. Lacking a sense of direction, the PLO since 1982 has been a revolution in limbo, owing its survival in large part to the wealth it generated over the years and to technological innovations in modern communication that link together Palestinian centers of power scattered around the world. No contemporary revolutionary movement has had to operate in such a vacuum, with no territorial base of its own and with no direct access to the enemy or the land in question.

The predicament of Israel and the Palestinians is largely a function of the receding centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict, now that the region is absorbed by other overshadowing conflicts and causes: the Gulf war and the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. In a highly competitive conflict "market," the Palestinian problem occupies today a low priority in the strategic calculations of regional powers. Moreover, most of the attempts to solve it address the Arab (i.e. Jordanian) and Israeli dimensions of the problem, not its Palestinian dimension, though this is the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE "JORDAN OPTION" is the most plausible of these attempts, certainly less implausible than the holding of an international peace conference. But it is at best an experimental remedy for an incurable disease. In essence, the Jordan option is a convenient rearrangement of priorities: an Israeli-engineered re-Arabization of the occupied territories under Jordanian auspices. Jordan and Israel would be the main beneficiaries of the swap, but the question is whether either of the two parties could deliver. Given the continuing political paralysis in Israel and King Hussein's limited maneuvering room, the answer is almost certainly that they could not. For the Jordan option to have a chance of succeeding, two prior conditions are required: a real political consensus in Israel and Arab (and American) support for the Hashemite monarch. Neither one is likely to materialize.

As for the likely emergence of a credible and pragmatic leadership in the occupied territories—the last remaining piece of debatable Palestinian land from an Israeli standpoint—prospects are no more promising. If, as some have suggested, West Bank leaders can assume a pivotal role in devising a working arrangement over the future status of the occupied territories, they will have to contend with three formidable forces—Israel, Jordan, and the PLO—each claiming a stake in the deal and a legitimate right to torpedo the entire process. The problem facing the West Bank Arabs is different from that confronting the diaspora Palestinians. As PLO officials and intellectuals are debating the merits of an independent Palestinian state with their Israeli counterparts in Western capitals Arabs of the West Bank live under Israeli military rule and face a new breed of fanatic settlers who believe that by expelling people from their native land they are doing God's bidding.

Yet, the problem is not just due to a lack of acceptable formulas for peace; it is much deeper, having to do with the gradual erosion of the entire political and social order that helped shape the course of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as its partial settlement in the 1960s and 1970s. The present deadlock is a direct consequence of the fact that Arab-Israeli politics have changed since

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the 1960s and 1970s, when conflict was matched by escalating attempts to contain it. Now, while the urgency to settle conflict is still there, all avenues toward some kind of settlement are blocked.

Just as the PLO was a major beneficiary of the post-1967 political and social order in Arab politics, today it is the main loser as a result of its disintegration. The configuration of internal and external forces that worked to the advantage of militant Palestinian nationalism, particularly in the 1970s, is no more.

For the PLO, the changing reality and image of the Palestinians' condition presents a major problem. The PLO can no longer capitalize on the pre-1967 image of impoverished Palestinian camp dwellers, anymore than it can lobby for more support for its (nonexistent) armed struggle against Israel. While some Palestinians still live in dismal conditions, others are well-established and successful citizens of Arab and Western countries, forming a solid Palestinian bourgeoisie in diaspora. The Palestinian self-image—and outsiders' perceptions of them—is not one of destitution and powerlessness, but that of assertiveness, even though Palestinian efforts have resulted in failure and half-finished achievements. For many Arabs, the PLO is no longer a revolutionary model worth supporting, nor is it the embodiment of vanguard progressive Arab politics; instead it is an inefficient bureaucracy which has embraced the corrupting practices of power. Like most Arab regimes, the PLO is busy consolidating power, containing dissent, and preserving the status quo to insure basic survival. At best it can attract lukewarm support, not admiration.

Excluding the Palestinians of the occupied territories, the common denominator shared by most other Palestinians is the desire to return to Beirut. This reflects not only the need for a physical base but, at least as important, for the psychological comfort of having a strong foothold in a country in which Palestinians of all persuasions once felt at home, and where only recently the PLO once earned a place of its own on the political map of the Middle East. To be sure, the idea of returning to Lebanon is less a yearning for a lost past than it is the only pragmatic option that remains within reach. Despite all the ills of Lebanon, it is the only place where the Palestinians can hope to establish a semi-independent base and regain some of the self-confidence lost since 1982.

But even if Arafat's PLO fully succeeds in capturing some of its former strongholds in Lebanon—as it recently did in the South and, to a lesser extent, in West Beirut—it will be a despised PLO, rejected by all Lebanese groups and not considered a revolutionary model to emulate. The recent abrogation of the 1969 Cairo Agreement by an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese parliament, which deprives the PLO of a legal cover in Lebanon, was an indication of how little support the PLO enjoys there today. Post-1982 the PLO in Lebanon is nothing more than a sectarian militia competing for the same space claimed by no fewer than a dozen other militias and foreign armies. Under the best of circumstances it could reestablish itself in Lebanon only as that country's eighteenth sect.

LEBANON'S SECTARIAN fragmentation is no longer an anomaly in Middle Eastern politics. Not only is sectarianism the fastest growing trend sweeping all three of the different cultures and societies of the region—Iran, the Arab World, and Israel—but it is the most convenient and effective means for political mobilization and control. No state and no revolutionary movement can afford to turn its back on forces which appeal to the growing populist tendencies of these societies. The PLO, like other regimes in the region, has to make the best of this fractured environment. But it may be the biggest loser in what is a merciless political game.

The Palestinian issue, for long the heart of "the Middle East problem," is now overshadowed by more damaging conflicts (the Gulf war) and a more credible and haunting revolutionary movement (Islamic fundamen-

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talism). Israel is unable to deal with its own problems, let alone those related to an enemy posing little physical threat to its society. The vital interest of the superpowers are unaffected by whether or not the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Palestinian problem are solved. The Palestinians themselves are divided, exhausted, and do not know what they really want.

No solution will come in the lifetime of the present generation of Palestinian leaders. Palestine is likely to become a question to which there is scant hope for answer. Increasingly, it is likely to inspire poets and intellectuals more than politicians and army generals. But even they may be getting bored. For as Jean Genet wrote shortly before his death, "The word 'Palestine' in a headline used to sell papers because one hoped to read about new exploits. Today it is for account of setbacks."[6]

[6]Jean Genet, *Un captive amoureux*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p. 283.

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Secrets

Michael A. Ledeen

WE AMERICANS are intensely ambivalent about secrecy. We know that any country, even the most "open," must be able to keep secrets from its enemies in order to survive, yet we fear that secrecy may undermine democratic society: if we do not know the full truth, how can we be expected to make informed and intelligent decisions about our future? Our antipathy to secrecy is embodied in Woodrow Wilson's call for "open compacts, openly arrived at." This bit of conventional wisdom remains strong, even though many of the most successful foreign policy actions in the recent past—from the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China to the Camp David talks—would have been impossible without secret contacts and discussions.

The most recent appeal to "openness" in foreign policy came from Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and co-Chairman of the Iran-*contra* Investigation, who declared that policies made in secret are inevitably inferior to policies that emerge from full, open debate. It is all wonderfully high-minded and unexceptionable; it is also unworkable. These high-minded abstract principles are in conflict with a world where secrecy makes its own demands. If secrets—of various sorts—cannot be kept, good policy and good relations are impossible.

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The American distrust of secrecy is unique even among societies that share our commitments to democracy and freedom. The great chasm between the United States and other democratic countries is nicely illustrated by an exchange between Alexandre de Marenches, former head of French Intelligence and Christine Ockrent, in their recent best-seller *Dans le secret des princes:*

> (de Marenches): . . .the sensation-seeking press cannot resist scoops . . . because it has found through more or less honest methods (who knows where?), let us say documents alleged to have come from the Pentagon. The press then prints things that only help the enemy and damage the United States. I find that totally irresponsible.
> (Ockrent): In other words, the American press, which one tends to elevate to the status of a model, would be, in your opinion, an irresponsible press?
> (de Marenches): No. I am much more nuanced. But certain elements in the American press are dangerous because they work against the interests of the United States. . . .

What makes Americans' attitudes toward secrecy so different? First of all, there is our unique notion of popular sovereignty: Americans believe that authority flows directly from the people to elected officials, and that the elected officials should be continuously accountable to the public. There is very little room in this political universe for the notion of "reason of state": the idea that the state itself has interests that may, on occasion,

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supercede those of the citizenry. For most Americans, the very notion of "state" is a virtually meaningless abstraction. For even our closest democratic allies, *raison d'etat* is a thoroughly acceptable justification for action.

Our elected officials do not swear an oath to defend the national interest; they swear to uphold the Constitution, which in turn defines the rights of individual citizens. Elsewhere, leaders swear to defend the interests of the nation. We believe that all citizens are politically equal, and therefore entitled to the same information; in most other countries it is taken for granted that the political elite is entitled to know far more than the public at large.

This is not to say that there is not a demand for greater openness in other countries (there often is, and the United States is often held up as a positive example by those fighting against restrictions on the flow of information), nor that there are not Americans concerned about excesses of information-sharing in the United States. But there is no other nation in which the antipathy to secrecy is so strong, and the tension between secrecy and openness so intense. Even Great Britain, in so many ways the model for our own political culture, has an Official Secrets Act—and libel legislation—that makes the British Government—and media—far more close-mouthed than ours. The willingness of the British Government to wage an extensive legal battle against the publication of—and quotation from—*Spycatcher*, a recent memoir by a former British intelligence official, would be unimaginable here.

The requirements for secrecy

GOOD POLICY depends upon both good information and good judgment, and good judgment is best achieved through candid discussion within the policy-making community. If our policy makers cannot openly speak their minds to one another, their errors in judgment are less likely to be discovered and corrected. And they are not going to speak openly if they fear that their remarks—complete with undeleted expletives—are going to be revealed to the world at large.

The requirement for candor in the policy-making community is often mischaracterized, as if secrecy were inevitably the enemy of open discussion. While that may be true if the insistence upon secrecy is carried to such an extreme that our top policy makers no longer listen to the full range of opinion on the issues, or withhold information to which the public is entitled, it is important not to confuse the two sorts of "openness": one refers to candor, the other to the number of participants. We need candor, but we do not need large meetings or a large number of participants, or full public debate *at every stage* of the policy process, or even of every aspect of policy.

The matter is clearer still with regard to relations with foreign leaders. In most cultures, it is taken for granted that it is sometimes necessary for leaders to do things which they would not wish to admit in public. Yet it is urgent for the government of the United States to know these leaders' real desires and intentions—as opposed to their public posturing. These real intentions can be discovered only through private conversations—if they are really private. For if the contents of private conversations leak out to the public, foreign leaders will cease to be candid with American officials, to the great detriment of the American national interest.

Some years ago, when the debate over SALT II was raging in Congress, I was present at a discussion between a top European leader and two extremely influential former American officials. The European—who had publicly called for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty—was imploring the two Americans to do everything possible to defeat the Treaty. One of the Americans wryly said to the European, "and if we succeed, will you not denounce the United States for failing to support the negotiating position of our President, and for being unreliable allies?" "Quite so," replied the European, "but you must try to block the treaty nonetheless."

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Americans are often shocked by this sort of hypocrisy, and our instinct is to demand it be exposed. Yet this would only make matters worse, for exposure has the sole effect of depriving us of the honest thoughts of foreign leaders, and their knowledge as well. In the 1970s, following the exposures involving the CIA and White House, foreign leaders concluded that the American Government could no longer keep secrets, and thus a considerable volume of knowledge was withheld. Foreign governments shared their knowledge of sensitive subjects like terrorism with a handful of trusted American friends, some in government, some outside. But the American bureaucracy never acquired the information, and thus when people like Secretary of State Alexander Haig—who had learned a lot from the Europeans during his stint as Commander of NATO—asked that information on the Soviet role in international terrorism be brought to the attention of Congress and the public in the early 1980s, he discovered that the information was not available inside the American Government. This made the quest for a rational counterterrorist policy all the more difficult.

Our own elected officials have reached similar conclusions about the discretion of the bureaucracy, and this has led to the use of outsiders as "back-channels" between top American officials and their foreign counterparts. The most famous of these cases is ABC newsman John Scali, who was the secret intermediary between President Kennedy and Soviet Communist Party leader Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In such cases, it is convenient to use a single intermediary, without having to go through the usual bureaucracy. In addition to the convenience (decisions can be made by a handful of persons rather than innumerable officials), it is easier to keep the entire affair secret as well. Finally, if our interlocutors attempt to exploit the contacts for their own purposes, an outsider can very easily be denied. It is far more difficult to wash the government's hands of a full-time official. Interestingly enough, in almost all cases these channels function well, with maximum security.

The pattern, then, is the opposite of that claimed by the conventional wisdom: secrecy actually encourages the free flow of information and candid expression, while exposure limits the flow of knowledge and forces top officials to speak guardedly, if at all.

If secrecy is important in the free flow of ideas both within and among governments, it is absolutely vital in the area of intelligence. For there is far more than embarrassment at stake: we are dealing with human lives. In many countries in the world, we badly need people to commit treason in the name of *our* interests, and much of the information we need to defend ourselves can only come from individuals who risk their careers or even their lives to tell us the truth. They are most unlikely to do so if they fear they will be exposed by us; a handful of such cases will deter a far larger number of other people from cooperating with us, both now and in the future. This is precisely the position in which we find ourselves today, for the torrent of revelations that has emerged from the various investigations into the Iran-*contra* affair has reinforced the fears of the mid-seventies. As the *New York Times* reported in August, once again our allies have restricted the flow of sensitive information to the American Government.

The need for secrecy applies to all clandestinely-gathered information, whether it involves human sources or more mechanical means of gathering data. Some years ago, the intelligence community was shocked to discover that a low-level CIA employee named William Kampiles had sold to the Soviet KGB (for the paltry sum of $4,000) data about the capabilities of the most secret American spy satellite, the KH-11. The loss of secret information about the KH-11 threw into question the accuracy of the "information" gathered by such satellites, for once the Soviets knew what the KH-11 could "see," they could take steps to deceive it, or to conceal things from its field of vision. And it is not even necessary for information to be

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given directly into the hands of a hostile intelligence organization for such damage to be done to the national interest: every time a journalist reveals the "discovery" of some kind of clandestine information-gathering program, whether it be a surveillance satellite, electronically-equipped aircraft or seafaring vessels, or a working relationship with a foreign government, we pay a heavy price. And, paradoxically, the risk is run whether the journalistic "revelation" is true or false, for it invariably puts the targets of information-gathering operations on greater guard, thus making it more difficult to learn things about them.

The Search for a Workable Policy

IS THERE SOME way to balance the demands of a democratic society—above all, the requirement that the public know what leaders are doing—against the imperative of secrecy?

The "solutions" that we have adopted are embodied in two acts of legislation: the Freedom of Information Act, and "oversight." This curious term—which technically means something quite different from the process it is meant to describe—refers to the use of small groups, whether in Congress or in the courts, to monitor the ongoing behavior of the executive branch, in order to ensure that no violations of due process or the intent of Congress occurs. There used to be no less than eight such "oversight committees" in Congress, but in recent years the number has been thankfully reduced to two: the Select Committees on Intelligence in both the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. The "oversight process" is hailed by its defenders as an advance for "openness," but in reality it is simply a method for Congress to expand its territory. The legislators are expected to keep the secrets secret, just as if they were members of the intelligence community. The public only comes to know about the secrets if someone violates his vow to maintain secrecy. Thus, "oversight" merely expands the number of people who are in the know; it does not enhance the public's ability to evaluate the performance of the government.

On the other hand, "oversight" has a limiting effect on the Executive Branch, for in practice there are certain kinds of secret actions that invariably leak when they are shared with Congress. Some years ago, I heard Admiral Bobby Inman—then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence—argue against a proposed covert action on the grounds that "this sort of thing always leaks from the oversight committees." The proposal was scrapped, just as others were when Senator Joseph Biden threatened to "leak" them if, against his recommendations, they were put into effect. So, by bringing Congress into the act, some secret actions are blocked, and others are sabotaged by leaks from hostile legislators.

In a more serious effort to ensure that the public is reasonably informed, Congress a few years back passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which makes it possible for interested persons (they need not be citizens of the United States) to demand that the Executive Branch release previously-classified information.

The FOIA is on balance a good thing, although not nearly so good as it ought to be. To the extent that information can be declassified and released to scholars, journalists, and even businessmen, we the people are better off for it. However, the shortcomings of the Act are considerable:

- The decisions on declassification are sometimes made by people who are not in a position to be able to evaluate the sensitivity of the information. Thus, information damaging to American national security has been released.
- The Act applies only to the Executive Branch, not to the judiciary or to the Congress (probably because Congressmen wrote the Act in the first place). Thus, it is hard to view matters in full context, since in many policy matters the documents from a single branch of government may be incomplete and even badly misleading. If we are con-

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cerned about "the public's right to know," we should ensure that the public obtains the fullest possible picture of events. FOIA should apply to Congress as well as to the Executive Branch.

- The declassification procedures are often exasperatingly slow, and reflect the basic principle that it is far more difficult to correct an original error than to avoid the mistake in the first place.

- The most devastating consequence of the FOIA is that officials of the Executive Branch, fearful that anything they write may be dragged into public view at some later date, take care to craft their written documents in such a way that they cannot cause future embarrassment. This means that many of the most crucial decisions cannot be documented—officials either do not write it down, or write it down in a way to place themselves in the most favorable possible light. Thus the historians of the post-FOIA world are going to have an extremely difficult time reconstructing contemporary events. No less a personage than Dr. Henry Kissinger has said that, henceforth, the crucial exchanges between government officials will be spoken—either face-to-face or on the telephone—rather than written.

So once again, efforts to make government more open to public scrutiny end by producing the opposite effect.

The Media

MANY VIOLATIONS of secrecy occur through the media, which are used by those who hold the secrets to convey secret information to the public. Since the media play such a central role in the conflict between openness and secrecy, they are invariably at the center of the debate. This is sometimes unfair, for the major burden for keeping secrets should fall upon those who hold them: officials of the American Government. And in cases where abuses of power are occurring, there may be no other way to call the practitioners to account, other than "leaking" the facts to the media. But this does not mean that the media should be exempt from accountability, even though some American media spokesmen have made claims that verge on such a position.

In extreme cases, the media have claimed for themselves the rights and privileges of a secret intelligence agency: total protection of sources and methods, a unilateral right to decide whether to pay for information and when or whether to release it, and a refusal to subject their analyses or even claims as to matters of fact to outside authority for evaluation. In essence, such a position amounts to a total right of secrecy for the media, with all the attendant risks of abuse that exist in other institutions. Democracy needs a free press, but it also needs a responsible press. If, as media spokesmen constantly argue, government can only be made accountable if it is open, why should the media—unique among all major American institutions—avoid accountability by being granted the right of total secrecy?

The media respond by stressing the importance of protecting their sources, arguing that if journalists were routinely required to identify them, there would undoubtedly be a shortage of "inside" sources. There is something to this; people are more likely to provide explosive information behind the shield of anonymity than to go "on the record." And an open society needs to encourage people to tell the truth to the public, even when the truth is terribly embarrassing. Thus it is essential that sources be protected whenever possible. But should this protection extend to cases where journalists hold information essential to the identification of criminals? Should it apply to cases where information clearly damaging to national security has been supplied to the media, and through them to our enemies? If, as Justice Holmes put it, a man has no right to cry "fire" in a crowded theater, do the media have the right to jeopardize the national security because sensitive information has been placed in their hands?

If it were agreed that the media do not have an absolute right to reveal secrets, and

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formalized into law, some of the information currently reaching the public would remain secret. Contrary to the claims of the advocates of ever-greater openness, this might actually help the policy process. For one thing, members of Congress would not be able to blackmail the Executive Branch by threatening to "leak" information about actions of which they disapprove. If legislators disagreed with proposed actions, they—like others charged with responsibility for foreign policy—would have to make a convincing case within the policy-making fora. Furthermore, without the constant threat of secret information finding its way into the media, candor would increase, thus making it more likely that good policy will emerge. And finally, as foreign governments come to realize that secrets can be kept in the United States, they will share a greater quantity of sensitive information with us, to the great benefit of our policies.

Veil, by Bob Woodward, shows all the flaws of the current state of affairs. Woodward presents dozens of stories about alleged CIA operations, some true, some false, some half-true, as is inevitable with a person writing under pressure of a deadline about highly complex matters. There is little concern for national security (indeed, if he is telling the truth, he has almost certainly doomed several foreign citizens who made the mistake of cooperating with the government of the United States), and in one major respect the damage exists whether or not the book is accurate. For anyone contemplating bringing sensitive information to an American government official, a book like *Veil* will freeze the blood, since it shows both that American officials talk about subjects that are properly secret, and that American journalists will write about anything, whatever the potential cost of life, limb or the national interest. In my view, such a book ought not to be published.

It will be objected that this is a call for censorship, no matter how limited it may be. This is quite true, but other democracies' experience with the censorship of sensitive national security information should encourage skeptics to conclude that the gains will outweigh the undeniable losses.

Americans are usually surprised to learn that even in countries where the national interest is explicitly held to be superior to the requirements for free speech, journalists often find the arrangements quite satisfactory. I attended a seminar three years ago in Israel on the role of military censorship; the participants, to a man, were highly critical of the Begin government in office at the time, and could have been expected to attack the practice of military censorship. I was amazed to hear that all of them—including the editors of the leading newspapers in the country—agreed that they had never been prevented from publishing a story which they felt urgently needed to be told. In fact, several of them said that they wished the censor had been more active in certain cases, because they had published stories which, in retrospect, they wished they had not.

Israeli journalism is every bit as aggressive and rough-and-tumble as the American variety, and the reaction of the Israelis should give us all pause. On the other hand, there are clearly dangers of excess in the practice of censorship, as I believe has occurred in the British efforts to suppress *Spycatcher*, a book which provides very little new information (most of it had appeared in books published in Great Britain), and reveals nothing of any sensitive activities in the past fifteen years. We need to find a reasonable middle ground between those who think that secrecy is solely the responsibility of the government (and hence the media alone should decide whether to publish or broadcast anything that comes into their possession), and those who believe that anything "classified" should remain out of public sight.

Towards a Fair Balance

THE DEMANDS of secrecy versus openness bring into conflict two legitimate, but opposed interests. Good policy, good relations, and successful operations

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all require at least a certain degree of secrecy, and it will not do for the advocates of openness to demand that all or even most classified information become public knowledge. On the other hand, the public is entitled to reasonably complete information.

The ideal solution is for the Executive Branch to explain its policies, and the thinking that went into their formulation, as fully as it possibly can, so that the public can at least follow the analytical process. No one can reasonably demand that the government share its secrets with the world at large, but it is certainly reasonable to expect our leaders to explain to us what they are doing, and (to the extent possible) why. Thus, while the public is not entitled to know what foreign leaders said to our officials in private conversations, our top policy-makers should be able to give the American public the "lessons learned" from such conversations. The same principle applies to other areas where secret information plays a role in policy: the secrets should remain secret, but the consequences of the secrets should be shared.

To be sure, this ideal is far more easily stated than practiced, for even with the best will in the world, governments must sometimes withhold information from the public. But this almost always attaches to operations, and not to overall policy. The exception to this rule is the case of a secret operation, which, if successful, would lead to a substantive shift in overall policy, as in the case of the secret diplomacy that led to Nixon's *demarche* to the People's Republic of China. Since most Americans approve of the results of the secret diplomacy, there has been little criticism of the way in which it was conducted. But many of the stinging attacks that have been directed at Reagan's handling of the Iran-*contra* initiatives can just as easily be aimed at Nixon and Kissinger for the China policy, or, for that matter, at F.D.R. for his covert assistance to Great Britain in 1939–41. Both were in conflict with the publicly-stated objectives of American foreign policy; both were carried out behind the backs of Congress. The difference between these initiatives and the Reagan debacle is that they achieved their objectives before they were discovered. Here there is no formula for salvation: successes are applauded, and failures condemned, and that is that. But in both the Nixon and Roosevelt cases, had the policy been made public at the time it was being conducted, the national outcry would have been deafening, and the policy would have been wrecked. Would Messrs. Inouye and Hamilton retroactively approve a full investigation into both affairs, complete with public exposure of the role of foreign agents (like Intrepid) and private American citizens in the operations? Would Mr. Hamilton lecture F.D.R. about the superiority of publicly-debated policy over secret operations, when it is quite likely Great Britain would have foundered without the secret American support?

Whatever the evaluation of a given policy, there is nothing to be said for the shocking disclosure of secrets that has accompanied the debate and investigations. Much has been made about the conflict between Congress and the Executive Branch during the Iran-*contra* hearings, but in fairness to the legislators it must be said that by far the greater leakage of secrets has come from the Executive Branch. From the very beginning, the White House, the State Department and the CIA have shown a remarkable insensitivity to the requirements for secrecy. The names of sensitive foreign contacts have been revealed, the formats of secret American documents (such as presidential "findings") have been made public (thereby enabling the KGB to make better forgeries), methods and names of secret communications have been published, and the inner workings of the intelligence community have been held up for public examination. In short, those who wish to obtain our secrets have been provided with many of them, and given a road map to those they may wish to acquire in the future. While much of this information has emerged from the testimony, depositions, and documentation released by the various investigatory committees of Congress, the bulk of it was unilaterally made available by the White

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House, and much was published by the Tower Commission, which was appointed by the President.

Some feeble case might be made for the astonishing refusal of the White House to assert any degree of "executive privilege" in this matter (although those foreigners who cooperated with us in the belief we would never reveal their identities would no doubt disagree), there is even less to be said for the wholesale delivery of secret documents to the "independent counsel," Judge Walsh. The members of his staff obtained instant clearances, and could not have received the sort of exhaustive background investigations to which the authors of the secret documents were subjected. Unlike the officials of the government itself, the Walsh people were not required to demonstrate a valid "need to know" the contents of, for example, *all* of the NSC documents concerning international terrorism and the steps taken by this country to combat it. There are many foreign governments who would love to know the contents of those documents; have steps been taken to ensure the full security of the Walsh operation? One can only say, on the basis of a few trips to their offices, that there is little sign of thoroughgoing physical security. But that is not the central issue here; the point is that the Executive Branch quite quickly abandoned the fight to keep its secrets secret; thereafter, many national secrets were in the hands of a variety of people, many of whom were reading their first secret document. Thus did the Reagan Administration demonstrate its lack of seriousness in the defense of its own secrets.

If there is to be any hope for a reasonable approach to the question of secrecy, the Executive Branch will have to do far better. It must fight for the right to retain secrets, at the same time that it shows greater sensitivity to the public's right to be informed about the basic elements in our foreign policy. It must initiate the national debate on the need to protect secrets, including some measures to call the media to greater accountability. And it must engage the Congress, the courts and the media in such a way as to produce a workable compromise between the two legitimate demands—for secrecy and openness—that are today so violently in conflict in our society. Since this administration clearly lacks the vision and the will to embark on such a challenging enterprise, we can only hope that the next president will be capable of doing so.

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U.S.–Japanese Trade: Yes, Blame America First

Steve H. Hanke

AFTER THE disastrous consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, Congress effectively removed itself from much of the detail associated with trade policy. This gave the Executive Branch a wide scope in formulating and implementing trade policy. In the 1980s, however, Congress has become increasingly uneasy with its secondary role.

In an attempt to reassert its authority and regain control over the micro–management of trade policy, more than twenty congressional committees have drafted two trade bills: H.R.3, which was passed by the House in April 1987 and S.1420, which was passed in the Senate in July 1987. Both bills are broadly similar and unprecedented in their scope. Indeed, each gives the appearance of a large metropolitan telephone book. At present, an unwieldy conference committee, composed of 155 Congressmen and 43 Senators, is attempting to hammer out what promises to be a comprehensive and decidedly protectionist trade bill.

Much of the impetus for the mercantilist mood in Congress has been derived from our growing trade deficit with Japan. Politicians, pundits and some so-called analysts argue that the U.S.-Japanese trade gap is caused by the fact that our markets are open to goods from Japan, while Japanese markets are closed to goods from the U.S. In consequence, the American public holds the view that the trade gap with Japan is bad, and that it is caused because we are "right" and the Japanese are "wrong." This piece of conventional wisdom, more than any other, has allowed the Congress to follow a rather reckless trade course. Given the unprecedented power of this U.S.-Japanese trade argument, a bit of reflection on its underpinnings is warranted.

GOVERNMENTS can close markets by imposing tariffs, quotas, or so-called non-tariff barriers. A review of Japan's record in these areas is both revealing and surprising.*

Japan's tariffs are among the lowest in the world—along with Switzerland's and Sweden's. For manufactured goods, Japan's average tariff level is 36 percent lower than ours. Japan's highest tariffs are imposed on 20 agricultural products, but even here, tariffs are low by international norms. This explains why Japan is the world's largest net importer

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*For a more complete review see: Gary Bank, *The Japanese Trade Threat: Myths and Realities*, (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, February 1982).

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of agricultural produce, and why it is the largest importer of American beef, pork, chicken, grain sorghum, grapefruit, limes and lemons, and the second-largest market for our soybeans and wheat.

Japan has one of the best international records for eliminating quota restrictions. Since the early 1960s, the Japanese have reduced the number of items covered by quotas by 85 percent. Furthermore, Japan has raised ceilings on items still covered by quotas. In consequence, quotas are not as binding as they once were. This is substantiated by the fact that, during the 1970s, the value of Japan's imports covered by quotas grew at an annual rate of 21 percent, a rate that almost matched the 22 percent rate of import growth for items not covered by quotas.

Japan uses non-tariff barriers to a lesser extent than either the U.S. or the Common Market. This is shown in studies by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and by the fact that no complaints have been filed against Japan under the Agreement's "Standards Code."

If the fact that Japan does not close its markets is not enough, what is even more surprising is that U.S. laws close Japanese markets to the shipment of products from the U.S. Specifically, our laws prohibit oil produced in Alaska and unprocessed logs cut on federally owned lands—both products that the Japanese would desperately like to purchase from the U.S. in large volumes—from being exported to Japan. So the U.S., not Japan, has closed the Japanese market to major U.S. exports.

Although this untold trade tale is rather shocking, it provides the U.S. with an opportunity to act unilaterally to defuse the troublesome U.S.-Japanese trade issue and set our trade relations with Japan straight. The Reagan Administration should propose legislation to lift restrictions on Alaskan oil and federal log exports. This action would reduce our annual trade deficit with Japan by at least 50 percent. In consequence, it would disarm the mercantilists in the Congress and put them in a defensive, if not embarrassing, position. To succeed in these efforts, however, the Administration must be prepared to counter the faulty arguments that produced these restrictions in the first place.

In January 1968, significant oil and gas reserves were discovered at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska's North Slope (ANS). Following the ANS discoveries, there was much Congressional testimony and debate about alternative plans for transporting oil and gas to market. Finally, in 1973, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act was passed. This allowed for the construction of a pipeline across federally owned lands from the ANS to southern Alaska—where crude oil could be loaded on tankers at the port of Valdez and shipped to market. This Act included the requirement that any exports to noncontiguous countries, such as Japan, must first receive presidential approval.

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act established two criteria for determining whether exports would be allowed: first, the President must conclude that exports "would not diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum refined within, stored within, or legally committed to be transported to and sold within the United States," and second, if the President makes such a determination, then he is required to report his findings to Congress, which can then overturn such a presidential export initiative by passing a joint resolution within 60 days. The 1977 and 1979 amendments to the Export Administration Act (EAA) placed additional restrictions on the export of oil to noncontiguous nations.

The tight restrictions contained in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act and the Export Administration Act make it almost impossible to export oil from Alaska to noncontiguous nations. Japan is hit particularly hard by these restrictions, since it imports almost all of its oil, and Alaska would, under free trade conditions, be Japan's least-cost supplier.

Like all trade restrictions, those placed on Alaskan oil are the product of concen-

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trated special interests. Hence, to understand why Alaskan oil is saddled with export restrictions, we must learn about special interest groups and their interventionist arguments. One special interest group is the maritime industry (the seamen's unions, domestic shipbuilders and U.S. shipowners). The maritime industry's interest in supporting restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil hinges on the existence of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which is commonly known as the Jones Act. The Jones Act mandates that waterborne commerce between U.S. ports be carried in U.S. built, owned, registered, and manned ships. When the maritime industry can successfully obtain legislation to limit the export of U.S. goods, it can—to the extent that these goods would then be traded within the U.S. and transported by water—artificially increase the demand for U.S. seamen and ships.

The maritime industry's support of restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil has paid large dividends. More than 90 percent of the U.S. flagship capacity, measured in deadweight tons, is committed to carrying oil from Alaska to U.S. ports.

ALTHOUGH it is true that the restrictions on exporting Alaskan oil have benefited maritime interests, the costs imposed on other industries and citizens are large, and they outweigh the gains to the maritime industry. The owners of Alaskan oil bear a major portion of these costs, since the market value of Alaska's oil assets is reduced because producers are required to transport their products in high-cost U.S. tankers to uneconomic destinations in the U.S. With the market price of oil given, high transportation costs mean not only pure economic waste, but also lower net receipts at the wellhead for Alaskan oil. The burden of lost value to Alaskan oil producers is considerable. Transportation charges are $.90 per barrel higher, if Alaskan oil is shipped to the West Coast of the U.S. rather than Japan, and $3.70 per barrel higher if the oil is shipped to the Gulf Coast.

By reducing the wellhead price of Alaskan oil, export restrictions mean that the incentives to explore for and develop more Alaskan reserves are reduced, since a portion of the value of any new discoveries (as well as existing reserves) is transferred from the oil industry to the maritime industry.

The environmentalists have joined the maritime industry lobbyists because they generally adopt a "Mother-Hubbard" view of natural resources. As they see it, there is a fixed quantity of various natural resources, and the nation's standard of living will decline rapidly as each natural resource "cupboard" becomes bare. Given this view, the environmentalists quite understandably support legislation that restricts the development and use of natural resources, since restrictions put off the day of reckoning. The environmentalists have supported restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil because they believe that, although export controls do not stop the development and use of Alaska's oil reserves, they at least slow down the process.

If the environmentalists' view of natural resources were correct, the real cost (inflation apart) of natural resources, including oil, would have been increasing over time. The plain facts, however, refute the environmentalists' theory of natural resource scarcity. The long-term costs of energy, for example, have been falling; energy is becoming less, not more, scarce. Consequently, the environmentalists' claim that government intervention is needed to save the U.S. from running out of low-cost oil and other natural resources is unsupportable.

If this were not enough, it should be mentioned that the environmentalists' support of restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil is inconsistent with a basic tenet of their ideology. They believe that resources should be wisely used and that, in particular, the value of natural resources should be enhanced. But the restrictions waste resources by unduly increasing the resources required to transport oil to market. In consequence, they also reduce the value (wellhead price) of Alaskan oil.

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Consumer groups also support export restrictions on Alaskan oil. This derives from their belief that, by keeping oil in the U.S. market, domestic oil prices will be lower than if exports were allowed.

Consumerists' arguments for export restrictions on Alaskan oil also lack merit; prices are not lower simply because oil is delivered to the lower forty-eight states from Alaska, rather than from other sources. Once produced, oil is sold in competitive markets. Hence, the delivered price of oil of a given quality and in a given market tends to be the same, regardless of its source.

Advocates of strong national security also support oil export restrictions. In their narrow view, a ban is justified because a self-sufficient oil supply will guarantee U.S. immunity from the supply disruptions caused by foreign wars and/or embargoes.

The national security alarmists' arguments for export restrictions are also flawed. Actually, such restrictions impede the attainment of energy security. U.S. restrictions on Alaskan oil exports force Japan, America's most important ally in the Far East, to depend almost entirely on Middle East OPEC producers for oil supplies. If the U.S. were to supply Japan with some of its oil, however, Japan's sources would be more diversified, and its energy supply more secure. This, in turn, would help the security position of the U.S.

The national security advocates should remember that they have, in a slightly different context, recognized the advantages of diversified sources and "trade" in oil. This is why they have been proponents of continued U.S. membership in the 21-nation International Energy Agency. Terms of membership in this group require the sharing of U.S. oil with other members in times of emergency. Thus, although the national security proponents favor no trade in Alaskan oil during non-crisis periods because it promotes our energy security, they argue that, during emergencies, forced "trade" should be mandated to ensure our security. Clearly, this group of interventionists has never quite gotten its facts or its analyses straight. They should realize that free trade and the diversification of supplies will enhance our security.

The increased value of Alaskan oil due to free trade would, of course, prompt more exploration and development of Alaskan oil and bring more crude oil to world markets, thus weakening OPEC's position and improving U.S. national security.

Free trade and the export of Alaskan oil would also eliminate the pure economic waste, from excessive transport costs, referred to earlier. This would benefit both the Japanese and U.S. economies, and in consequence, would contribute to the overall security positions of both.

ABOUT 50 percent of the nation's mature softwood inventories are located on federally-owned lands. In 1968, the so-called Morse Amendment to the Export Administration Act was passed. This amendment places an embargo on the export of unprocessed logs cut on federal lands. In addition, the amendment contains a provision that prohibits substitution: a firm that owns private timber cannot export unprocessed logs from its private land and then purchase federal timber for processing in its domestic mills.

As is the case with Alaskan oil, the ban on log exports is the brainchild of special interest groups. For example, owners of sawmills who depend on logs cut on federal land do not want federal logs exported. As they see it, the ban helps keep federal logs, which continue to become more difficult to obtain, at home. Thus, an export ban allegedly gives these mills a more secure supply of logs, and also helps to keep domestic log prices lower than they would otherwise be.

Environmentalists support the export ban as a way to reduce the demand for logs cut on timber-rich federal lands. Again, their "Mother-Hubbard" theory of natural resources applies: any policy that reduces natural resource use is a good policy.

The basis of the argument used by the mill owners and the environmentalists to support the ban on the export of federal logs

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has the same source: an alleged timber famine in the U.S. But, in fact, the U.S. has today a larger total inventory of commercial timber than it had at the turn of the century. This condition exists because the annual growth of federal timber exceeds the amount harvested by at least 150 percent. To the extent that there is a famine, it has been created artificially by federal restrictions on the annual allowable harvest in public forests. The government could alleviate this condition either by privatizing its commercial timberlands or changing its method for determining the annual amount of timber cuttings.

In addition to yielding more logs, such changes would greatly enhance the environmental and wildlife values derived from these forestlands. At present, most federal timber is "overripe." In consequence, it is subject to "blow-down," disease and fire, which are problems associated with old age. If the "overmature" timber is cut and the forests replanted, the environmental and wildlife problems that are generated on old-growth timber stands would be eliminated.

The wood-products processing industry supports a log-export ban because they want to export finished products, not logs. They see the ban as a way to force foreigners to purchase finished goods rather than logs. By exporting finished products, rather than logs, the wood-products processing industry argues that it could generate more employment and income.

This argument would have merit only if the U.S. enjoyed monopoly power in the market for finished products. But no such monopoly exists, since the international market for finished products is very competitive. If this were not enough, Japan has literally thousands of mills that produce finished products. With an international competitive log market, these mills have been able to switch to other log sources since the ban. In consequence, the Japanese are by no means in a position where they can be held hostage by U.S. processing mills as the result of our unwillingness to sell them federal logs.

The net result of the ban, then, has not been an increase in employment and value-added in the U.S. wood-products industry. Rather, it has been a loss of employment and income because we no longer cut and ship federal logs overseas.

FOR ALL of its trade-liberalization rhetoric, the Reagan Administration has done little more than backslide on this issue. Of late, this retreat has turned into a near surrender in which the Congress has taken the initiative on trade policy and is threatening to erect new trade barriers.

To avert the consequences of protectionism and possibly a destructive trade war, the President must not only veto any trade bill crafted by the Congressional conference committee, but he must personally eliminate the mercantilists' most effective weapon: our contentious trade relations with Japan. This will, indeed, require courage, since the President will have to tell the American people an untold trade tale, one in which the Americans, not the Japanese, are cast as the villains. What is more, the President will have to be prepared to explode the arguments employed by powerful special interests to rationalize our self-imposed embargoes on U.S. exports to Japan.

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Four Myths about Africa

Nick Eberstadt

OVER THE past few years, the Administration, the House, and the Senate have considered economic aid proposals that respond to wide-spread public concern about the plight and prospects of sub-Saharan Africa's populations. In their analyses of the sub-Saharan region's current problems, views of future solutions to these difficulties, and recommendations for American action, these various proposals have been broadly parallel.

All have been animated by the humanitarian generosity for which the United States is rightly renowned, and have reflected the preferences of the American public that the blessings of the twentieth century, including the prosperity that twentieth century knowledge has made possible, be generally available.

Unfortunately, none of these proposals can be expected to advance those objectives effectively. To the contrary: there seems to be good reason to worry whether the funds marshalled in these proposed efforts would not be turned instead to ill-advised or even harmful purposes.

The risk arises because these proposals betray some serious misunderstandings about the nature of the problems facing the local populations in the sub-Sahara. Four problems seem to be particularly misunderstood: population, environmental degradation, debt relief, and "policy reform."

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Population

MOST INSTITUTIONS and individuals involved today in dispensing Western aid to African governments identify population growth as a major obstacle to development in the sub-Sahara and elsewhere. M. Peter McPherson, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) from 1981 until Fall 1987, has stated, for example, that "the critical problem of excessive population growth in the Third World . . . constitutes the primary obstacle to increasing per capita food production, reducing malnutrition and chronic disease, and conserving dwindling nonrenewable resources." Organizations and individuals of similar view have advocated vigorous population programs for sub-Saharan Africa, to be financed in large part by donations and tax funds from the West.

By and large, this view ignores both the reasons for population growth in Africa today, and the likely consequences of aggressive government-sponsored population policies.

As best can be told, population growth has accelerated rapidly throughout sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Second World War. *The principal cause of this acceleration has been a pronounced and general drop in the death rate.* (In some areas, it appears that

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fertility may also have increased, but increases in fertility are thought to have been a decidedly secondary factor in the acceleration of population growth for the region as a whole.) Declining death rates, of course, mean that life expectancy is increasing. A pervasive drop in death rates in sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, would indicate a correspondingly pervasive improvement in health conditions over previous levels.[1]

A fact neglected in much of the discussion of the "population problem" in sub-Saharan Africa is that parents throughout the region appear to prefer large families. The preference is strong, and it is pervasive. It is shared across language groups, and spans the income scale; indeed, even Africa's educated elites show an unmistakable preference for large families. Under such circumstances, population programs which seek to reduce parental fertility are likely to be viewed with the deepest suspicion by those who are supposed to benefit most from such programs.

An additional complication arises from the tribal character of contemporary sub-Saharan rule. The overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan countries are composed of collections of tribal groups; typically, governments are dominated by tribes that are in competition with, or hostile toward, other populations within the same territorial boundaries. Post-colonial African history is replete with instances in which government has been used as a tool of tribal war. Under these circumstances, vigorous population programs run the risk of fraying political fabrics even further. How such tensions would contribute to "long-term development" is not immediately apparent.

American advocates of population programs for sub-Saharan Africa typically insist that they favor voluntary family planning. They typically suggest that they wish parents to be able to attain the family size that parents themselves desire. Their claims are contradicted by the very nature of the programs they are helping to devise.

In most of sub-Saharan Africa, it is *infertility*—not unwanted pregnancies—that women rank as the top problem. The fate of a barren woman in much of the sub-sahara is a pitiable one. Yet little attention is accorded by western experts to the "population problem" that most concerns Africans *themselves*.

If family planning were to be truly voluntary, moreover, population programs would not be linked to numerical population targets, set as objectives for governments to achieve. The groups which promote "voluntary" population programs for sub-Saharan Africa, however, typically see no contradiction in attaching targets of fertility alteration to these programs—even when the explicit goals with regard to fertility alteration are radical and extreme. In Ghana, for example, "voluntary" family planning programs co-exist in the government's population program with a target to see national fertility levels reduced by half by the year 2000. How the government might meet such a target voluntarily is by no means clear.

Environmental Degradation

IT HAS often been suggested that a principal cause of sub-Saharan Africa's current economic difficulty is the environment. Many in the aid community have asserted that the region's agricultural—and nutritional—problems have resulted from unusual shortfalls in rain, the progressive extension of the deserts, and deteriorations resulting from population growth.

Such arguments, however, are both misinformed and misleading. There is no "natural" connection between drought and famine in the modern world—even in poor countries. India, for example, suffered serious failures during and after its monsoons for two years in a row in the mid 1960s; the impact on food production was severe, but India did not

[1]Population figures for sub-Saharan Africa are very much less accurate and comprehensive than some commentators seem to suppose. There is, for example, not a single country in the sub-Sahara with a near-complete registration system for either births or deaths.

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experience famine as a consequence. Even in a poor society, a government can cope with drought in such a way as to minimize or prevent a rise in death rates—if it is interested in doing so.

Throughout much of the sub-Sahara, erratic rainfall patterns have been a long-standing meteorological condition. The written historical record for most of the sub-Sahara is comparatively recent. As best can be told, however, variations in precipitation did not automatically trigger famines in the sub-Sahara in the past—even though localities were typically more isolated, less monetized, and further removed from avenues of outside assistance than they are today. Evidence suggests that local households and communities, then as now, provided for contingency. If these preparations are today in certain areas more likely to be insufficient, one must ask why this would be the case.

The record in Ethiopia under Marxist-Leninist rule may provide a partial answer. In the years since the *Derg* took power, the country's agricultural system has undergone forced collectivization; its educated and skilled personnel have been terrorized; its relief for the needy, when provided, has been meted out with ethnic and political selectivity. Famine would be the likely eventual result of such practices *entirely irrespective of local weather patterns.*

Ethiopia is by no means the only state in the sub-Sahara where adverse results of government policy are sometimes ascribed to the weather. In Tanzania, for example, regional and countrywide food shortages have been officially blamed on the weather for more than a decade. Such explanations ignore the economic and human costs of Tanzania's *ujamaa* program of comprehensive, forced agricultural collectivization.

Finally, there has been much talk of the impact of desertification and environmental degradation on sub-Saharan agriculture. These discussions have been largely anecdotal in nature, focusing on particular stories rather than comprehensive statistics. Such discussions testify to the sorry state of statistical services in the sub-Sahara. Governments which have so much difficulty (and in some cases, so little interest) in counting their own populations are not likely to be able to document changing ecological conditions with either ease or accuracy.

Statistics pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa must be used with caution and care, for they are less reliable than often seems to be assumed. For what it is worth, however, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has attempted to assemble estimates of agricultural trends for the various sub-Saharan countries. According to these numbers, there has been considerable variation in performance among countries in the sub-Sahara since the late 1960s. The countries with the worst performance trends over the period from 1969/71 to 1983/85, by these estimates, were Angola, Ghana, and Mozambique. None of these countries are in the Sahel—the sub-Saharan region most seriously affected by drought.

According to the USDA's estimates, per capita output of agricultural goods fell by over forty percent in both Ghana and Mozambique between 1969/71 and 1983/85. Over those same years, per capita agricultural output is estimated to have risen in both the Ivory Coast and Malawi. The Ivory Coast shares a long border with Ghana; Malawi is adjacent to, and in fact largely surrounded by, Mozambique. If weather and environment were decisive factors in the agricultural and economic problems of the sub-Sahara today, one would not expect to witness such strikingly different performance records in neighboring countries.

Preoccupation with the specter of environmental degradation can divert attention from the role of civil order and enlightened government policy in promoting agricultural progress. Political decay, domestic turmoil, and destructive economic or social policies may be expected to affect the ways in which rural populations maintain and enhance the productivity of soil, forests, or pastoral lands. The converse does not obtain.

Preoccupation with environmental deg-

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radation, moreover, tends to focus undue attention on agriculture and agricultural production. Although its role is important, agriculture is but a single sector within the economy of even the poorest countries. It is purchasing power which is essential to the well-being of local households, rather than production levels of any single commodity. Increasing local agricultural production often coincides with broad material advance, but it is not indispensible to this process. Between the late 1960s and the mid 1980s, for example, Japan's per capita agricultural output fell by about ten percent—yet few people would view those as years of economic retrogression in Japan.

Debt Relief

THE CALL for debt relief figures prominently in the aid community's recent proposals for the sub-Sahara. "Rescheduling" the sub-Saharan states' official debt to the United States government would involve a partial or full forgiveness of outstanding loans which in total currently amount to over $2.5 billion. The disbursed and outstanding multilateral and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to "low income Africa" that Congressional draft legislation would wish to affect totalled over $16 billion at the end of 1985 by the most recent available published estimate of the World Bank, and would presumably be even greater today.

These amounts, however, pale in comparison with the concessions that have already been requested in international fora—proposals, it should be noted, about which Administration officials have to date made only favorable general comments. The United Nations Programme of Action for African Recovery and Development 1986–1990, adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in June 1986, would require, in the estimate of the Organization for African Unity, the forgiveness of *$35–$55 billion* in outstanding international debts to sub-Saharan states.[2]

The idea that debt relief would stimulate material advance in the sub-Sahara arises from a number of seriously mistaken impressions. It is a mistake, for example, to assume that the governments in question "simply can't pay back" the money they have borrowed—much less make good on the other obligations to which they have committed themselves in contract. In most countries in the sub-Sahara, key industries have been nationalized in the post-colonial period, and government owned enterprises now figure prominently in the economy. Most of these governments have other saliable assets as well.

It is a mistake, moreover, to assume that the actions which might facilitate the redemption of these obligations would necessarily prejudice prospects for material advance, or endanger the poorest populations of the countries in question. To the contrary: the policy changes which would enable sub-Saharan states to repay their debts more easily are consistent with renewed economic growth and improved popular welfare—including improved welfare for the poorest fractions of these local populations.

The "debt crisis" now afflicting sub-Saharan Africa is, to a very significant degree, a crisis of productivity. Repayment problems have typically arisen because the borrowing states have not earned with the foreign capital at their disposal sums sufficient to meet the original—and often extremely forebearing—interest and amortization schedules for their loans. The same policies that led to low rates of return on borrowed foreign capital also depressed exports, discouraged cost management in public and private enterprises, and restricted the economic opportunities of the less privileged ethnic groups and social strata.

[2]Since this total could far exceed the estimated total of disbursed and outstanding debt of "low income Africa" to Western governments and multilateral development banks, it would seem to envision a substantial "rescheduling" of African states' debts to private lenders as well.

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It is a mistake to think that forgiving official loans from the West to the governments of the sub-Sahara will necessarily, unambiguously, or even generally reduce the *prospective burdens and privations for* Africa's subject populations in the years to come. As has been noted, much of the lending to "low income Africa" in the postwar period has been arranged on extremely easy terms. In 1985 (the latest year for which the World Bank has provided comprehensive estimates) over $35 billion of official loans from Western governments and multilateral organizations were disbursed and outstanding to the governments of "low income Africa." This sum was estimated to account for over four-fifths of all international loans to these countries. Since almost all official loans to the sub-Sahara are arranged on terms more favorable than could be negotiated in the commercial marketplace, this means that about four-fifths of the international borrowings of "low income Africa" are concessional in nature.

If concessional lending involves an element of charity, it correspondingly reduces the rate of return that must be earned on borrowed money in order to pay it back. In Africa's current circumstances, we must ask whether it is a kindness to the local populations of the sub-Sahara to hold their rulers to a lower standard of economic performance than the one that commercial borrowers must expect to maintain if they are to attract and repay foreign capital. It is, after all, not the populations of the sub-Sahara who have been granted concessional loans from the West: such lending has, to the contrary, been awarded to their rulers.

The terms upon which a state may secure funding can go far in shaping its own expectations and conduct. Needless to say, most governments in the sub-Sahara, in their present straits, do not need to be encouraged to be less thrifty, less accountable, or to confuse more thoroughly the concepts of commerce and charity. Yet this is precisely what the extension of concessional lending to the sub-Sahara has served to do.

Debt relief would vastly intensify this problem. To enforce further debt relief on official loans is necessarily to reduce the rate of return that is expected on those particular funds borrowed by those particular states. Already the real rate of interest on much of the official lending to the sub-Sahara is zero, or negative. To drive down the real rate of interest on those loans still further will have the effect of excusing local policies that have been positively destructive in their economic consequence.

Retroactively excusing the rulers of the sub-Sahara from their international obligations would not seem to be the most promising strategy by which to encourage governmental accountability and responsibility. Nor would such a signal be expected to bolster civic virtue—a quality already in extremely scarce supply in much of the sub-Sahara. To the contrary: lawfulness in sub-Saharan Africa may be expected to suffer directly as a consequence of any general debt relief program advanced, or endorsed, by Western countries. The primary victims of such a policy, in the event, will not be Western taxpayers, but rather the very groups and individuals that their funds are meant to help.

"Policy Reform"

PROPONENTS OF extra aid to the sub-Sahara are today virtually unanimous in recommending that American funds be used to promote "economic policy reform." The idea is that self-sustaining economic development can be fostered by paying governments to adopt policies believed to be conducive to this general purpose.

The concept of "economic policy reform" aid is no longer new. It represents the current orthodoxy among official institutions dispensing development aid to governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has for a number of years identified "policy reform" as one of the four principal overseas objectives to be secured by its spending. By the same token, the World Bank has for the better part of a decade awarded "structural adjustment" loans to recipient states; such

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loans, which constitute an increasing fraction of World Bank lending, are not attached to any specific project (as the Bank's Articles of Agreement require every loan to be), but instead are expected to underwrite changes in government policy. The previously mentioned UN Programme of Action explains much of its request for external aid in terms of the need to support "policy reform" in the sub-Sahara.

Indeed, some American enthusiasts have already come to believe that public monies are no longer enough to encourage "policy reform." In October 1985, in a now famous speech, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker suggested that American banks loan an additional $20 billion to specific debtor governments, above and beyond the level these banks took to be commercially prudent. The rationale for attempting to direct additional private capital into states to which the proposed creditors thought it ought not go, Baker explained, was that these funds might help the states in question undertake "policy reforms" that would eventually make them creditworthy.

In the abstract, few observers would oppose the prospect of "policy reform" or "economic policy reform" in sub-Saharan Africa. Far from it. To the extent that sub-Saharan Africa's current circumstances are the result of the practices and actions of local governments, corrective steps by these states would be not only economically beneficial, but absolutely necessary to enhancing prospects for material advance.

Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect foreign aid programs financed under the rubric of "policy reform" to be capable of bringing about these corrective steps, or even of supporting corrective adjustments in any general fashion.

The "policy reform" programs for less developed countries that are currently so popular with, and so heavily subsidized by, agencies dispensing public development aid from the West neglect a simple but rather important fact. The actions of a government depend upon the intentions of the rulers. Providing a government with additional, windfall, resources will increase its freedom to maneuver. This will make it easier for the group or groups in power to pursue their own objectives, whatever these may be. Additional resources will not, in themselves, alter the intentions of the group or groups in power.

By and large, the intentions of governments are altered most effectively by altering the group in power. Since few regimes view their own liquidation with equanimity, proponents of "policy reform" programs face a dilemma. If a government voluntarily accepts aid for "policy reform" this will likely mean that the group or groups in power have come to the conclusion that the program would not interfere with the pursuit of the regime's own intentions. If, on the other hand, a program of "policy reform" promises significantly to constrain, compromise, or alter the ability of the regime to pursue its ambitions, and if the acceptance of such aid is the prerogative of the state in question, such a "policy reform" package will likely be refused by the group or groups in power—and may well be decried as an attempt to interfere in domestic affairs or to impinge upon national sovereignty.

Providing a government with the aid to pursue its own intentions more effectively need not conduce to either material advance or the well-being of the local population. This has been demonstrated on more than one occasion in post-colonial Africa. We may recall Tanzania's ill-fated *ujamaa* program, previously mentioned. That program, which involved the forced collectivization of so much of the country's rural population, and did so much to shatter the country's agricultural economy, was financed in large part by overseas development aid, particularly aid from the World Bank. Surveying these Tanzanian results in the late 1970s, W. David Hopper, then and now a Vice President of the Bank, wrote that "as long as food aid . . . is supplied to Tanzania by the industrial countries, the social experiment (i.e., *ujamaa*) will continue." One may wonder not only about the continuance of *ujamaa*, but about

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its initiation; would a program so manifestly destructive in its economic consequence have been undertaken in the first place without assured sources of overseas aid?

Not all sub-Saharan governments, of course, have demonstrated the contempt for their subjects and indifference to economic result that have been articulated so clearly over the years by the rulers of Tanzania. At the same time, the constellation of intentions represented in the many governments of the sub-Sahara can, in total, hardly be described as an auspicious point of departure. Liberty, integrity of person, security of property, rule of law—these exist in a handful of places in the sub-Sahara. What should we expect from programs that will empower current governments to pursue more effectively their ambitions and objectives?

Even with aid that is tied to a given project, the intentions and capabilities of the recipient government are of enormous importance. "Project aid," however, is supposed to result in a tangible product—the project itself. A given project—a road, a dam, an agricultural research station—may be shown to have been a failure. By contrast, no program of "policy reform" can ever be demonstrated to have failed. If original targets and objectives of "reform" are not achieved, it may always be argued that unforeseeable events were to blame, that the project itself was a success, and that things would have been even worse without it.

USAID's record of achieving the initial objectives of its "policy reform" programs has to date been extremely unpromising. It is no secret that, since at least the early 1970s, USAID has been explicitly concerned ever more with relief work and social welfare, ever less with the particulars of fostering conditions conducive to "self-sustaining economic development." This is a trend which has been actively and purposefully encouraged by Congress.

Yet the fact is that development agencies and public financial institutions with more freedom to maneuver have not fared much better than AID in their attempts to enforce "policy reform" on the "partners" receiving their aid. The World Bank's structural adjustment initiative has been described as innovative and successful, and not only by World Bank personnel themselves. With the possible exception of Turkey, however, I am not aware of a single instance in which a country awarded "structural adjustment" funds has subsequently been judged more creditworthy, or more attractive to investment, by the international financial community. Even in Turkey, subsequent events were decisively influenced by a military coup that overturned the government with which the "policy reform" program had been negotiated. As for the International Monetary Fund, a number of studies by European and American economists have suggested that recipients of its "short term" assistance are quite likely to be return candidates for further "temporary" aid. While the IMF has a reputation for imposing strict conditions with its loans, results suggest that its actual ability (or inclination) to enforce "conditionality" may be limited. Whereas for example IMF loans are typically extended to help local governments achieve "stabilization" of their economies, such loans have frequently been followed by a prolonged period of rapid or even accelerating domestic inflation—precisely the opposite of what "stabilization" is commonly understood to entail.

There is at least one avenue of "policy reform" that proponents of "policy reform" aid programs often neglect to consider. It is called the international marketplace. The international marketplace has at its disposal considerable amounts of lendable capital. It is also quite flexible, being capable of extending capital to borrowing countries through quite a variety of different "programs." The international marketplace is constantly testing and assessing the "policy environment" of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. If the local environment is deemed to be auspicious, funds will be available, both to private concerns and to local governments. If the "policy environment" is deemed to be inauspicious, new funds will no longer be

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available, or will be available only at a premium—or will be available only after the international marketplace is satisfied that effective corrective steps are actually in progress (not simply promised).

In the international marketplace, unlike development aid agencies, the "review process" takes place daily. It occurs spontaneously, and relies on an information system more complex and far-reaching than any development official might attempt deliberately to construct. This version of "conditionality," moreover, often actually does cut the supply of international funds to governments when these governments violate the letter or the spirit of their international agreements and obligations. Note that this avenue of "policy reform" does not presuppose ongoing subsidization by Western taxpayers.

No marketplace, of course, operates with perfect efficiency. If they did, there could be no role for, or purpose to, entrepreneurship. And insofar as they articulate human choices, markets may also articulate errors in judgment. Yet it is one thing to recognize these realities, and quite another to improve upon them.

The burden of proof is on the proponents of "policy reform" programs. They must be able to argue that their interventions will be more conducive to "policy reform" than nothing at all—that is to say, than simply allowing the international marketplace to enforce "policy reform" on states which would, without development aid, be obliged to establish creditworthiness by actions and conduct consonant with attracting capital. Moreover, proponents of "policy reform" aid programs should be prepared to argue that the reforms they propose to purchase from local governments would constitute so dramatic an improvement over the ordinary workings of the international marketplace as to justify the taxation of Western populations to underwrite the process.

IN CRITICIZING specific initiatives being implemented in, or considered for, sub-Saharan Africa, I do not mean that there is little to be done to improve the economic prospects for the region. Exactly the opposite is true.

Greater governmental interest in civil order and respect for property—including the property of their own subjects—could be expected to have a predictable and positive impact not only on the ability of the sub-Saharan states to repay their debts, but also on the well-being of local subject populations. Pursuit of more liberal trade regimes and domestic policies would perhaps increase the capacity to generate not only export revenues, but also domestic output, demand for labor, and ultimately, purchasing power for the poor.

The World Bank's 1986 *World Development Report* gives breakdowns of central government expenditures for sixteen sub-Saharan states, excluding South Africa. (That the Bank can provide such figures for less than half of the sub-Saharan states in its statistical appendix is revealing in itself—perhaps especially in what it portends for ongoing and proposed "policy reform" programs.) For the sixteen countries as a group, the unweighted average of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to central government expenditure in 1983 was just below fifty percent. Western aid, including American aid, directly underwrites current policies and practices in the sub-Sahara. Indeed, it may make possible some of the more injurious policies which would be impossible to finance without external help. It might be well to consider the moral and practical consequences of this arrangement before underwriting it on an even greater scale.

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Socialist Prisons and Imprisoned Minds

Paul Hollander

AMONG THE factors making for an unsteady American foreign policy are the swings in our perception of our adversaries and our recurring misapprehension of those adversaries' intentions. Such failings are foremost in our perception of the Soviet Union and other communist countries. While in some instances fluctuations in our perceptions have followed internal change in these countries, more often they have reflected deeper American cultural propensities unrelated to the character and policies of the countries concerned. The idea of a long term confrontation with a relentlessly hostile political system, with no obvious end in sight and no clear solution available, has been particularly uncongenial, indeed barely tolerable to Americans—both the public at large and members of elite groups. It has been even more difficult for Americans to accept the reality of foreign animosities rooted not so much in some clear conflict of interest, economic or geopolitical, but in ideas, in ideology.

An incorrigible American optimism about the possibilities of getting along with all nations, or reaching mutually satisfactory compromises in case of conflict, is among the factors which interfere with realistic assessments of our adversaries. The belief in pragmatic conflict resolution, in many ways an admirable trait, runs deep in the American character and cultural tradition and is strengthened by an increasingly legalistic political-economic ethos. It is further bolstered by a general tendency to see change in positive terms; our adversaries may (unreasonably) be hostile today but surely sooner or later they will mend their ways. Americans, including high officials, policy-makers and academic specialists are also inclined to dismiss vocal expressions of hostility directed at us as mere "rhetoric" or "propaganda" which do not reflect the genuine attitude of the adversary concerned (usually the Soviet Union). At the same time, members of the American elite tend to treat anything less than bitterly hostile denunciation as authentic expression of goodwill, and are reluctant to probe the underlying motives when less benign messages are communicated.

Our difficulty in entertaining realistic and steady conceptions of our adversaries has contributed to two versions of isolationism. The more old fashioned variety seeks to keep the U.S. out of global politics because it is seen as a country superior to all others and thus should not soil itself by involvement in their sordid squabbles. The more recent and influential version, to the contrary, wants us

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to keep out of world affairs because it takes a highly critical view of American society. The defeat in Vietnam provided a major rallying point and source of legitimation for isolationists of all stripes, but especially for those who seek to save the world from the corruptions of American influence. The reforms of Gorbachev and the possibilities for agreements on disarmament provide the latest justification for reducing American commitments around the world to those generally eager to see such reductions. Yet the problem of correctly assessing the motives and policies of our adversaries, foremost among them the Soviet Union, will not go away in the foreseeable future.

Underlying the varieties of isolationism and the hopeful expectation of attaining amity in international relations is a sense of security largely undisturbed by historical experience and supported until recently by geographical circumstance. There is an almost instinctive reluctance to admit that our adversaries can or wish to do us any harm, or even that we have any genuine adversaries who could not be turned around, negotiated into common sense and decency, or made to realize that hostility is foolish. Hostility directed at us, if at last acknowledged, is seen as the result of misperception and misunderstanding.

All of these circumstances have converged to make wishful thinking a major defining characteristic of American foreign policy—a wishful thinking that often shades into outright self-deception.

This attitude was memorably demonstrated by Senator Paul Simon, one of the contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination. At a political gathering a

> . . . questioner said he was tired of talk about America's enemies. The country has no enemies, he insisted. Simon . . . [said] 'OK, OK . . . We have to say there is the possibility of the Soviet Union being the enemy. . . . There is some paranoia on our side. There is some paranoia on the other side. What we have to do is understand each other better.' If Ronald Reagan had once been an exchange student in Moscow 'my guess is we would be living in a different world today.'[1]

Among the sources of the misapprehension of our adversaries reference must also be made to what is sometimes a literally disarming and disabling sense of left-wing guilt. The United States, in the left's litany, is richer than most of its enemies; it lost far fewer people in World War II than the Soviet Union; it was the only country to use the atomic bomb; it used to dominate and "exploit" Central America; it has done more than its share in doing damage to the environment; American society is riddled with social problems and flaws—how then can we stand for any moral righteousness in international affairs? Nor are we always and entirely consistent in our dealings with repressive governments. Of the guilt elicited by such inconsistency a recent outburst of Arthur Schlesinger Jr. provides a fine example:

> What a collection of fakes we Americans are! We endlessly proclaim our devotion to democracy and human rights. We endlessly rebuke the rest of the world for falling short of the high standards of liberty and probity that we unfailingly achieve ourselves (or do we?). And with our self-congratulatory habits . . . and undaunted lack of self-knowledge, we overlook the fact, evident to others, that our concern for democracy is, to say the least, partial and selective.[2]

The burden of Schlesinger's argument was that as long as we are not creating democracy in Haiti we had no business to be disturbed by the communist system in Nicaragua.

When our indigenous, culturally derived difficulties in grasping the character and intentions of our adversaries combine with their elaborate efforts to misrepresent themselves, American foreign policy faces unusual difficulties. This has been the case much of the time in American-Soviet relations and most recently with regard to Nicaragua. Soviet-American relations have fluctuated (often quite wildly) between warmth, enthusiasm

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and avowals of commonality of interest on the one hand and the shocked recognition of mendacity, domestic repression and foreign aggression on the other (as seen in President Carter's startled dismay over the Soviet attack on Afghanistan, preceded by his joint search with Brezhnev for God's blessings; or by the Congressional distress that followed Daniel Ortega's commute to Moscow, replacing, temporarily, the fervent belief in his well-intentioned, independent course).

AMONG the many illustrations of the confluence of deception and self-deception in our relations with communist governments, one stands out as remarkable even by contemporary standards of political deviousness. I am referring to the generally unknown history of guided tours designed for Western visitors of the prisons of communist countries.

The prison visits were part of more comprehensive political tours pioneered by the Soviet Union as early as the 1920s (and in turn nurtured by the venerable tradition of "Potemkin villages" of earlier times). In the course of these travels, idealistic Westerners, foremost among them intellectuals and churchmen, toured exceptionally repressive and impoverished countries and returned singing of their extraordinary achievements.[3]

In succession the prisons of the Soviet Union (under Stalin), of China (under Mao), of Cuba (under Castro), and those of contemporary communist Vietnam and Nicaragua have been acclaimed. In each case, such acclaim has been repudiated by former inmates who testify that the prison systems of these countries were in fact exceptionally hellish.

How can we account for this contrast—one confirmed, in many cases, sometimes enriched and supplemented, after the suitable passage of time by the authorities of the countries concerned? The key lies in the combination of elaborate, highly organized deception on the one side and a spontaneous, eager self-deception on the other. (As a former Chinese tour-guide confided in a former pilgrim: "We wanted to deceive you. But you wanted to be deceived."[4])

The significance of the durable attractions of communist prisons is threefold. First, it provides further evidence of the importance the rulers of these countries attached to impressing selected visitors from abroad and through them Western public opinion at large. Second, the favorable impressions acquired by visitors shed light on important elite groups in Western societies. Third, the credulousness displayed, and the intensity of the wish to believe provide insights into the conditions of the Western societies and the political cultures to which the tourists belong.

It was in the Soviet Union—and the countries inspired, influenced or dominated by it—that the techniques of such hospitality were most purposefully and elaborately developed in the service of clearly defined political objectives. These techniques were embraced by political leaders who believed both in the importance of ideas as weapons and in the moral-historical superiority of their societies. Given such a disposition, the task of persuading outsiders about the virtues of their regime became a high priority.

The theory and practice of political hospitality came to resemble those of socialist realism, the official Soviet theory of literature and art under socialism. According to its tenets, the artist must capture and present reality in its emergent state. What he must portray is not some statistical average, not a mere reflection of the way things actually are, but the way they are becoming and are supposed to be. Thus the artist must grasp the 'typical' and in doing so eliminate the dividing line between 'is' and 'ought.' Social phenomena in the process of decline can be safely ignored while those pregnant with the promise of the future deserve attention.

In the same spirit the techniques of political hospitality embody principles of selectivity: the visitors to the new society are to be shown those aspects which point ahead, which represent the highest achievements of the new social order, perhaps exceptional

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today but not so tomorrow. Hence deception is transformed into the purposeful display of the most impressive and, theoretically speaking, essential attributes of the society.

All requirements for successful political deception were present in the Soviet Union (as in the other societies noted below): the will to deceive on the part of the elite, and the associated belief in the importance of the political objectives served by the deceptions, a generally docile and compliant population, and control over the resources needed for the conduct of these policies. Last but not least, many of those to be deceived were predisposed to accept the messages their hosts were anxious to convey. Deception and self-deception were, for the most part, highly integrated and mutually reinforcing.

There have been four major waves of political tourism in this century: the Soviet, beginning in the 1920s and cresting in the mid-1930s; the Chinese between the late 1960s and mid-1970s; the Cuban throughout the 1960s and diminishing without ending through the 1970s; and the Nicaraguan in the 1980s. Other destinations included North Vietnam during the war and communist Vietnam after the war. In each instance the pilgrimages and tours have been stimulated by conditions and problems within the societies the tourists came from. In the 1930s it was the Depression, in the 1960s the Vietnam war and racial unrest (in the United States) as well as the pains of "empty affluence." In the 1980s the discovery of Sandinista Nicaragua as the current haven of socialist ideals coincided with the election and re-election of Ronald Reagan and the alienation he inspired (or intensified) among the American intelligentsia, the clergy and segments of the middle classes.

The major components of political hospitality varied little over time. They include selective display, some degree of flattery, and catering to the expectation of the visitors. Since a confident generalization from personal experience is a universal and almost irresistible impulse, it is imperative to integrate such experiences with the political objectives pursued. For intellectuals in particular, generalizing from personal (and often limited) experience is a characteristic activity.

To make the generalization of personal experience politically useful, two conditions must be met. The visitor's exposure to such experiences must be selective and the circumstances of his visit generally pleasant. It is difficult for most people not to have a favorable impression of those who treat them with kindness. Likewise it is difficult to believe that those who are kind to us can be unkind to others. Being critical of one's generous hosts creates a sense of betrayal.

The mystique of personal experience, belief in the authenticity conferred by 'being on the spot' also works in favor of political hospitality. Everybody has a vested interest in the credibility of his personal experiences and the generalizations and judgments derived from them—even when being shown a model prison in a police state.

Given the favorable predisposition of such tourists, techniques of hospitality are likely to set into motion selective perception, the application of double standards and contextual redefinition (the process whereby particular events or phenomena are evaluated by their overall context and not by their concrete observable attributes), all of which reduce the importance of the realities actually experienced.

These mental processes were exemplified when a sympathetic American visitor to Cuba argued—after being told that 15 percent of the patients in the Havana psychiatric hospital had lobotomies performed on them—that "we have to consider that under socialism lobotomy plays a different role. . . . These are socialist lobotomies."[5] In a similar spirit a recent supporter of Nicaragua reported that "as for censorship, certain things are not allowed to be printed in the newspapers, but people can write or say anything as long as it is not printed."[6] As for imprisonment, according to Bishop James Armstrong and Reverend Russell Dilley of the United Methodist Church ". . . there is a significant difference between situations

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when people are imprisoned for opposing regimes designed to perpetuate inequities (as in Chile and Brazil, for example) and situations when people are imprisoned for opposing regimes designed to remove inequities (as in Cuba)."[7] And "Sister Mary Hartman, the American nun who is in charge of the [Nicaraguan] government's human rights commission, excuses *turba* [mob] violence against dissenters as directed 'only at people who support the United States'."[8]

Among the outstanding historical examples of successful deception is the visit of Henry Wallace and Owen Lattimore to a region of the Soviet Union populated at the time entirely by slave laborers and their guards. Wallace left without becoming aware of any of this and he praised the pioneering spirit of the economic enterprises and their workers.[9] Among the notable Chinese contributions to political hospitality under Mao was the repeated display of prosperous, reformed capitalists in their lavish homes for the benefit of visiting Western businessmen.[10] More recently it was justly said of the rulers of Nicaragua that they "have raised political tourism to an art form."[11] Their innovative techniques included the two offices of Tomas Borge:

> Borge has two different offices. One . . . is located in the Silvio Mayorga building where he meets religious delegations and delegations from democratic political parties. In this office Borge has photographs of children, gilded, carved crucifixes and a Bible or two. Before Borge meets with religious delegations he usually memorizes Bible passages which he can quote . . . Borge's real office where he fulfills his duties as Interior Minister is located . . . in Bello Horizonte . . . *In that office there are no* crucifixes or Bibles—only Marxist literature and posters of Marx, Engels and Lenin.[12]

IT IS PERHAPS understandable that oppressive political systems have made the most determined efforts not merely to conceal their coercive policies but to substitute for them make-believe penal institutions for the benefit of foreign visitors. While these forms of deception, as others, were pioneered in the Soviet Union under Stalin, similar practices also sprang up in China under Mao, in Cuba under Castro and in Vietnam in the 1980s and most recently in Nicaragua. The obvious purpose of all such displays was to impress selected visitors with the humane treatment of prisoners and the policies of rehabilitation which were supposed to highlight the moral superiority of the political system as a whole.

Perhaps the most stunning example of susceptibility to such deceptions was provided by G.B. Shaw, especially remarkable in view of his otherwise regular display of cynicism and skepticism. He commented on the Soviet system of rehabilitation:

> In England a delinquent enters [the jail, that is] as an ordinary man and comes out as a 'criminal type,' whereas in Russia he enters . . . as a criminal type and would come out an ordinary man but for the difficulty of inducing him to come out at all. As far as I could make out they could stay as long as they liked.[13]

Most foreign visitors of Soviet penal institutions in the 1930s were impressed not only by the practices of the Soviet 'correctional system' but also by its spirit. Dr. J.L. Gillin, a former president of the American Sociological Society and "one of the leading authorities on penology in the United States" reported: "In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current in capitalistic penology are discarded. There are no 'crimes' . . . There is no 'punishment,' only 'measures of social defence'. . . ."[14] The British political scientist, Harold Laski, contrasted favorably the environmentalist, social-determinist approach prevailing in the USSR with the state of affairs in Britain: "The final principle . . . is the effort, through the creative organization of leisure, to prevent that deterioration of character which seems so frequent in our normal prison population. . . ."[15] Anna Louise Strong, the famous American friend of the Soviet Union, wrote that Soviet justice "aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way

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as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better."[16] Sidney and Beatrice Webb reported that "the [prison] administration is well spoken of and is now apparently as free from physical cruelty as any prison in any country is ever likely to be." Some of these beliefs must have been based on their visit to Bolshevo (the much visited model prison) which they described as "a remarkable reformatory settlement, which seems to go further, alike in promises and achievement, towards an ideal treatment of offenders against society, than anything else in the world."[17]

Many of the institutions visited by the Western sympathizers seemed to have no walls, fences or watchtowers. Apparently the prison system was based on trust, the visitors concluded. Mr. and Mrs. Corliss Lamont met prisoners who informed them that they did not feel at all as if they were in a prison.[18] Lenka von Koerber, a German student of Soviet prisons, asked one of the prison officials: "Is there any dissatisfaction among the prisoners?" She was told that "Naturally there is a little sometimes but very seldom. Our prisoners have unlimited right of complaint."[19]

There was hardly any aspect of the Soviet prison that did not elicit the enthusiasm of such visitors. Cultural, educational and recreational facilities were among the most highly praised. For example, prisoners were reported to have absolute quiet in the reading rooms where they had a good supply of newspapers, periodicals and books. If a play bored the prison audience, the dramatic circle would be asked to choose more carefully in future.[20] Inmates enjoyed classes in cultural and vocational subjects, gymnastics, books, dramatic performances, concerts both for and by the prisoners, and a prison newspaper, of which the right to make complaints was an essential feature.[21]

In Mao's China too the authorities sought to present their correctional system in a favorable light to selected Western visitors. Despite the precedent of Soviet misrepresentations, Western visitors did not go to China armed with greater skepticism.

Sympathetic Western intellectuals perceived the Chinese penal system in much the same manner as the Soviet one was seen in the 1920s and 1930s, but in the light of what had since been learned about Soviet practices, the Chinese policies were regarded as superior. According to Simone de Beauvoir, "the Chinese have carefully studied that precedent in order not to repeat its mistakes . . . the dissimilarity to the Stalinist system is patent, since no administrative internment exists in China."[22] The Chinese, like the early Soviet reformers, stressed rehabilitation, work therapy, humaneness not punitiveness. Both Soviet and Chinese officials fervently claimed that the eventual reintegration of convicts into society was their ultimate goal. Corliss Lamont (among others) had no difficulty transferring his benign views of the Soviet correctional system to the Chinese: "In China," he wrote, "even though it remains a dictatorship, they don't shoot their dissenters; they 're-educate' them."[23]

Simone de Beauvoir reported:

> I did personally see one prison . . . This one in Peking was not a model prison . . . all central prisons are the same in China. . . . Here, the prison is in the depths of a kind of park; two soldiers are on duty at the outer gate; but once you are inside it you see no wardens, no guards, no guides, only ununiformed and . . . unarmed overseers. They exercise the functions of foremen and political and cultural instructors.[24]

Pierre Trudeau (former prime minister of Canada) and Jacques Hebert were evidently also taken to the same prison, where only one sentry stood guard and within the walls of which "a garden welcomes us, planted with greenery and fine fragrant trees. This is a prison?" They too reported the absence of bars and were given a lecture on the rehabilitation process.[25] A former prisoner, Bao Ruo Wang reported that the Peking jail, prison number one, was "one of the best attractions of the standard Peking tour for foreign visitors."[26]

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Felix Greene was another privileged Western visitor who was allowed some glimpses of Chinese penal institutions in the early 1960s. He found "the Chinese doing what we had been trying to get the English authorities to do for years without success. Mainly, of course, to get the stigma, the moral stigma, out of imprisonment." He too was astonished and pleased to note the virtual absence of guards, the open gates, the low walls, no locks, no window bars and a generally relaxed, genial atmosphere.[27] Audrey Topping visited the Nanking prison in 1973 and reported that the "Chinese fought crime with the same vigorous, politically oriented enthusiasm with which they fought hunger" and praised the rehabilitation program based on "political education and labor."[28]

MORE RECENTLY the grotesque spectacle of well meaning Westerners visiting and lauding Soviet or Chinese prison camps was replayed in communist Vietnam. The occasion was a tour of a "re-education camp" arranged for an American Church delegation. As in the past the visitors were critical of their own society (in this case the United States), deplored its policy toward the host country and were favorably predisposed toward its social system.

The following quotations were taken from the statement of this group of American church officials testifying before a subcommittee of the U.S. Congress. They included Dr. Paul F. McCleary, executive director of Church World Service, Midge Austin Meinertz, Director of Southern Asia, Church World Service, and Dr. Harry Haines, Executive Director of the United Methodist Committee on Relief. They reported:

> At the camp itself, although there was a small open sentry stand at the gate, there were no guard towers, no barbed wire, none of the traditional 'prison' appurtenances . . . we observed that the men appeared to be sufficiently fed and in general good health. . . . When asked directly about punitive measures for would-be 'escapees' the camp commanders indicated that there were none. . . . Although the camp commanders assured us that no punitive measures were employed . . . they did indicate that positive reinforcement for meritorious behavior was common (extra cigarettes, extra soap, towels, whatever). . . .
>
> As we walked into the u-shaped central area, the men were mostly sitting on their sleeping platforms in small groups talking, playing cards, playing guitars, smoking home-made water pipes. . . . When we asked as to the limitation on personal effects we were informed that there was none. . . .

The amenities of the camp included tool and furniture workshops, gardens, and dining halls. Small touches, flowers in a vase made of a painted can, caught visitors' eyes. The visitors concluded that "the entire process of reeducation is one reflecting the government's commitment to encouraging and enabling people to exercise their rights, restored as full participants in Vietnam's future."[29]

There were other examples of highly patterned reluctance to believe that the Vietnamese authorities would mistreat their prisoners. American critics of U.S. policy during the war—usually sympathetic toward North Vietnam—insisted that American prisoners of war were not mistreated. Richard Falk, for example, wrote that the concern with the condition of American prisoners was "the result of a deliberate and cynical effort on the part of the Nixon administration to exploit the plight of the POWs." In the same spirit another war protestor and social critic, David Dellinger, referred to the "Prisoner of War Hoax," and Richard J. Barnett of the Institute of Policy Studies pronounced "the evidence of mistreatment . . . highly suspect." The North Vietnamese authorities in turn did everything they could to foster belief in their humane treatment of the prisoners who were frequently displayed and questioned for the benefit of American delegations friendly toward North Vietnam. As a result, "Upon his return from Hanoi [Ramsey] Clark assured a committee of Congress . . . that the

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prisoners he had met were well treated, had exercise, got all they wanted to eat. . . ."[30]

A 1984 trip by the Rev. Jesse Jackson provided insight into the Cuban management of prison visits for the benefit of foreign dignitaries. A journalist reported:

> What the Rev. Jesse Jackson saw . . . was a clean, painted prison where inmates played baseball—a scene, one released prisoner says, is "very different from the way of life in Cuban prison."
>
> The morning of Mr. Jackson's visit, 'common' prisoners were assembled hastily, given new baseball uniforms and equipment and told to play ball . . . "as soon as he [Jackson] left, the balls and bats were taken away and the prisoners returned to their cells." Such elaborate preparations, including special diets and "extra things like Kool-Aid" are routine when foreign delegations visit Cuban prisons, Mr. Noble [a released prisoner] said.

The prisoner also noted that "We are never allowed to play baseball except when visitors come. We call it 'the visitors' team.' " On the day of the release of the prisoners "many of them were allowed to wear a shirt for the first time in nearly two decades. . . ."[31]

It is hardly surprising that the communist authorities of Nicaragua, like the Soviet, Chinese, Cuban and Vietnamese before them, felt confident that they too could benefit from the conducted tour of prisons.

American churchmen visiting Nicaragua in 1983 reported that "The prison we visited was the first of seven prison farms. Former national guardsmen willing to cooperate are moved through a series of more and more relaxed prison settings. The prison we saw had 38 inmates, no armed guards, conjugal visits." One prisoner "had high praise for the government and said if freed he would go to fight for the FSLN in the north. Money made from the crops is put back into improvements for the prison. . . . As part of the routine the men attend classes in literacy and agriculture. Many who previously had no skill but shooting a gun, now have plans to become farmers."[32]

Gunter Grass, the famous German writer and vocal critic of the United States was given a personal conducted tour by Tomas Borge, a privilege reserved for important visitors (it was also extended to a Canadian film crew which made a highly favorable documentary about Borge.) Grass wrote:

> We have been able to read that there are political prisoners in Nicaragua. What is meant, of course, are the members of the National Guard, who perpetrated crimes against the people. . . . We asked about them, and Tomas Borge, a minister of state . . . immediately proposed a visit to Tipitapa prison. . . . It differs from Somoza's torture centers by the humane way in which sentences are carried out. . . . Several hundred former national guardsmen live here and . . . have received sentences ranging from three to thirty years. There is no death penalty. Prisoners work from Monday to Friday, and they have built a hospital and two new prisons with larger cells. . . . Saturdays and Sundays are kept free for visitors who come each week and are allowed to stay for three or four hours. There exist rooms . . . for married couples who are permitted a so-called intimate visit.
>
> "If we take revenge [said Borge], we destroy the purpose of the revolution. Our revolution represents the renunciation of revenge." . . . [I]n this tiny, sparsely populated land, where Christ's words are taken literally, the Sandinista revolution provides a different example.[33]

The correctional system of Nicaragua was also praised (as had the Soviet been earlier) by a criminologist who reportedly went there "to see what it was all about" having heard rumors that inmates were mistreated. He was surprised by the humanity of the prisons and prison officials and returned with the conviction that "the United States should adopt some of the Nicaraguans' methods of rehabilitating and treating prisoners. . . ."[34]

In 1986 September the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights issued the following statement:

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What are called the *Granjas de Regimen Abierto*, or "Open Rule Farms," in reality are prisons for display purposes where a limited number of prisoners—in comparison with the thousands of political prisoners to be found in the other prisons—really enjoy positive conditions. The majority of these prisoners have been transferred to these prisons as a prize for having stood out as informers for State Security . . . The international delegations that are taken to these centers normally find the prisoners "happy and grateful" . . . and in some cases they even put on "cultural shows" in which the prisoners sing and dance for the visitors.

But there is another type of prison in Nicaragua, where no international organizations are allowed to enter . . . these are the State Security jails that are . . . some of the worst jails in Latin America, where prisoners are called by numbers . . . kept incommunicado, completely isolated in totally dark cells; both food and water are given out at irregular intervals depending on the "cooperation" of the prisoners . . . physical and psychological tortures and the use of drugs during the interrogation are all everyday events in these prisons.[35]

IT HAS BEEN a remarkable social-historical fact of the last half century that not only have exceptionally brutal political systems earned the admiration of idealistic Westerners but that their most repressive institutions, prisons and forced labor camps, were singled out for praise. While disillusionment with the particular political system often followed, the regular *recurrence* of such striking political misjudgements and the ability to be so spectacularly deceived require further comment.

Western societies since the 1920s have produced a great deal of discontent and estrangement among intellectuals and all those who felt their idealistic longings and impulses frustrated by their social environment and culture. The emergence and persistence of a reservoir of adversarial sensibility help to explain the susceptibility to the claims and promises of each new putative embodiment of revolutionary idealism, social justice and communal fulfillment. It is a susceptibility that, as shown above, is even capable of substituting (with a little help from organizers of political tours) a benign, idealized version of the most degrading institution "socialist" societies have produced.

Only the intensity of alienation, the hostility to Western societies and the associated need to believe can explain the credulousness of the political tourists and pilgrims. Most of them were not generally naive or credulous, but on the contrary sceptical and cynical, always ready to unmask sham and discern the difference between appearance and reality in their own society. The suspension of their critical faculties requires special explanation: it is to be found in the deeply felt wish to believe. Thus the spiritual hungers ungratified by our society and culture have given rise from time to time, to appetites which have been appeased by the most elaborate deceptions in recent history.

Unhappily enough the political systems so adept at playing on the illusions and needs of Westerners also happened to harbor a profound and ideologically conditioned hostility toward the United States and the West. The visitors' delusions have shaped public opinion about these societies diverting attention from their hostility. Thus the perpetuation and recurrence of illusions about our adversaries (Nicaragua being the most recent and consequential case) continues to influence and undermine American foreign policy.

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Vietnam: A Military Post-Mortem

Alvin H. Bernstein

So long as no acceptable theory, no intelligent analysis of the conduct of war exists, routine methods will tend to take over even at the highest levels.

—Clausewitz, *On War* (Book II, Ch. 4)

Why go through so much trouble when the river could be persuaded not to flood by the sacrifice of a black goat on its banks, the land owners had wanted to know.

"But that doesn't work. You've tried it before. Every year the floods are worse."

The landowners remained silent out of a polite amazement that anybody could be so stupid as to doubt the efficacy of a sacrifice when properly performed by Brahmins. They were torn between amusement and distress at such obtuseness.

—J. G. Farrell, *The Siege of Krishnapur*

WHATEVER its other distortions, Oliver Stone's powerfully manipulative movie, *Platoon*, is notable for its accurate depiction of the central operational dilemma that the U.S. Army faced in Vietnam. The action opens with a platoon searching at night in the jungle for Vietcong (VC) guerrillas. During the picture's climax, that same platoon is overrun and all but wiped out when it encounters a regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment many times its size. General William Westmoreland feared this sort of thing might happen if he employed small unit, anti-guerrilla tactics. He therefore resorted instead to multi-battalion sweeps of the Vietnamese countryside. These large mobile units would search for enemy forces and, he hoped, destroy them with withering firepower when contact was made. Unfortunately, contact was rarely made. Such sweeps took time to organize and were impossible to keep secret, so that we usually wound up telegraphing our punches to an enemy adept at dodging them. VC units, which in any case had excellent intelligence concerning our troop movements, could simply hide, melting into the jungle or the villages whenever they received advance notice that our battalions were on the way. American strategists therefore had to choose: either they opted for the safety that large units could guarantee, in which case they were doomed to tilt at windmills, or they exploited the advantages of small unit deployments—the ability to travel at night undetec-

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ted, to ferret out the VC's guerrilla forces which moved only under cover of darkness, and to leave protectors in the villages and hamlets—in which case they risked having those units ambushed and destroyed piecemeal. General Westmoreland worried that the public back home would not countenance many such massacres. Faced with an enemy that employed a classic revolutionary warfare strategy against us, a strategy involving both large, conventional VC and NVA battalions and small guerrilla bands, he adopted the less risky but less effective method of operations.

In *The Army in Vietnam*, Andrew Krepinevich, an active duty major in the U.S. Army, a West Point graduate with a Harvard Ph.D. in Political Science, now assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, argues that General Westmoreland made the wrong choice.[1] His meticulously researched, scholarly and readable book takes on the senior leadership not only of the Army but of the Department of Defense as it documents from primary sources how, in Vietnam, our military leaders clung to familiar conventional tactics, despite overwhelming daily evidence from the field of their inefficacy. We used tactics designed for operations against the Warsaw Pact to fight guerrillas in Southeast Asia, waging a war of attrition against opponents we had difficulty finding. Throughout the war the enemy easily replaced his casualties faster than we could inflict them. Major Krepinevich's debate with his own establishment, as represented by such thoughtful, persuasive authors as Colonel Harry Summers and General Bruce Palmer, is not merely academic.[2] The "lesson" the senior military leadership seems to have learned from Vietnam is that the Army should eliminate counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare from its operational repertoire. Accordingly, the CIA, not the military, advises the *contras* in Nicaragua and the counter-insurgency forces in the Philippines. Two crucial issues therefore ride on the outcome of this argument over history: will our Army prepare to deal with the next limited, unconventional conflict that faces us, and how will it fight in that conflict?

The Major believes that we had not in Vietnam, nor have we yet developed, a counter-insurgency capability and doctrine. This deficiency, he believes, caused our defeat in Vietnam, where our main enemy, at least from 1965 to 1968, was the VC guerrilla. Others insist that the real enemy was North Vietnam. They point out, in what they take to be conclusive support of their position, that the NVA, not the VC, eventually marched on Saigon in 1975. Consequently they fault the Army only for not having made the war into the conventional conflict they wanted. As General Harry W. O. Kinnard put it at the time: "We were fighting their [the enemy's] kind of war and I wanted to make them fight our kind of war. I wanted to turn it into a conventional war—boundaries—and here we go, and what are you going to do to stop us."

Many of our senior officers still believe that our inability to take the war directly to its source—North Vietnam—doomed our effort from the start. According to this view, we lost in Vietnam because of the strategic limitations imposed by a distrustful president, a pusillanimous Congress, an unsupportive, irresponsible and sensationalist press, and a flabby national will. Our political leaders failed to understand that, all along, war had to be waged not just against the VC but wholeheartedly against the North Vietnamese. Our military leaders shared responsibility for our defeat to the extent that they accepted the limits set on their operations.

Major Krepinevich, on the other hand, in emphasizing the role of the VC, comes to the less comfortable conclusion that the bulk of the responsibility for our defeat belongs to our military leadership. They did indeed

[1] *The Army in Vietnam* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 352 pp., $26.50).

[2] Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (U.S. Army War College, 1981); Bruce Palmer, *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (University of Kentucky Press, 1985).

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accept without hesitation the restrictions imposed on them at the beginning and, with the sole exception of Maxwell Taylor (who was then the ambassador to Saigon), never expressed to the National Command Authority any reservations about their ability to carry out their mission within the parameters set by the civilian leadership. They chose the strategy we followed. In the crucial years between 1965 and 1968 they lost valuable time as well as credibility by fighting the VC with operations that could never have defeated a formidable guerrilla army. Until Tet, they were allowed to do more or less what they wanted (short of saturation bombing and invading the North). Their later advice to call up the reserves and widen the conventional war to include Cambodia and Laos, Major Krepinevich thinks, would have only increased the magnitude of the disaster that was Vietnam.

Major Krepinevich argues convincingly that our military consistently misread the nature of the war they were called upon to fight in Southeast Asia. The problem took shape even before the war began in earnest. President Kennedy had tried to persuade the Army to develop a genuine counter-insurgency capability in preparation for the various communist-inspired wars of national liberation that he saw in our future. For the most part, the Army's leadership viewed the President's urgings as a "fad" that would divert resources from their ability to defend Europe. They doubted it would outlive his presidency and so paid only lip-service to it. They renamed some units and did some minor tinkering but made few large scale, substantive changes such as would have been required for the creation of a formidable counter-insurgency force. Instead, they went about business as usual by preparing for the war that might come in Europe. This was not entirely unreasonable but it resulted in a very conventionally-minded army exporting its conventional concept of operations to fight an unconventional enemy in Vietnam.

This book's greatest contribution lies in its explanation of the mismatch between the enemy's strategy and the counter-strategy we insisted on using. It makes intelligible how and why our military leaders chose a strategy that had no hope of producing victory. The Army never understood that the key to defeating an insurgency is to prevent the guerrillas from controlling the populace. Such control is vital to their success.

As Major Krepinevich explains, revolutionary warfare has three phases which shade into one another: organization, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. In Vietnam, during the first phase, the insurgents had proselytized among the masses, created a close-knit political cadre into which they could recruit new members, and built up their intelligence base. In the second phase, which had begun by the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, they were seeking to gain control in remote, almost inaccessible areas. At the same time, in more populated districts, they were building their base of support by combining fear with popular appeal, as they attacked local government leaders. They worked to forge those links with the population that give an insurgency its strength and on which its final success depends. Their support system, like that of all rural guerrillas, ran in the opposite direction to that of a conventional army. In conventional war a soldier's supplies and arms come from the rear to support combat operations at the front. In an insurgency supplies are already at the front, that is, among the people, and the supply lines flow from that front to the insurgents' rear base camps. VC combat operations in this second phase of the Vietnam War therefore had to focus on maintaining access to the people, in order to syphon logistical support away from the government to themselves. Not yet ready for direct confrontation with the government's forces, they used their military strength to extend their hold over the people.

INSTEAD OF DESIGNING a strategy to prevent this, our leaders thought in conventional military terms and saw interdiction of external support for the

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guerrillas as the key to isolating and defeating them. Our uniformed strategists still see it so, if the recent analyses of Colonel Summers and General Palmer reflect their thinking. That was *not* the key, according to Major Krepinevich. External support, he claims, played only a secondary role during this phase of the war, and he might have cited the thriving New Peoples' Army in the Philippines to demonstrate how well insurgents can function without much foreign support. What we should have been doing, therefore, was undermining the people's internal support to the guerrillas—an especially difficult task, given a weak government and ineffective law enforcement. Such conditions allowed the VC to survive and expand when they were most vulnerable. The NVA's march on Saigon at the end of the war, in 1975, hardly proves that the guerrillas were inconsequential before that and says nothing about their role in preparing for the conventional finale. During the second phase, the guerrillas were crucial, and Major Krepinevich is surely right to emphasize the importance of the insurgency then. Even during the third phase of revolutionary warfare, when insurgency has to become conventional war against the government's forces because in the end that is the only way to topple the regime, the transition can be reversed. The soldier can turn back into a guerrilla if open warfare is not succeeding, as happened in Vietnam after Tet in 1968 and again after the failed Easter offensive in 1972. The truth is that the NVA was able to undertake the final invasion in 1975 because the guerrilla had first accomplished his task of prolonging the conflict until we lost the will to continue and left the country, bound never to return.

As a consequence of having the wrong objective—interdiction of external support—we used inappropriate tactics. Major Krepinevich's main point is that, in its second phase, a revolutionary war can be dealt with only by a counter-insurgency strategy, and he shows how we played right into the insurgents' hands when we tried to defeat them with quasi-conventional battles. So long as our forces were out in remote areas seeking confrontation, the VC were not forced to fight to maintain the access to the people that was their lifeline. We should have been trying to gain control of the population ourselves. If we could have won the people's support, if we could have made them feel secure against guerrilla retribution, they might have provided the government with information about the activities of the guerrillas, rather than the other way around.

The author analyzes in detail what is needed for effective counter-insurgency operations. First, he says, they must be mobile *on the ground* (not just in helicopters) in order to patrol intensively in populated areas and so keep the guerrillas off their guard and away from the people. When small, friendly units are roaming the countryside, it is hard for insurgents to mobilize their forces into main units for attacks upon towns and hamlets. Saturation patrolling, not a series of blind sweeps, keeps guerrilla bands from massing for large scale attacks. When the insurgents do fight, they will not have surprise on their side and will therefore provide targets for government forces, if those forces have the ability to react rapidly. General Westmoreland's aversion to such small unit deployments stemmed from what he saw in Binh Dinh Province in 1964, when the VC wiped out the ARVN forces that confronted them there. He concluded that if he broke US forces into smaller units which could have concentrated on pacification, they might meet a similar fate. The ARVN's debacle, however, was caused by their lack of backup troops to summon to their aid once battle was joined. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, had available airmobile forces suitable for quick reinforcement of small unit patrols. General Westmoreland rejected this option.

Second, the military, both ours and the South Vietnamese, should have worked with local police forces to complete the destruction of insurgents who had infiltrated the population. A village can endure an occasional raid better than it can a string of assassinations which indicate that insurgent agents are liv-

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ing among them. In the final analysis, a successful strategy for counter-insurgency has to secure the government's base areas, separate the guerrilla forces from the population and eliminate the insurgent infrastructure. In an infested area, the army must concentrate enough force either to destroy or to expel the main body of guerrillas and then hold the area for pacification. If the local intelligence operation focuses on the guerrillas' infrastructure, it will eventually locate their troops. If it looks only for their troops, it may well miss the infrastructure. Above all, the government's army has to demonstrate that it will remain in the newly cleared area until the people are capable of assuming the bulk of the responsibility for their own defense, because premature departure will undo whatever has been achieved. This "oil drop" method of counter-insurgency requires that adjacent areas be pacified one by one with the counter-insurgency forces edging ever outward to control more and more territory. Such a process may of course take years to complete but over time it offers the possibility of removing permanently the internal threat.

As Major Krepinevich's book makes clear, we never saw ourselves in Vietnam for the long haul and so never developed a real counter-insurgency capability. From the very beginning, in the wake of the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, we began training the ARVN in conventional tactics despite the fact that the French had been defeated by insurgents. Insisting that the threat to South Vietnam's security came not from within but from the North, we wasted those early years, as we prepared the ARVN to hold the coastline until SEATO forces could arrive to thwart a conventional NVA attack.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did prepare counter-insurgency plans as far back as 1960, but their efforts were short-lived. By the time General Westmoreland took command of our troops in South Vietnam in 1964 we had already returned to conventional operations. The year before, battalion-sized VC and NVA forces had begun operating in the South, and this is part of what occasioned our move away from counter-insurgency and back to a more familiar strategy of interdiction and offensive operations. Intelligence was telling us, however, that only fifteen percent of the increase in VC strength was coming from the outside. That estimate, it now appears, may have been too low. Major Krepinevich, basing his judgement on the information available when he wrote, is critical of this decision. We now know, however—from Vietnamese publications that did not appear in time for him to incorporate their contents into his analysis—that Ho Chi Minh decided to send North Vietnamese Special Operations Forces into the South in January of 1955 and that units of the First Vietnamese Special Forces battalion began arriving in May of 1959, but were not fully engaged in combat operations until May of 1963. From the same publications we learn that in the spring of 1959 Ho Chi Minh ordered the first supply trails opened to South Vietnam, that only people who had repatriated to the North from the South be involved and that only captured French weapons be sent, in order to keep the operation clandestine. Our military leadership jumped to the conclusion that, with the appearance of NVA units, the war had entered its third and final stage. Major Krepinevich maintains that it was still an insurgency. The most recent Vietnamese disclosures suggest that in fact it was both. By 1964 our enemies were employing a mixed strategy against us.

IN EARLY 1965 the Army's preference for a conventional strategy gained further legitimacy from indications that the war was moving towards its third and final phase. In a series of engagements around Binh Gia between December 28 and January 4, the VC attacked and occupied the village, located about forty miles east of Saigon. Then they struck at the U.S. barracks in Pleiku. The initial rationale for the introduction of large numbers of U.S. troops was therefore protection of our bases, but we seem to have been hoping that our commit-

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ment of conventional troops would somehow force the war into a conventional conflict. The Army, Major Krepinevich shows, made no provision for the possibility that the enemy might return to phase two operations in response. When they did, we found ourselves without a counter-insurgency force. What we had was a mid-sized conventional capability in search of a mission. First, we developed operational plans for interdicting North Vietnamese supplies to the South, plans similar to the one Summers and Palmer are still advocating. These could not have succeeded fully because complete interdiction of supplies and troops was impossible and in any case only a fraction of these was coming from outside. Second, we settled on a strategy of attrition, designed to "search out and destroy" as many VC as possible. Again, we were frustrated, since the enemy was able to set the pace of operations. The VC and NVA continued to maintain access to the people and their logistical base by leading our manoeuvre battalions inland on wild goose chases, drawing them away from the population centers they should have been protecting. Between 1967 and 1968, for example, the VC initiated eighty-eight percent of our actions with them, proof not only that they controlled the operational tempo but that they could determine their own casualty rates as well. The Army nonetheless persevered in its attrition strategy, demanding ever more troops and ordnance, and that the war of interdiction be extended to Laos and Cambodia. Yet a Pentagon report had appeared as early as 1965 stating that conditions were deteriorating, the strategy not working, and that pacification had to be given top priority by 1966 at the latest. The Army suppressed this report.

This record of operational obstinacy might not seem so frustrating if we did not have an actual example of what a real counter-insurgency program might have accomplished. It is an exception that proves the rule. When the U.S. Marines in I Corps arrived in Vietnam they put into practice their approach to pacification which, as Major Krepinevich explains, had its roots in the service's heritage. Indeed, their 1940 manual is a textbook for counter-insurgency operations. Sir Robert Thompson, the British counter-insurgency expert, said of their approach: "they alone made a serious attempt to achieve permanent and lasting results in their tactical area of responsibility by seeking to protect the rural population." Under General Lewis Walt they worked closely with the people, themselves living inside the hamlets. Gradually they joined with the villages' paramilitary Popular Forces (PFs) to increase the number of night patrols and ambushes in the areas immediately surrounding the villages, so that the VC were eventually driven away from them. These Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), as they were called, consisted of 15 Marines and 34 PFs living in each village. By 1966 there were 57 such villages in I Corps, by 1967, 79. Each CAP performed traditional counter-insurgency operations, to destroy the village's VC infrastructure, protect the government's infrastructure and the people, organize local intelligence nets, and train more PFs. The program suffered only because the Marines did not speak Vietnamese and because they failed to organize an interlocking network of units in accordance with the oil spot principle.

These operations took time and patience but they produced impressive results, with casualty rates less than half those of our search-and-destroy forces. The VC at first responded to the Marines' tactics by insisting that local farmers let their crops rot or face reprisals. The CAPs easily handled such initial small unit reprisals and the VC then had to resort to battalion-sized assaults. These too the Marine Corps/Vietnamese teams defeated. The ultimate mark of success, as the Marines tell it, was the appearance of NVA units in the area. Unfortunately, the Army was neither as impressed nor as patient as it should have been. Contemptuous of what it took to be a lack of offensive initiative, it was still searching, as Major Krepinevich shows, for quick solutions. General Westmoreland argued that we could hardly afford to put squads into every hamlet and accused the

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Marines of allowing the VC to roam freely, insisting that they adopt a more "aggressive" strategy. The Army had a CAPs program but, as Major Krepinevich explains, they implemented it in their own inimitable style. Four-man Army teams and an ARVN officer worked with village paramilitary forces for about a month before moving on. This hardly produced the same lasting results as did fifteen Marines remaining for the duration. In fact, the General failed to understand how counter-insurgency operations worked. We need only have placed squads in the peripheral hamlets, and this, Major Krepinevich estimates, would have required 167,000 men, with plenty left over for rapid reaction forces designed to deal with larger VC or NVA units. As for the vulnerability of small units, the Army's own report claimed that our forces routinely defeated enemy forces two and three times their size. In no instance had a dug-in U.S. company ever been overrun, regardless of the size of the attacking force, while nothing larger than a company ever came close to annihilation when caught on the move. Small unit operations would moreover have given us a far more favorable "tooth-to-tail" ratio—more men in the field, fewer in support roles—for they would not have required as many service men to maintain equipment as our conventional operations did.

HOW COULD WE have won the Vietnam War? Major Krepinevich argues that a classic counter-insurgency strategy could have kept the communists from taking over South Vietnam. He thinks that U.S. troops, from the very beginning, should have been used to pacify the densely populated coastal plain, from the DMZ all the way to Saigon, much as the Defense Department's International Security Affairs bureau suggested in 1968, with the advantage of three years' perspective on the war. While we worked to pacify the coastal areas we should also have been training and equipping South Vietnam's Armed Forces who would eventually have had to assume operations from us. If the communists deployed in major strength during this period, our forces would have been available to enter the war and destroy them, though Major Krepinevich thinks that the enemy would have been unlikely to adopt and persist in a conventional strategy that would have made him vulnerable to superior U.S. firepower. After U.S. ground forces had secured the densely populated coastal plain, they could gradually have moved forward into the more sparsely populated areas in order to cut off the insurgents more completely from the people. Meanwhile sufficient main-force units would have been kept in reserve to blunt any conventional assault against the pacification program. Special Forces could have served as strike teams just beyond the frontier, detecting attempts by the enemy to concentrate forces for an attack upon the populated region. In effect, this strategy would have used the U.S. Army to deny the guerrillas access to the population, thereby establishing a prolonged stalemate during which we would have prepared the ARVN to take over the war effort. Had this strategy been used from the very beginning, Major Krepinevich believes, successful Vietnamization could have been achieved at a reduced cost in U.S. casualties and resources. At the same time the strategy would have placed greater emphasis on defeating the insurgent threat and giving the ARVN an easier task than the simple enclave strategy advocated, in vain, early in 1965 by Maxwell Taylor and the State Department.

Major Krepinevich's book ends on a most depressing note. He concludes that for all the blood and treasure vainly spent, our armed forces have learned nothing of value from their experience in Southeast Asia. For a decade the military suffered from a self-induced case of institutional amnesia, striking the study of counter-insurgency from the curricula of their Command and Staff and their War Colleges. While Major Krepinevich acknowledges that the Army, in response to Congressional pressure, has recently recreated some of the unconventional capabilities

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it once possessed, this renaissance reminds him of the window-dressing the Army produced for the Kennedy administration. Above all, he notes how its recently revived unconventional capability clashes with the conventional doctrine that the Pentagon now publicly espouses. That doctrine insists that the U.S. commit no combat forces overseas unless the interests involved are vital to U.S. security, that the troops committed be sufficient in number to accomplish the mission, and that the American political leadership have the clear intention of winning. Major Krepinevich thinks "vital interests" are code words for Western Europe and Japan and that the phrase "clear intention of winning" is a built-in prescription for escalation. Above all, he believes that this disparity between the Pentagon's force structure alterations and its doctrine "represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempt to fight a conventional war against a very unconventional enemy."

This clear-headed, persuasive and often brilliant strategic analysis of the Vietnam War—the best ever to have appeared on the subject—establishes, as far as such things can ever be established, that without an effective counter-insurgency program we had no chance of prevailing in Vietnam. Major Krepinevich has destroyed the position of those who argue, with determination that borders on blind rigidity, that we could either have ignored the communist insurgency altogether or suffocated it by bottling up the North Vietnamese within their own borders. His incisive arguments should silence, once and for all, those who think we could have forced the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to fight our kind of war. "We will outconventional the unconventionalists," as one of our unfortunate generals once unfortunately put it.

Major Krepinevich's own position, on the other hand, that a counter-insurgency strategy on its own could have defeated the mixed strategy our enemies used against us, is less convincing, not because of any flaw in his analysis but because of the difficulty of long-term strategic planning in a democratic state such as ours. The patient, undemocratic North Vietnamese were not going to give up and we were not going to destroy their country: we simply did not fear them enough for that. Had they continued, in response to our strategy, to send south men and materiel in order to keep the pot boiling, how long would we have persevered? Could we have prepared the ARVN to withstand, unaided, the military might of the North Vietnamese, whose importance Major Krepinevich downplays in reaction to received opinion but who were, after all, present in South Vietnam throughout the conflict? How long could an American conscripted force have been able to remain in Vietnam, even if half the size and suffering fewer than half the casualties of the one we kept there for over a decade? Such a force might have increased the time our troops could have remained in the country and an appropriate operational strategy might have decreased the time required to checkmate the enemy's offensives. Could it have enabled us, as Major Krepinevich suggests, to end the war? Perhaps. But if not, what then? These are the questions our military leadership and civilian policy-makers should have discussed in the early 1960s as they contemplated war in Southeast Asia. That they did not reveals that they failed in what Clausewitz considered to be "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act that the statesman and commander have to make": namely, "to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."

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Right Man, Wrong Book

John Keegan

EDWARD LUTTWAK'S new book is covered with endorsements on the dust jacket—always a bad sign. Good books speak for themselves. Guarantees by Thomas Schelling, Les Aspin and James Schlesinger that the contents are the right stuff have a counter-productive effect—at least on this reviewer. And why should Luttwak of all people seek out the approval of his peers? In a sense, Luttwak has no peers. He is to the writing of strategic affairs what Richard Perle is to their practice—individual, creative, often wrong-headed but always brilliantly interesting.

So how does *Strategy** match up with the best of what he has done in the past—notably with that *tour de force*, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire?* In that book, Luttwak enthusiasts will remember, he not only produced the first comprehensive survey of Roman military policy from the first to the third centuries A.D. He also pointed out that it had passed through three distinct stages, from a system of preserving the empire by threatening to absorb neighbors to one of fixed frontiers and finally to a reactive defence in depth. The transitions reflected the changing fortunes of the empire itself. But they also, Luttwak suggested, indicate a repetitive pattern in the evolution of all great power strategies and utter warnings even to the nuclear powers of our own time.

The book was brilliantly illuminating to read, not least because it so effortlessly subsumed an enormous amount of historical information in the development of an intricate but convincing argument. *Strategy* also deploys a great deal of historical learning and advances a complex argument. This time, however, the marriage is less successful. It is not that Luttwak does not know enough to support the argument he constructs. He reveals, as always, that he knows an astonishing amount. The trouble is that the argument itself is too complicated—too complicated, at any rate, for this reader to follow easily or to retain.

The trouble starts in the opening chapter. There he begins with a philosophical proposition—just as Clausewitz began *On War*. But philosophy is the curse of strategy. Not even Clausewitz, a very considerable thinker indeed who had fifteen years of unobstructed time at his disposal, could succeed in bringing the whole gamut of military

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*Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War* (Harvard University Press, 283 pp., $19.95).

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phenomena within the dialectical structure he had chosen as his method. As Michael Howard, Clausewitz's modern translator, has demonstrated in his commentary on the new edition, the master's argument goes by fits and starts and parts of it simply depart at a tangent.

Yet Clausewitz's opening proposition at least had the merit of clarity and force. "War," he said, "is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds," and then spent most of the rest of *On War* demonstrating how that statement must be modified. Luttwak, by contrast, begins with a statement that denies there can be any clarity in strategy whatsoever. Its nature, he says, is that of a paradox. The choice that seems best, he says, may be worst. What seems strength may be weakness. What seems right risks being wrong.

Now all this is perfectly true. But it is not an idea to launch at a reader's head on the first page. It warns that he will probably not understand what is going to follow, since paradox is by definition a matter of black being really white. Yet the ordinary reader, on being introduced to a subject unfamiliar to him, needs the immediate reassurance that black *is* distinguishable from white and that he will be able to follow the author down the path chosen for him.

It is all the more a pity that Edward Luttwak has chosen such a daunting proposition with which to begin his book, because much of the interior is both straightforward and thought-provoking. Thus he very sensibly points out that it is a useful clarification in thinking about war to divide it into the various levels at which it is actually conducted. These levels he identifies as the technical, the tactical, the operational, the strategic and the grand strategic.

At the technical level, he warns, the danger to guard against is permitting trust in weapon superiorities to prevail against age-old wisdoms about how the soldiers threatened by them will adapt and react on the battlefield. Again, at the tactical level, it is human factors that remain paramount—tenacity and courage—as well as the imponderables of chance.

The operational level—it is a concept borrowed from German military thinking—translates tools and tactics into military effect on the battlefield. The operational style will be either attritional or that of manoeuver, determined, he believes, by calculations of relative strength. Powers that see themselves as stronger than their enemies will try to wear them down, powers that feel weaker will seek quick advantage by striking at the enemy's vulnerable points or by tempting him into a battle of movement where miscalculation and chance can play an offsetting role.

THE LEVEL ABOVE operational he calls that of theater strategy, since the scope of operations always has a spatial context. The crux of theater strategy is to decide what sort of operations conforms best to the conditions prevailing there, to make the right choice and to see it through. Guerrilla warfare, for example, always tempting as an option to a weak power, can work well in difficult terrain—as long as the guerrillas can find a source of supply. But it is quite unsuited to territory where observation and movement favor a mechanized adversary.

Finally, via a dismissal of the 'nonstrategies' of sea and air power, the author arrives at 'grand strategy,' which is the level at which military activity is made to serve political purpose. It is in this chapter that he most strongly emphasizes his theme of paradox—that what is wanted as an end is not necessarily best achieved by being seen to aim for it, or even by aiming for it at all. Thus arms control is not necessarily the best means to achieve peaceful relations between states nor is appeasement the most certain way towards the averting of war.

Finally, in an appendix, the author offers us some definitions of strategy, without choosing any of them as his own. Strategy, he tells us, is derived from a Greek word, *strategos*, which means general. But there he is wrong—or at least imprecise. The root is in fact deeper than that. It comes from two Greek words, one for 'army' and the other for 'command,' a far more illuminating insight.

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The double root allows the student to approach an understanding of the compound concept down two routes—that of what may be understood by 'army' and what by 'command'. Both, of course, have greatly changed their meanings over the centuries. There are six different ways by which an army may be raised—through conscription, regular enlistment, militia service, mercenary hire, enslavement and warriordom. Which, whether alone or in combination, characterizes a particular army is a function of culture. And culture will again determine which of six methods or styles of command—preheroic, heroic, anti-heroic, unheroic, false heroic, or post-heroic—will be exercised to lead it.

Had Edward Luttwak begun with roots, he would not have led his readers into the confusion which, one suspects, inevitably awaits most of them in this book. It has, in short, been written the wrong way round. As a *conclusion*, the idea that strategy is by its nature an affair of paradox would have been powerfully arresting. As an opening proposition, it embroils the author himself in insuperable methodological difficulties and consigns his readers to bafflement.

Despite much bafflement myself, I continue to regard Luttwak as one of the two or three most interesting writers and thinkers in the field of military affairs in the contemporary world. The kindest light in which to regard *Strategy* is as a sort of public clearing of his intellectual decks as a preliminary to an advance on a wider front. Richard Perle, after all, in the aftermath of the Russians buying the 'twin track' policy on INF, is discovering the sensation of having been too clever by half. That does not mean we have heard the last of him. *Strategy* is too clever by half and then some. Let us certainly not hope its appearance means we have heard the last of Edward Luttwak. Clausewitz cries out for supersession. Only someone as clever as Luttwak undoubtedly is will be able to rewrite him. Luttwak's *On War* will be worth waiting for.

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A Wounded Nation

Robert G. Livingston

WEST GERMANY'S STORY is a success story. Devastated by war, it embarked on its "economic miracle" and is now the most prosperous nation in Europe. Discredited and ostracized during the 1950s for the crimes perpetrated in its name, it built itself as a thriving democracy and became a key member of the Western Alliance. And yet, as Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher tell us in their new book, West Germany is a "wounded nation."*

Their book, unsparing in its criticism of the university educated children of the 1968 student rebellion, underlines a truth about Germany not readily accessible to non-Germans. Given the geopolitical importance of Germany, however, Americans had better familiarize themselves with the societal weaknesses and generational tension that Noelle-Neumann lays bare with her data. If she is right, the United States needs to think of its political and military presence in Germany not only in terms of reassuring the West Germans against Soviet expansionism and pressures, but also in terms of protecting the West Germans against their own self-destructive insecurities. We would do well to bear this conclusion in mind, especially now that the putative INF agreement between the U.S. and the USSR, as well as American doubts about continuing to shoulder the main burden of Europe's security, threaten to excite those insecurities even more.

Noelle-Neumann has subtitled her book, *About the Germans' Effort to Alter their Character*. There can be no doubt that after devastating defeat in 1945 the Germans did indeed change (much more so, in fact, than the Italians or even the Japanese). Compared with pre-Hitler Germany, domestic politics in postwar years have been marked by consensuality, openness, and tolerance. In foreign policy, Hitler's single-minded and ruthless pursuit of exclusively national goals has given way to a cautious multilateralism based, at least until now, on staunch loyalty to NATO and, at the same time, unremitting efforts to promote friendly relations with the East.

Noelle-Neumann seems to think that the West Germans have overdone this transfor-

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*Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, *Die verletzte Nation: Über den Versuch der Deutschen ihren Charakter zu ändern* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987).

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mation of character, especially since 1968. Other conservative writers, notably the distinguished historian Hans-Peter Schwarz, have argued along similar lines: in dealing with others, the West Germans have gone from berserk assertiveness under the Kaiser and Hitler to undue meekness nowadays. Schwarz depicts Bonn as content with a morally mushy "peace policy" which, though intended to demonstrate reliability and peacefulness, has become a burden both to the Federal Republic and its allies.

This transformation in Germany's external behavior is paralleled by profound domestic value changes. Noelle-Neumann's data record a substantial breakdown of family cohesion, sexual morality, religious commitment, and work ethic. This transformation of values occurred suddenly and dramatically in the years between 1967 and 1972, particularly among those aged under 45. West Germans do not differ in this respect from their contemporaries in other Western countries, including the United States as survey results from a number of countries included in the book show.

There are two areas, however, in which the West Germans deviate markedly from prevalent norms in other Western societies. It is these two areas that cause German conservatives acute concern.

First, in a sharp departure from pre-war patterns, there seems to be a deep divide between parents and children in West Germany, with the younger generation questioning parental values and authority to an extent greater than in most other European countries. Noelle-Neumann and her colleague contend that Germans have internalized mistrust for every kind of authority. Only 15 percent of the Germans surveyed consider the inculcating of obedience to be an important goal of education. Fewer Germans than any other Europeans (with the exception of the Scandinavians) favor a strengthening of authority; more of them believe that parents and officials must justify assertion of their prerogatives. She concludes that, "An unusual distancing . . . from every [even potential] authority penetrates . . . all aspects of life, including the family and relations between the generations."

The second negative characteristic which causes concern to the authors is the absence of patriotism. Where "national pride" is concerned, all surveys show that West Germans rank consistently at the bottom of the scale. About a quarter of Germans consider "national feeling" unimportant, and well over a third feel the same way about "patriotism." These sentiments are particularly marked among those under 45, university graduates, Liberals (Free Democrats), Social Democrats (SPD), and, especially, Green voters. Over 75 percent of the Greens consider patriotism unimportant and only eight percent of them value it. In the absence of patriotic feeling and respect for traditional institutions, Germans under 45 focus attention on their "lifestyle," and in some cases upon their local region, their *Heimat*. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a wide spread disinclination among West Germans to defend their country. Only about a third of those polled say they would be ready to do so, which puts them along with Belgians and Italians at the bottom of that European scale.

This diminished German national feeling is the result of the lesson the Germans learned between 1939 and 1945: unbridled nationalism can lead to catastrophe. The occupying powers' reeducation programs after the war, as well as the entire postwar West German educational system, has consciously and conscientiously downplayed the nation state as embodying German values. German's loyalties were directed toward preserving the "free, democratic, basic order" established by the constitution of 1949 rather than toward traditional symbols. It was not until 1985 that the two television networks even saw fit to end their evening transmission with the *Deutschlandlied*, the old national anthem.

Strongest among Germans' feelings about their place in the world has been a sense of vulnerability. This is central to the writings of older conservatives such as Noelle-Neumann and Schwarz. It underlies

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the foreign policy positions of every party, whether in the form of fidelity to NATO on the part of Christian Democrats (CDU), or of advocacy of neutralism by the Greens.

There are two sources for this sense of vulnerability. First, is the sense of guilt for crimes committed by Hitler's *Reich;* second is the Federal Republic's geographical location. Most West Germans react nervously when they think about what Schwarz calls their ". . . hopelessly dependent and exposed security position." He recalls that the salient characteristic of German history from the seventeenth to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was, as it is today, weakness; Germany was the playing field of European power politics, rather than a player. Only briefly, from Bismarck to Hitler, was it otherwise.

Konrad Adenauer, the first, great chancellor of postwar Germany, found some surcease from such existential anxieties in NATO. The establishment of the Federal Republic, the adoption of a democratic constitution, individual liberties, membership in NATO, and a close relationship with America have together constituted for West Germans a seamless, integrated order that allowed them to regain respect, reap economic rewards, and lead comfortable, undemanding lives. In particular, West Germans have regarded the alliance as a *raison d'etre* for the Federal Republic, a view on which the Christian Democrats have based their politics for thirty years. Clear majorities in the electorate favor NATO membership, with only the Greens proving an exception. In the domestic political struggle, conservative parties still try to make support for NATO a litmus test of loyalty to the Federal Republic itself.

For most West Germans NATO, the United States, and the presence of American troops amount to the same thing. Surveys show that, since 1957, less than a fourth of the population would welcome a troop withdrawal, while over 60 percent would regret it. American dominance in West German politics and culture has stamped the entire contemporary scene since the war. The Bonn government has always followed the American lead in Europe, whether in deciding to deploy American Euromissiles in 1983 or to remove them in 1987. Even the *Ostpolitik* of the Social Democrats in the 1970s was acceptable to German voters partly because it was in line with President Nixon's policy of *detente* at the time. Almost throughout its existence, the Federal Republic has looked much like an American client state.

But as the values of young Germans began to change in the early 1970s and they began to challenge established institutions the relationship with NATO and America came under attack. Support for NATO and the presence of American forces continues to be strong, but criticism of American policies and of the client relationship has increased markedly, notably among those under 45. Not only the Greens, but younger leaders within the big parties as well unhesitatingly challenge American policies and define German national interests in ways that diverge from NATO positions.

THE REASON IS that each of the two major parties warily watches for signs of revived German patriotism. Each is determined to capitalize on such a revival and therefore experiments gingerly with nationalist approaches. The Social Democrats have depicted their Eastern policy as providing the best means of satisfying national aspirations in the East, especially in relation to the German Democratic Republic. Chancellor Kohl has been for some years larding his speeches with references to the "Fatherland" and has been promoting the establishment of museums to commemorate the history of Germany (in Berlin) and of the Federal Republic (in Bonn).

These sentiments notwithstanding, the basis for an alliance-oriented-but-national policy are good, for that would correspond to the basic approach West Germans have pursued ever since they regained sovereignty in the 1950s. In the West, the Federal Republic has operated almost exclusively multilaterally: through NATO, the European Commu-

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nity, and institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Western European Union. Bonn's Eastern policy, too, has been multilateral in nature. When *Ostpolitik* began in 1969, the Federal Republic first made its own bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations. As time went on, it chose to pursue its policy through multilateral frameworks, such as the Mutual Force Reduction meetings in Vienna and the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. Although conservative critics of the Federal Republic's foreign policy have faulted it for "obsessive modesty" and lack of initiative and imagination, successive administrations in Bonn have continued to favor multilateralism. They have done so because it has enabled them to take refuge from American demands, by pointing to the need to establish a common European Community position or an East-West consensus.

For three decades now this careful internationalist approach has reassured West Germany's allies by giving them what they wanted most from post-Hitler Germans: reliability, predictability, stability—characteristics which the Federal Republic's leaders have themselves adopted as commandments for foreign policymaking. How this cautious approach will appeal to a new generation of policymakers, less hesitant about defining national interests in national terms and less inclined to defer to the French and British, remains an open question.

For all their fidelity to NATO and the United States, Germans doubt the American military commitment to Europe. Washington's decision to strike a deal with Moscow on intermediate and short range missiles at West Germany's expense has unsettled CDU conservatives tremendously. West Germans in all parties have watched with apprehension the spreading of the belief among American conservatives, and more recently among convinced Atlanticists as well, that at least some U.S. forces should be brought home from Europe. If—perhaps the right word is *when*—that day comes, it will be a shock. Those who share Noelle-Neumann's gloomy assessments of West Germany's sense of insecurity fear that it will be a traumatic experience.

My own view is that the Federal Republic's emotional, political, and institutional investment in NATO and the other organizations of Western integration, and its preference for caution and calculability, are by now so ingrained that the West Germans will absorb the shock without too much difficulty. They will invest still more effort and resources in NATO and the EEC and will strengthen their influence there. Signs of this are evident already. The current NATO Military Committee chairman is a German. The next Secretary General will almost certainly be Manfred Wörner, the present West German defense minister. It is likely that the next EEC president will be a German as well. As American dominance in Western Europe declines with the withdrawal of our troops, the expansion of West German influence will occur at the expense of the French and the British. That will raise awkward questions, not least with regard to nuclear weapons, which the Germans do not have and, so far, have said they do not want.

With the assumption of such dominance within NATO and the EEC, West Germany will at last assume a political position commensurate with the size of the bills that it has been paying for all these years. The gain for the West should be a broader understanding by Bonn of its security responsibilities, and its willingness to move away from the exclusive fixation upon Central Europe. We may be seeing the first sign of this understanding in Bonn's unprecedented decision to send warships to the Mediterranean to replace American vessels ordered to the Persian Gulf.

The anxieties and radicalized personal values that so trouble Noelle-Neumann have not, in the crunch, translated into appeasement by Bonn. From the Berlin blockade of 1948 to the installation of the Pershing IIs in 1983–87, West German governments have withstood threats and blackmail. A younger generation's readiness to challenge American policies, and to conceive their country's interests differently

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from time to time will not, I believe, undermine a commitment to NATO that inheres in the fabric of the Republic. Shouldering greater responsibilities within the alliance should engender in West Germany a sense of national pride—this time in the form of responsible patriotism—whose absence Noelle-Neumann and her colleagues lament.

"After 22 Revolutions. . . ."

Baghdad

Despite overwhelming superiority in firepower and almost complete mastery of the air, the Iraqi Army is being ground down by Iran because it lacks motivation and the will to fight, Western military analysts and diplomats say.

"They are non-achievers," a Western military attaché said of the Iraqi Army. "Although they've theoretically got the weapons, the equipment, the flag-waving and tub-thumping, they just don't produce results. The evidence is in."

Analysts say the war, which began in September 1980, entered a crucial new stage on February 9, when the Iranians broke through long-entrenched Iraqi defences near the city of Faw on the strategic Faw peninsula at the Gulf near Kuwait. Moving swiftly, the Iranians poured thousands of soldiers, most of them fiercely religious Shiite Moslem volunteer irregulars, into the gap. Three weeks later, after diverting huge amounts of artillery, tanks and troops, including the élite Republican Guard, to a counter-attack, the Iraqis have failed to oust them.

Experts contrasted what one described as "five and a half years of military incompetence" and a "ponderously inflexible" Iraqi command structure with the ferocious fighting spirit of the lightly armed Iranians.

The Iranians rush into battle welcoming "martyrdom" at the behest of their leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Iranian front lines tend to be scenes of chaos and dedication, where turbaned mullahs with rifles slung on their backs rush about on brightly coloured motorcycles encouraging the troops.

Religious slogans are posted everywhere, and reinforcements sometimes arrive cheerfully carrying their own coffins as a sign of their willingness to be "martyred." There is little sign of military activity behind the combat area itself.

Calling the war a battle "between Islam and blasphemy," Ayatollah Khomeini has demanded the ouster of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and his Ba'athist government, which holds a pan-Arab, secular ideology.

Some military experts in Baghdad traced the lack of enthusiasm among the Iraqi soldiers to two major political factors: what they viewed as a lack of a strong, clear sense of Iraqi national identity, and ambivalent feelings about the government and the Ba'ath Party.

Like other Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Egypt and Iran, Iraq is not a historic entity. The nation exists within lines that were drawn on a map by European powers, first in semi-colonial mandates after the Ottoman Empire fell in World War I, and then as independent countries after World War II.

Iraq has had 22 "revolutions," most of them government coups, since 1920.

"They haven't had enough time for people at the extremes of the nation to believe in a unity for which to sacrifice themselves," a diplomat in Baghdad said. "I doubt whether the veneer of nationalism is very thick or very substantial."

John Kifner
The New York Times
(from *Encounter*, September/October 1987)

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The Unacknowledged Partnership

Daniel Pipes

CONTINUED HOPES of convening an international peace conference make it clear that although the era of Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter has long passed, the legacy of their "peace process" remains powerful. Many high officials in the Israeli and U.S. governments see the task of bringing Arabs and Israelis into formal negotiations as their most important contribution to Middle East politics.

On the surface, this seems like an irreproachable idea; what person of goodwill can oppose efforts to get enemies to sit down together? But a closer look reveals that negotiation has become outdated. Blind pursuit of this objective may, paradoxically, work to unsettle Arab-Israeli relations.

Today, the peace process means just one thing: a formal and public agreement between Israel and Jordan (with Palestinians represented by Jordan). It cannot refer to anything else. Egypt, which used to be the focus of Middle East diplomacy, has dropped out of the picture since its 1979 treaty with Israel. Lebanon has no government and cannot participate in negotiations. Syria refuses any long-term accommodation of Israel. Of the direct participants, only Jordan and the Palestinians are left as Israel's possible interlocutors.

But the record of Israel's experience with Egypt suggests that the consequences of a formal agreement would not be entirely beneficial for itself, Jordan, or the Palestinians. To see why, one has to look at the striking contrast between Egypt's poor relations with Israel and Jordan's much better ties with it.

Since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed, Egypt has reduced contacts with Israel to a bare minimum. Almost no Egyptians visit Israel, negligible cultural interchange takes place, and trade amounts to little more than the oil that the peace treaty requires Egypt sell to Israel. The Egyptian government exploits disagreement—such as Israel's raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia—as an excuse to reduce ties with Israel. The Cairo press engages in anti-Semitic outbursts calculated to provoke anger in Israel. The dispute over a tiny enclave called Taba has gone on for years, eroding good will on both sides. Relations have declined to the point where Egyptian authorities hardly bothered to investigate the October 1985 massacre of seven Israeli tourists—including four children—by a uniformed guard in the Sinai desert. Israelis have accurately dubbed relations with Egypt a cold peace.

Many Egyptians want to restrict relations even more. A majority of politicians,

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administrators, journalists, and intellectuals oppose the peace with Israel. Though few advocate breaking the 1979 treaty, most second-echelon figures argue for a further reduction in the present level of cooperation.

IN CONTRAST, although Jordan maintains a formal state of war with Israel, the two countries have developed a thick network of practical relations. Trade has multiplied many times since the Israelis began a policy of "open bridges" right after the 1967 war. Tens of thousands of Arabs enter Israel for family visits, tourism, or medical purposes. In the other direction, foreigners and Arab Israelis (but no Jewish Israelis) enter Jordan from Israel.

The two governments cooperate closely in running the West Bank. Israeli authorities permit Jordan a wide variety of privileges, such as providing textbooks used in West Bank schools and sending official delegations to inspect crops. Agreements over the years have ranged, in the words of an Israeli official, "from anti-mosquito to anti-terrorism issues." In contrast to the years of argument with Egypt over Taba, Israel has twice adjusted the ceasefire line at Jordan's request. The two sides have arrangements to drill and distribute water, control air traffic, develop agriculture, regulate currency transactions, and avert military flareups. Israeli engineers have taught their Jordanian counterparts a new, inexpensive way to extract potassium from the Dead Sea area; to do this the Israelis reached Jordan via a special road by the Dead Sea. Senior Israeli and Jordanian officials meet and travel together in the West Bank. Recently, rumors have circulated about impending Israel-Jordan economic cooperation in the Arava region, Jordanian use of Haifa port, and even *de facto* Jordanian control of East Jerusalem.

Extensive negotiations recently preceded the opening of a branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank in the West Bank; at issue was oversight of the bank's activities. In the end, a creative compromise was reached: Israeli authorities oversee shekels deposited in the Bank of Israel, Jordanian authorities oversee dinars deposited in the central bank in Amman. Financial cooperation extends to very practical levels: when Amman wishes to transfer money to the West Bank, a security company carries cash in a bullet-proof vehicle to the Jordan river; at the border, Jordanian and Israeli officials jointly count the cash, and then the Israelis take control of it. Israeli officials have gone out of their way to plead with Americans to fund King Hussein's plan to spend $240 million a year on a development plan in the West Bank; they make no comparable efforts for aid to Egypt.

The two states tacitly cooperate against their mutual enemy, Yasir Arafat. To exclude PLO influence, they coordinate mayoral appointments on the West Bank, and Jordan is allowed a fairly free hand to choose lesser municipal officials. In December 1986, for example, local residents filled 100 positions in the West Bank's civil administration; all were reportedly friendly to the king. Israeli authorities recently deported a pro-PLO newspaper editor; his successor is expected to be friendlier to Jordan. There is talk now of Israeli permission for pro-Jordanian political parties and pro-Jordanian universities to begin operating on the West Bank. Reports from Israel indicate repeated Jordanian efforts to bring Israeli authorities together with Atallah Atallah (also known as Abu Za'im), the Palestinian leader Amman is promoting as a replacement for Yasir Arafat. In many ways, the Israeli authorities punish pro-PLO activities and reward pro-Jordanian ones.

In return, Jordanian authorities have signaled their acceptance of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. For example, they did not support efforts in Hebron to head off the construction of a new synagogue and they no longer try to stop the provision of electricity to Jewish settlements. An Israeli analyst, Pinhas Inbari, concludes that

> Jordan is no longer aiming for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories; on the contrary, Amman is interested in an Israeli alliance against PLO influence, and as a logical conclu-

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sion, Jordan is not inclined to enter formal negotiations with the Jewish state and is quite happy with behind-the-scenes arrangements.

Both governments see economic growth as the key to reducing PLO influence in the West Bank. Thus, Amman publicly hailed the Israeli decision in August to lift a ban on West Bank produce exports to Europe. It also permits West Bank doctors to train in Israel and even sanctions Israeli teachers in Ramallah hospital. The results have been impressive—Israeli figures show that the gross product of the West Bank grew by an average of 9 percent in 1985 and 1986.

To coordinate all these matters, Jerusalem and Amman have established direct political communications. Beginning in September 1963, King Hussein met Israeli leaders many times; the most recent occasion was in April 1987, when he spent seven hours with Shimon Peres in London. Hussein has visited various parts of Israel, even spending time in Tel Aviv on one occasion. He met with Golda Meir ten times. In recent years, Israeli leaders have found it easier to meet with the Jordanian king than with the Egyptian president. More than that, Israeli leaders openly praise the king. Thus, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres tells visitors that he "admires and respects" the king.

To assure deniability, in the past agreements between the two states were always verbal in nature. But, according to Israeli press reports, starting in 1987, most contacts now take the form of written messages. For example, negotiations concerning the East Jerusalem Electric Company were conducted through a series of memoranda. Intermediaries are not hard to find; United States diplomats or West Bank officials are usually happy to offer their services. Amman's willingness to commit its position in writing indicates a new level of trust in Israeli officials.

Should current policies be maintained, joint Jordanian-Israeli rule over the West Bank appears to be a likely outcome. In this scenario, Amman would oversee West Bank Arabs' daily life while Jerusalem would oversee the Jews' daily life and control the region militarily. Advocates of an independent Palestinian polity would be excluded from power.

NINE YEARS of the Egypt-Israel peace makes clear that public and formal relations between an Arab state and Israel create problems of their own. Several Arab leaders—Hafiz al-Assad of Syria especially—insist that the Arab state of war against Israel continue and that Arabs not acknowledge the existence of Israel. These leaders are willing to ignore ties that remain *sub rosa* but they cannot abide official relations. Thus, to protect itself after the peace treaty was signed, Cairo narrowed contacts with Israel.

There is every reason to expect that King Hussein would do the same following a formal peace. In fact, Jordanian authorities are already bending over backwards to cover their good relations with Israel. Attention to the two states' friendly state of war provokes strident criticism from Amman. An Israeli specialist on Arab radio programming, Shaul Menashe, explained last year:

> It may sound surprising, but right now the most venomous propaganda against Israel does not emanate from Damascus or even from Riyadh; it comes from Amman. The Jordanians want to demonstrate to the Palestinians in the territories that they do not fall short of Arafat or Syria, and they may also want to cover up secret contacts with Israel. That is why Jordan never says "the prime minister of Israel," which even Syria says, but "the prime minister of the Zionist enemy," or "the Zionist war minister."

Were a formal peace to be signed, this sort of posturing would shut down many of the existing forms of tacit cooperation.

All signatories would suffer more harm than good from a formal Jordan-Israel peace treaty. It would isolate King Hussein politically, endangering his throne and life. His present policies enjoy Saudi, Iraqi, and Syrian backing: were he to sign a document,

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Saudi Arabia would cut off subsidies, Iraq would cool relations, and Syria would begin sabotage and terrorist activities. Why should Israel and the United States jeopardize a relatively stable and pro-American kingdom for a piece of paper? Formal peace would exact a price from Israel by threatening Jordan's security and reducing bilateral ties. The Palestinians would suffer from a breakdown of the Jordanian-Israeli cooperation, worsened conditions on the West Bank, and from a likely eruption of violence between Palestinian factions.

The informal, even clandestine, relations that Jordan maintains with Israel have the advantage of not provoking trouble. The key to Jordan's relations with Israel lies—paradoxically—in their not being codified by legal instruments; that they are unofficial means they can be denied. What Shimon Peres calls a relationship "characterized by understanding more than by [formal] agreement," should not be tampered with lightly. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir publicly describes relations with Jordan as a "de facto peace." Not surprisingly, he and many Israelis prefer this to a formal but cold peace.

This pessimistic conclusion does not imply that all peace treaties between Arab states and Israel are counter-productive, only that the costs must be carefully weighed against benefits. Overall, Egypt's treaty with Israel probably serves those two countries (and therefore the United States) better than any alternative. In the case of Jordan, however, the costs associated with a formal treaty appear to exceed the benefits.

A friendly state of war serves as well or better than a hostile state of peace. Washington should take heed.

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Dissent on Iran

Amos Perlmutter

THE REAGAN administration's policy in the Persian Gulf is likely to have two unfortunate outcomes: it Americanizes the Iran-Iraq war, and it runs the risk of doing egregious damage to the possibility of better U.S.-Iran relations in the future, the most important long-term U.S. interest in the region.

The Americanization of the Gulf war is progressing rapidly. Six months ago, the Reagan administration announced the policy of reflagging Kuwaiti ships. Today, we have a fleet of some fifty ships in the Gulf and its vicinity, the equivalent of the total number of ships in the British navy. In the past five months the number of ships destroyed in the Gulf has quadrupled.

In the process of Americanizing the war we have become Iraq's *de facto* ally, an ironic development when one considers the history and present circumstances of the war. It was Iraq which started the war against Iran, believing revolutionary Iran was too weak to withstand an Iraqi onslaught. It was Iraq which violated international conventions by engaging in chemical warfare. It was Iraq which escalated the tanker war. It was an Iraqi pilot who launched the missile that crippled a U.S. warship, prompting Reagan's reflagging policy. Iraq now stands to lose the war. We thus find ourselves being the ally of the country that started the war, escalated it at every turn, and is now about to lose it. By tilting toward Iraq we have not helped our initial strategic goal, which was the protection of free access to the Gulf's oil supply. Our deepening involvement now jeopardizes this very goal.

One reason people give to justify this tilt is that we cannot possibly reason with the Iranians. But if the past teaches us anything it is that we have to deal directly with revolutionary regimes. There is no practical way to ignore Iran's present revolutionary government, abhorrent as it is. We have to find ways to open a dialogue with the Ayatollahs not only because we cannot ignore them but because it is in our interests to reach some kind of accommodation with Iran. We will not be able to change the nature of the Teheran regime, and it is likely that the Mullahs will hold sway in Iran for some time yet. But our long-term goal must be to align ourselves with the major power in the Gulf rather than to seek confrontation with it. The Iran of the Shah was a modernized empire of some 40 million people which acted in many ways as our surrogate in the Gulf. Such degree of cooperation is no longer possible under the present regime, but that does not mean an aggressive stance on our part will further our interests.

We are simply not in a position to bring Iran to its knees, short of an all out war on it. Iraq is even less capable than we are to do so. We should realize that for Iran the war has a deeper meaning; Iranians view it as another phase in the Shias' revolutionary war against

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the Gulf Sunnis. Unless this war threatens vital U.S. interests, we would be wise to stay out of it.

The protection of the open seas is not a sufficient reason for our current Iraqi tilt. It was the Iraqis who challenged the law of the open seas and it was they who committed the first aggression in the tanker war. The Iranians, with all their bravado, have clearly abstained from a serious challenge to free navigation in the Gulf, a challenge they could have mounted easily. Our intervention in the war cannot be justified as helping the Saudis or other moderate Arab regimes. It was the Saudis, after all, who tried eagerly to help us in our attempt to reach out to moderate Iranians. It appears that both the Saudis and the Kuwaitis would rather see us reaching a tacit accommodation with Iran than engage in open confrontation with it. It will be the Saudis and the Kuwaitis who will be left to face Iran's vindictiveness if we adopt a hostile stance vis-à-vis the latter.

The argument that we should pursue an anti-Soviet strategy in the Gulf may be correct, but it is difficult to understand how an actively anti-Iranian stance facilitates such a strategy. The threat Shiite fundamentalism poses to Soviet Central Asia is greater than the Soviet threat to the theocratic regime. Soviet military threats against Iran are not very convincing, and it is reasonable to assume that in the wake of their experience in Afghanistan Soviet leaders will hesitate before attempting to subdue a nation of forty million people imbued with religious and nationalistic fervor. The U.S. tilt toward Iraq, however, helped to reduce the wide gap of interests and outlook separating Iran and the Soviet Union. Our intervention in the Gulf has contributed to the process of conciliation now taking place between these old adversaries.

Before we rush into a shooting war, we should be clear what our interests are. The West does have a vital interest in free access to oil resources in the Gulf. It is not clear, however, that the tanker war that took place before we intervened was a real threat to Western interests, or even that it threatened more than a miniscule portion of oil shipments from the Gulf. It was rather an extension of the ground warfare between Iran and Iraq. As long as the destruction of tankers and oil facilities is limited to those of the two protagonists, we should not intervene.

The United States should come to terms with the regime of the theocrats. Such accommodation is possible. There are differences within the revolutionary elite that we should recognize. These differences are not so much between "extremists" and "moderates" as they are between those who want to concentrate on solidifying the revolution at home and those who want to export it. We should encourage the inward-looking forces in the regime. There is no easy or simple way to do it, but one certain way not to achieve it is to confront and provoke Iran unnecessarily.

Simultaneously, we should try to fashion a more meaningful strategic cooperation between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It should not be designed to challenge the Iranian revolution at home but rather to harness and restrain the revolutionary Shia spillover into the Middle East. We need to create a political shield to turn Iran away from its "world revolutionary goals." A strategic alliance of Israel and the moderate Arab states is the most likely instrument to restrain Iran. It would be a demonstration of strength and resolve without directly challenging or threatening the Iranian regime. It would be a demonstration of American influence, joining the most powerful states in the Middle East—Israel and Egypt—in a tacit political-military show of force which might yet persuade the radical clergy to restrict their revolution within Iranian borders.

This sensible course of action is available to the United States. Its opposite is the gratuitous policy of tacitly supporting Iraq adopted by the administration. What is more, it is a policy of supporting the loser. What are we likely to gain from it? Increasing risks to free navigation in the Gulf, a major military confrontation with Iran, and the latter's enduring enmity. Some gains!

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South Africa: The Perils of Parallels

Richard N. Haass and Kurt M. Campbell

SOUTH AFRICA invites comparison. For some it is a twentieth century morality play, peopled with individuals both black and white, literally and figuratively. For others it is simply another regional or national conflict in a continent already hosting too many such conflicts. And for others still South Africa is a strategic outpost rich in vital minerals astride key sea lanes.

Indeed, a review of recent public commentary suggests that South Africa invites more analogy than most places. It is not hard to divine why. Analogies can provide a shortcut to understanding the complex and the controversial. They can also furnish directions and strategies for action. Some see in the "black versus white" a parallel to two-sided struggles elsewhere. Others, rejecting this simplicity and acknowledging the divisions within both the black and white populations, nevertheless see in South Africa the familiar characteristics of struggling rival nationalisms. Pessimists tend to look to other seemingly hopeless situations and predict calamity, optimists to solutions that emerged from seemingly hopeless circumstances. The question remains, though: to what extent do parallels illuminate, and to what extent do they distort. A quick run through the various analogies reveals mostly their shortcomings:

The United States: A good many Americans view South Africa through the prism of the 1960s civil rights movement: Soweto is Selma, P. W. Botha is Lester Maddox, and black South Africa's funerals the equivalent of the freedom marches. There is the obvious element of a racially-configured society at conflict with itself. People see the blacks and others in South Africa as seeking their political and economic rights; in the end, like here, it is believed South Africa's politically dispossessed will prevail, if only because of the righteousness of their cause.

But the differences outweigh any similarities. In the United States, blacks who constitute a minority of the population sought equal rights under the existing political system. They wanted freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and nominally protected by the law. The courts and the federal government proved to be allies. Newspaper and television coverage of violence and poverty stirred the conscience and consciousness of the nation and the world.

In South Africa, however, the majority is seeking rights not guaranteed by any constitution or law; to the contrary, the law of the land systematically denies rights. Political

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aspirations cannot be achieved within the existing system but only by replacing it with another. Restrictions on the media often hide stark realities from people within and without South Africa alike. South African courts of law, often undermined by the executive, are increasingly part of the problem. Meanwhile, the court of public opinion often is too cut off to do much good.

Lebanon: References to Lebanon and its patchwork quilt of warring factions are also gaining currency. At first glance, there are a number of apparent similarities: the rise of domestic unrest and often random and indiscriminate violence; the proliferation of increasingly militant groups vying for power with one another as well as with the central government; the minority status of Lebanon's once-ruling Christians and South Africa's still-ruling whites.

Yet South Africa is not about to go the way of Lebanon. Disintegration in South Africa is not a real possibility. The central government and the internal security forces continue to display a daunting capacity to quell internal dissent. They have largely won the war in Namibia against the SWAPO insurgents. Domestically, the state of emergency is having its desired effect. The government has thus far demonstrated the will and the ability to cope with both domestic opponents and foreign enemies. The government in Lebanon could and can do neither.

Philippines: Events in the Philippines over the last 18 months are cited by South Africans for two reasons. Some see in "people's power," the mass civil resistance movement that ultimately brought down the Marcos government, a recipe for South Africa's majority to assume power. Secondly, the U.S. role in helping to bring down Marcos is seen as evidence of what the United States can do when it chooses to exercise its power.

Both analogies are flawed. The masses in South Africa are neither as politicized nor organized as the opposition was in the Philippines. Nor are they as united. Corazon Aquino was in the streets; Nelson Mandela is in jail. His organization is banned and has no access to the media, all in contrast to their alleged Philippine counterparts. Marcos fell less because of the opposition's strength than because of his own loss of nerve. Mrs. Aquino represented reform, not revolution, and those around Marcos saw no reason to give their lives resisting her. Afrikaners see nothing less than their way of life at stake, and will not hesitate to use force to defend what is now theirs.

The role of the United States is also qualitatively different. Unlike the Philippines, in South Africa the United States has no special role or voice as the former colonial power. Nor does the United States possess vital interests in the region or maintain a large military presence to safeguard them. In every way—politically, economically and militarily—the South African government enjoys a degree of independence from Washington and for that matter from all other *uitlanders* that seek to impose their will on Afrikanerdom. And any potential leverage the United States might possess is further diluted by the reality that although there is a general consensus in this country about what is desired for South Africa, there is no agreement about how to get there.

Algeria: The Algeria analogy is the one most cited nowadays in South Africa. It is usually held up by those who wish for a fundamental change in the political structure. A parallel is drawn between the Afrikaners and the French who were driven out of positions of privelege, the country, or both. Yet the French in Algeria were colonials, and always had the option of returning to metropolitan France. For the Afrikaner, there is no equivalent, no place to escape to. The Afrikaners see themselves not as transplanted Europeans but as Africa's white tribe. They are not about to go anywhere.

A better analogy might be to draw connections between the French tactics of dealing with a popular but poorly organized opposition. The French prevailed for many years, their relatively small security force mixing in equal parts brutality and efficiency.

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The South African government appears at least as capable.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: The use of neighboring Zimbabwe as a parallel is easily understood. Its civil war too was also in large part a racial conflict in which the bulk of the world stood against the white government. For many who want change, Zimbabwe is seen as proof that desirable and relatively bloodless change can happen and that when it does happen it can be orderly.

But there are key differences. White Rhodesians numbered only 300,000. Afrikaners number ten times that, and white South Africans number nearly five million in all. Rhodesia existed as a white outpost for only 100 years and was in essence a white colony. Whites have lived in South Africa for more than three centuries and see themselves as permanent residents. The Rhodesian military was small and relied heavily upon blacks. The core of South Africa's security forces is comprised of Afrikaner farm boys armed with sophisticated weapons. Rhodesia's jungle terrain lent itself to classic guerilla war. South Africa's more urbanized landscape does not. In short, Rhodesia was a politically isolated, poor, landlocked African state. South Africa is nothing less than a regional superpower. In the final analysis, Rhodesians always had South Africa as a fallback. South Africans have no such luxury.

Switzerland: It is noteworthy that one of the best sellers in today's South Africa proposes a Swiss, canton-style system of government that claims to fulfill black political aspirations while protecting the bottom line interests of whites. It thus has much in common with many of the schemes for sharing power now being promoted in South Africa, most notably the *Indaba* (dialogue) taking place between whites of mostly English descent and blacks (mostly Zulus) in Natal province.

Such models seem far more academic than real. There is no social consensus to implement these sophisticated schemes, which require a healthy degree of moderation and willingness to compromise. Most whites are not prepared to share power in anything more than the most token of ways; the more politicized blacks reject anything that sustains a racial approach to politics and accords whites any special status or priveleges. Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka unfortunately are likely to provide more accurate parallels for South Africa than Switzerland.

Israel: There are some interesting similarities. Both the Israelis and the Afrikaners see themselves as chosen and embattled: each has a covenant with God, each still commemorates a trek from oppression, each sees itself living in an often hostile world. Israelis fear being driven into the sea by an army of Arabs; Afrikaners fear a rising black tide. Both Israel and South Africa are expressions of religious nationalism. Both possess powerful militaries; each possesses nuclear weapons or at least the technology to make them.

Again, there are distinctions. Israel is a true democracy, maintains good relations with the United States, and enjoys an international legitimacy that for all its problems is still far greater than white South Africa can ever expect to experience. Politically and culturally, Zionism is a product of the enlightenment; the Afrikaner escaped from Europe before the enlightenment and consciously shut himself off from its values. Moreover, Israelis are not a small minority in their own country imposing their will on the majority; unlike South Africa, Israel's principal enemies are external.

In short, all parallels, be it those comparing South Africa to Israel or any other country or situation, must be used with great caution. Although some analogies provide illumination, more are likely to promote distortion. South Africa's predicament is unique, as was its history, as will be its future. Those who attempt to understand events by looking elsewhere are likely to be misguided; those who attempt to affect developments by applying lessons learned elsewhere are likely to be frustrated. There are no shortcuts to understanding South Africa's domestic difficulties and no roadmaps for formulating U.S. policy. Rather than search-

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ing the globe and consulting history for parallels that with scrutiny turn out to be more flawed than helpful, concerned observers and would-be policymakers might do better to focus on the unique characteristics that set South Africa apart.

A Bold Exchange

The following exchange during Gorbachev's walk-about in Khabarovsk was reported in *Pravda*, 30 July 1986 and *Izvestia*, 31 July 1986.

Gorbachev: *I'm sure you heard me yesterday asking the same question everywhere: "Are our plans clear to you all?"*
Voices: *They're clear to us all!*
Gorbachev: *Are you in the mood for work?*
Voices: *Yes, we are! We're in the mood for even better work!*
Gorbachev: *What else do you want?*
Voices: *Peace! Peace!*
Gorbachev: *Did you notice that yesterday in Vladivostok I devoted half my speech to peace? . . . Did you listen to my speech in Vladivostok yesterday?*
Voices: *We listened to you! We saw you! We read your words!*
Gorbachev: *And that's how we're going to act! And over there they can take that into account in their policies. No one is going to force us to our knees!*
Voices: *We'll never allow it!*
Gorbachev: *Never! Not this nation. Sabre rattling is not our policy. But we are going to strengthen our defences, and the main thing is that we'll improve our economy, so that our people will feel good and secure.*

As you know, all sorts of radio stations—and they are not the only ones—are now trying to malign our plans and policies, hoping that they can create a confrontation between the people and the leadership. They want to destabilize our country. . . . The main obstacle to imperialism is the Soviet Union, our strength, and our organized, strong-willed people!
Voices: *We're not going to let ourselves be insulted!*
Gorbachev: *No, we're not. I agree. If we can preserve this mutual understanding . . . the understanding between the working class and the leadership of our country, the understanding within each collective, between the leaders and the working people, we can have everything, Comrades. You must feel that you are in charge of this country. Hold your heads up high!*
Voices: *We have been holding them high ever since the Party Congress!*
Gorbachev: *And don't let them drop again! . . . You must hold your heads high and bow to no one, especially not to boors and louts, no matter what their official position may be.*
A Voice: *Right, that's the most important thing.*

Survey, August 1987

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Look, No Ships!

Paul R. Wisgerhof

THE UNITED STATES flag merchant marine had about 3,500 active vessels on the roles at the end of World War II. Today, it has fewer than 400. For the first time in the nation's history, the merchant marine is smaller than the Navy. As well, the average age of the U.S. fleet has risen to 18 years, and about a third of the fleet is 30 or more years old.

Nor is that all. The merchant fleets of the other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members have been declining at much the same rate as the U.S. fleet. This also holds true for the fleets of most of the non-NATO member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). On the other hand, the Soviet commercial fleet has doubled since 1960 from 1,200 to 2,450 vessels.

The growing U.S. trade imbalance is reflected in its ocean borne shipping. In 1984, U.S. flag vessels carried a meager 3.6 percent of the nation's exports and only 5.0 percent of its imports. In terms of the revenue gap between income for U.S. owned lines and expenses paid to foreign owned lines, the U.S. lost $600 million in 1980. In 1985 the loss was $2.46 billion.

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The reduction in the number of U.S. flag vessels has hurt maritime employment. Some 57,000 seamen operated 1,100 U.S. flag ships in 1955; in 1986 11,000 jobs were available on 370 ships. This drastic drop in employment has an impact on the nation's ability to man its Naval Ready Reserve Fleet in time of need, particularly for engineering and non-licensed crew.

Even with the recent expansion of the U.S. Navy, the nation's shipyards continue a decline begun in the late 1970s. Today there are 88 shipyards in the U.S. capable of building ocean-going merchant vessels—down from 110 in 1982. Employment in the yards has slumped from 142,000 to 116,000 over the same period. In 1975 the Navy used 11 of these yards; in 1985 it used six. The skilled workers formerly employed in these yards have scattered to other job markets, potentially lost from the shipbuilding trades forever.

Besides the construction of naval vessels, the U.S. needs shipyards for four primary tasks: the construction, repair, and modernization of merchant vessels; restoration and return to service of the Naval Defense Reserve Fleet; repair and overhaul of Navy vessels; and conversion of merchant vessels in time of war. Because of increasing costs, no U.S. shipyard has launched a new merchant vessel since 1985; no orders for new merchant ships are on the books of any U.S. shipyard today. While merchant ship technology continues to improve in other areas of the world, the U.S. shipyard merchant capacity is deteriorating.

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The United States needs to be able to lift combat forces anywhere in the world on short notice to meet its international commitments. In the event of a crisis, that lift capacity would come from four sources: U.S. Navy support ships; the U.S. flag merchant marine; the Naval Ready Reserve Fleet; and the Naval Defense Reserve Fleet.

The active navy support fleet includes amphibious warfare vessels which could be used to move Marines and some Army troops to battle; the mobile logistic ships which support the fleet; and the fleet mobility enhancement vessels which include prepositioned supply ships and eight fast logistic supply ships. The merchant marine would be required to provide about half its capacity immediately to support military operations. The Ready Reserve Fleet (now 88 ships, scheduled to grow to 116 by 1991) would provide thirty cargo ships and tankers within five days of the start of a crisis and the rest of the fleet within 20 days. The Defense Reserve Fleet of some 200 ships would be taken out of mothballs and reactivated in the first 60 to 90 days after the beginning of mobilization.

In addition to the U.S. flag merchant fleet, there exist another 500 or so vessels owned by U.S. corporations and individuals, some of which have U.S. citizen captains, which are said to be "under effective U.S. control" (EUSC). The majority of these ships operate in the bulk trades, so that only perhaps 100 would be "militarily useful." In a national emergency the Secretary of the Navy may order these and all U.S. flag vessels into service under the control of the U.S. government.

In the event of war in Central Europe, most NATO-owned and controlled shipping would be available for use by NATO. Approximately 400 of those vessels could be used to transport U.S. military supplies across the Atlantic. Some NATO shipping, particularly that flying the Greek flag, is neither owned nor manned by NATO nations, and might not be available for use. In addition, just as in the case of U.S. flag and EUSC ships, not all are militarily useful.

Three ship types will be of most use: passenger ships for troop transport; product tankers; and self-handling cargo ships. Passenger ships are a problem for the United States; we only have four small passenger/cargo vessels under U.S. flag. Another four are available from NDRF. However, counting all of the cruise ships registered under various NATO flags, another 25 should be available in time of need. Of the 1,600 or so tankers in the NATO fleet, only 20 percent could be used to carry product (gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel). Those with a displacement of between 25,000 and 50,000 tons would be most useful. Self-handling merchant ships are becoming a thing of the past with the rapid switch from break-bulk cargo ships to container vessels. Few container ships are capable of unloading themselves without the assistance of on-shore cranes. One may assume that if war comes to Central Europe there may not be too many on-shore cranes standing by the time the first support vessels arrive from abroad.

Today's U.S. Merchant Marine

OF THE LESS than 400 ships that comprise today's U.S. flag merchant marine, over half are tankers or bulk carriers of various types. The approximately 175 active U.S. flag freighters (called the "liner trade") carry about 22 percent of U.S. generated cargo traffic. These ships face competition not only from ships carrying the flags of our trading partners, but also from "third country" flags. The third country flags are mainly those from "flag of convenience" nations (Panama, Liberia, and so on) and from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Some authorities on U.S. shipping problems believe that U.S. shipping lines would make a profit if they were able to carry, in aggregate, at least 27 percent of the cargo traffic generated between the U.S. and its trading partners. However, the U.S. liner trade finds itself at a disadvantage vis-à-vis not only its trading partners' lines but also

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third country traders. The liner fleet averages over 15 years old; its crew costs are among the highest in the world; its citizenship and union crewing requirements are among the most restrictive anywhere; and its capital costs are significantly higher than most. Any recommendation to improve the U.S. liner trade's competitive advantage must take these problems into consideration.

Finding solutions to the problem of the shrinking U.S. merchant marine fleet is difficult, since economic and security considerations must be balanced. Past policies dealing with this shortage have been expensive failures. Some proposed solutions might actually work, but at high cost. Government subsidies add to the total tax burden of all taxpayers while cargo preference schemes add to the costs of importers and exporters. Given the seriousness of the problem, however, all options should be considered and perhaps combined along the following lines.

Perhaps the most important step is to provide new tax incentives for the construction and operation of U.S. flag ships. Tax laws regarding U.S. ships have been relatively static for many years. Most taxes apply to shipping interests as well as other transportation fields. Under current rules, a U.S. flag vessel may be fully depreciated over 16 years. Japan allows its ship owners/operators to depreciate their ships over five years, with a 40 percent write-off the first year. Japan also effectively subsidizes expenses incurred in operating the ship. The U.S. might consider a plan which would have the following elements: the ships must be built in U.S. yards; new construction would have to include "militarily useful" elements in each ship; subsequent U.S. owners could receive similar or equal benefits, based on the market value of the ship when acquired by new owners; depreciation of the ship would be complete in five years; and full expensing in year of incidence would be allowed. If this set of benefits were to stimulate the construction of 200 ships over a ten–year period the estimated cost to the U.S. government would be about $4 billion in foregone revenues.

A second step toward strengthening the fleet would involve entering into market-sharing and expanded cargo preference agreements with most U.S. trading partners. The U.S. liner industry claims to carry about 22 percent of all liner cargos imported and exported by the United States. To break even they claim to need about 27 percent of the business. Most nations, including the United States, stipulate that certain kinds of cargos must be carried exclusively or in part on ships of that nation. These cargo preference rules usually apply to all domestic shipping, that is, shipping between ports of the same nation (cabotage), and may also apply to all or some other cargos such as those owned, sold, or purchased by the government. The expansion of this concept to include all cargos traded between any two nations or among a group of nations, such as NATO or the OECD, similar to the agreements in effect regulating international aviation, could do much to encourage the expansion and modernization of the fleets of the participating nations. There would be no direct expense to the taxpayer. Any added expense would fall on the importer and exporter (ultimately on the end-use consumer), where some believe expenses of this type rightly belong.

The division of carriage between the U.S. and others participating, or between the U.S. and any group of nations, may be set at any mutually agreeable level. In order for third country flags to compete in this and in "cross" trades, a division such as 40/40/20 or 30/30/40 might be proposed. Continuation of third country flags in the trade will serve to moderate any temptation to make excessive rate increases. The cost to shippers is estimated at $3 billion.

Third, we might consider continuing or expanding the present subsidy scheme. Present subsidies paid to U.S. ship operators come in several forms: an operating differential, a construction differential, and Title IX loan guarantees on ships built in the U.S. The operating differentials are based on the fact that it costs more to crew a U.S. flag merchant ship than it does for most of the competition. The average U.S. container

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costs about $3 million per year in crew expenses while its Italian counterpart gets by for about $1.3 million. The cost of operating under an LDC (Less Developed Country) flag is even lower. Today's operating subsidies run as high as $3 million per ship annually. Since it costs from 2 to 3 times as much to build a ship in a U.S. shipyard as it costs to build the same vessel abroad, the government will pay part of the costs of building the ship in the U.S. provided certain military standards are met. This subsidy can easily amount to $1.5 million per year over the 16 year life of a ship. The 1936 Merchant Marine Act provided for government-guaranteed loans to promote the construction of ships in U.S. shipyards. If a merchant ship were to be built in a U.S. yard today that subsidy could be as high as $50 million.

If all of the subsidy programs were implemented and applied to 20 new ships per year, the average annual cost to the taxpayer would be about $5 billion.

A fourth option would be for the government to build cargo ships at the government's expense and then either sell or lease the new ships to private operators. The construction of a standard container ship today would cost about $150 million. If 20 vessels were to be built over the next year, the cost would be between $3 and $4 billion. Given a ship life of 30 years, 5 percent interest, and no further tax benefits to the leasee or buyer, the government would recoup between $110 million and $130 million per year. The advantages of this program are that it would: keep U.S. shipyards open, preserve and expand national ship building technology, maintain or expand shipyard employment and accomplish each while saving at least $2 billion in foreign exchange, or the approximate cost of building the same vessels abroad. This does not take into account savings of possible economic losses to the economy which would be associated with the likely closing of U.S. shipyards.

Clearly, various combinations of these programs could be created. Savings would probably be proportionate, although the gains or losses resulting from the combinations are hard to calculate.

The United States must find a way to build approximately 200 new merchant vessels over the coming decade. It must take steps to assure the commercial viability of both the new ships and the U.S. merchant marine. This means making sure that adequate cargos are available to the U.S. liners, or taking steps to provide adequate government fiscal assurances—or both.

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The War Colleges Debate

I read Williamson Murray's article with great interest. I agree that the Air War College has a great deal of room for improvement which we are struggling to achieve. I will leave grading the other war colleges to those who know them better.

Murray is correct to focus his comments on the fundamental purpose, or mission, of the war colleges—the study of war. In the Fall of 1985 we changed the Air War College mission statement. The current statement is: "to prepare senior military officers to develop, maintain, and lead the aerospace component of national power to deter conflict and achieve victory in the event of war." We replaced the old mission statement that Murray quoted for just the sort of reasons he found it deficient, i.e. its focus "on technocratic and bureaucratic issues and not on the messy business of war." . . .

Murray asserts that "Part of the problem is that the Air War College . . . is not an independent vehicle. It is directly under the Air University and a general is at the head of each." This point is a non-issue. Within the United States military everybody reports to, and is responsible to somebody. . . . What is relevant is the impact of command authority. Command authority is simultaneously one of the primary strengths and weaknesses of the war colleges. Without an agreement on what should be included in the study of war, and given the hierarchical nature of military command, our debates are often settled by command authority just as Admiral Turner imposed his curriculum on the Naval War College. The ability of the commander to order major changes in the war colleges gives them a flexibility unknown in civilian academic institutions. . . .

It is essential that the study of war at the war colleges retain the empirical character that can only be achieved by having a faculty with practical, field experience. . . . The war colleges in the development of their military faculty are at the mercy of the promotion sysems of the larger institutions they serve—the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. The reality for the Air War College is that the pool of talent in Air Force uniform with both empirical knowledge of operations, particularly at the colonel level, and scholarly reflection on war essential for faculty duty is too small. The Air Force must emphasize the intellectual preparation for war as a criterion for promotion in the officer corps, before we will have the faculty we need.

The war colleges need the empirical knowledge of the military in war and in peace that can most easily be gained by serving in the field. That empirical knowledge is missing in the other "place where we can educate a portion of America's leadership for the strategic tasks of the 1990s" despite Murray's statement that such an education is available only at the war colleges. That other place is in the schools, centers, and think tanks of the military-intellectual complex. In 1986 I spent a stimulating period of study at the Harvard-MIT Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament. . . . Despite the brilliant and well informed faculty in that program, I would not care to see the military members of the Air War College replaced by such civilians. What we need are better qualified military faculty members to complement our civilian faculty at the proper place for senior military officers to obtain most of their education for the strategic tasks of the 1990s. . . .

The philosophical and conceptual conflict between education and training will

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probably never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. I submit that the students' workload issues are not quite what Murray laid out. Our students do not spend thirty to thirty-five hours in the classroom. Since 1984 the average has been nineteen hours per week with a high in Fall 1986 of twenty-three and a half hours and a planned ceiling . . . this year of twenty hours a week in the classroom. . . .

The question of students' workload, in which the unstated comparison is with civilian graduate schools, raises another set of issues. Those issues are the secondary role of graduate schools as professional screening devices and the war colleges' secondary mission of professional socialization. One of the reasons for the heavy academic demands of graduate schools is to screen out students who are not serious about becoming a professional in the discipline being studied. . . . War college students have been screened for roughly twenty years before they arrive. Their service has made up its collective mind that they are the top professionals at that stage of their career, and the overwhelming majority of them are committed to the profession of arms. The graduate schools' role of screening professional novices is inappropriate for the war colleges. What we provide is an opportunity for rising professionals to meet and associate with others in the fast track, others that they will not meet any other way, i.e. professional socialization. . . .

I believe that we need to build a stronger military faculty. If the Air Force is unwilling, or unable, to make the changes necessary in its officer corps to provide officers with the combination of operational experience and intellectual, analytical skills necessary for faculty duty *and* to make that faculty duty part of the professional fast track, it is time for the Air Force to face reality and hire more civilian faculty members. It is vital to the national security that the Air War College provide a more intellectually rigorous program for its students. No combination of management initiatives will replace a high quality faculty.

Murray is correct that there are no simple solutions to the problems of the Air War College. . . . We constantly reform our curriculum and search for the best available faculty. We welcome assistance and will continue to invite outside speakers to provide divergent views to our students. I am proud to have invited Murray to speak at the Air War College in the past and hope he will be invited to speak in the future.

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[The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily the views of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense].

In his interesting article (Winter 1986/7) Williamson Murray tried to do two things. First, he attempted to grade the various war colleges according to the quality of the education they provide. Second, and more important, he argued that most of these institutions fail in their mission of preparing officers for top level command. They fail by confusing education with training, providing a smorgasboard of different courses instead of focusing on the conduct of war, and by not having grades or examinations . . . to introduce a competitive element into the learning environment. In criticizing these institutions, Murray has overlooked a whole array of problems. . . . A good place to start might well be the student-bodies who attend the various schools. A year's work at the National War College has convinced me, as Murray's experience has convinced him, that the students are far and away the best thing about that institution. The military men and women who attend the College are normally in their early forties. Most of them come from a lower middle class, small town or rural background and regard themselves, not without reason, as having done rather well in life. They have behind them twenty years hard work in an environment that is as demanding and as competitive as any in the country. These are people who have gained considerable international experience. They have

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traveled widely, and the majority have spent long periods living abroad. It is no exaggeration to say that, as a body, they are better qualified than any other group of students to be found in any institution of higher learning anywhere.

Working with such people can be a very rewarding experience, yet their limitations should not be lost sight of. These are no babes in the woods, listening open mouthed to anything that the professor will say. The very fact that they have made it to the rank of lieutenant colonel or above proves that they have self assertive, possibly even aggressive personalities. They tend to have their points of view and are not afraid of defending them in public. There is something unnatural about the setup in which such people are suddenly taken back twenty years and put onto the schoolbench—after all, how many successful doctors, or lawyers, or other professionals (not to mention politicians) would be prepared to return to school at the age of forty? . . . It is precisely this artificial character of the learning situation which makes it so difficult to transform the War Colleges into centers of academic excellence by instituting competition, examinations, and grades. To make the students' careers depend on such criteria would mean judging them on the basis of their performance during a single year in class, rather than in twenty years in their jobs.

In sum, I am suggesting that many of the problems for which Murray criticizes the War Colleges are not of their own making. Instead, they stem from the very excellence of the student bodies that these institutions have to work with. . . . In most military institutes of higher learning around the world the faculty is both military and civilian. The former are entrusted with teaching about war, a subject on which they are supposed to be the experts. The problem is that, although military experience may well make a man competent in the conduct of war, it does not necessarily make him proficient in classroom teaching. This is particularly true at the university level, where such teaching presupposes theoretical and verbal skills of the highest order. These are skills which most of the military members of the faculty, by very virtue of having succeeded in their profession, neither have nor require. . . . Consequently one sometimes doubts whether they can have very much to teach students from whom they are distinguishable, if at all, only by a few extra years of seniority. . . . None of this has anything to do with devotion or goodwill or the absence of either; rather, the difficulty lies in the nature of the military profession itself.

Although pointing to the system's shortcomings is easy, finding ways to correct them is more difficult. One solution would be to have the instructors carry higher ranks, thus helping increase the respect with which they are regarded by the students. Although it would be nice to have some generals around who are also intellectuals, ultimately there can be no doubt that a general's job is to train, plan and command rather than to teach, write and study. No country can afford to have part-time generals in command of its forces; and if this implies that the majority of them are not going to take a Ph.D. or be the most studious men in the world, so be it.

The civilian professors who make up the rest of the faculty are by and large better qualified than their military colleagues, most of them having doctorates and publications to their credit. However, people who have spent their lives in the armed forces, often commanding hundreds of subordinates and carrying responsibility for hundreds of millions of dollars' worth in equipment, can hardly be blamed for failing to allow civilian bookworms to teach them about their own profession, which as Murray very correctly points out is war itself.

But even too much readiness on the part of the military to learn from civilians is problematic. Coming from Israel to work in this country, one of the greater surprises which awaited me was precisely the apparent readiness of so many high ranking officers to listen. While obviously gratifying, this readiness also raises nagging questions concerning

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the fitness for war of an institution—the American military—which seems to lack intellectual self-confidence to the point that some of its combat manuals are being written for it by a consulting industry, sometimes known as the "beltway bandits." The willingness of officers, particularly high ranking ones, to listen to civilians trying to instruct them about things military in the war colleges and elsewhere may actually constitute a weakness. If this is valid, it highlights the self-contradictory nature of the mission with which many of the civilian faculty at the War Colleges are faced.

Finally, that soldiers should study their profession, war, much as lawyers study law and physicians study medicine makes good sense; what does not appear to make good sense, however, is to make them study it *after* they have already gained twenty years' military experience. The proper place to teach the operational art of war, it seems to me, is not the various war colleges but rather the general staff and command schools that each of the three services maintains and where officers are usually sent when they reach the rank of captain or major.

Much of what Murray has to say about the various war colleges and their shortcomings, is undoubtedly correct. But as he does not sufficiently appreciate the origins of the problem, he errs in his proposals for solving them. The first step in that direction necessarily consists of defining the mission of the war colleges. This might perhaps consist of three distinct sub-missions: *(a)* professional military training in the conduct of war; *(b)* politico-military education in the nonmilitary aspects of war; and *(c)* general education and the broadening of intellectual horizons.

The proper place to accomplish the first of these is the various general staff and command schools that are run by the services. To the extent that the war colleges ought to include professional-military training in their curriculum, the focus should be on joint operations which the service schools have neither the desire nor the capacity to teach.

Second, while it is reasonable to expect a lieutenant colonel . . . to know something about the operational art of war, he may still be lacking in his appreciation for the nonmilitary, that is political, economic, social and cultural aspects that impinge on his profession at the highest levels. An ideal war college should employ any and every means, including meetings with the country's leading experts and visits to industry and Congress, in order to help him gain such an appreciation.

Finally, the need to broaden a senior officer's outlook, to make him think about things afresh, cannot be exaggerated and may well constitute the most important single mission of any military institution of higher learning. . . . To solve this problem, a revolution not merely in the curriculum but in attitudes would be necessary. One should like to see the students at the war colleges devoting one third of their time—possibly, the last trimester—to some subject with which they are absolutely unfamiliar, and doing so at their leisure. The point of the exercise would not be to add another field of expertise to their credentials but to make them leap over their own shadow, as it were. They must be made to realize that their own way of thought neither is, nor can be, the only one possible.

Even the best curriculum is useless without good instructors. . . . It is a truism that a first-class faculty which earns the students' respect will be able to do well regardless of the nature of the curriculum; conversely, not even the best curriculum in the world can make up for the absence of a first class faculty. If the military faculty of the war colleges is to be upgraded, then it is imperative that the instructors carry (or at least be considered eligible for carrying) a star instead of the assigment marking the end of their careers, as is the case at present; ideally, such a star might be awarded for interservice expertise. If better civilian faculty are to be attracted, then it is imperative that their salaries, teaching load, and freedom to do research and participate in international academic life be at least the equal of anything that is offered by the best civilian universities. The net effect of all this may well be to make

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the war colleges more, rather than less, like the latter institutions. If it be agreed that one of their missions is to introduce the students to modes of thought other than the military ones with which they are familiar, however, then such a change will be all for the better.

Martin van Creveld
Hebrew University,
Jerusalem

The author's reply:

Lieutenant Colonel Ren Crowell has written a perceptive and intelligent reply to my article. Unfortunately, he fails to address certain crucial issues that are essential to an understanding of what our war colleges are or are not doing. He quite correctly points out that "we have no consensus on the body of knowledge to be studied at the various levels of our professional military education schools. . . ." In fact, that is what led me to write my article in the first place; but as I made clear, I believe the Naval War College comes far closer to the mark than what happens at the other war colleges. The muddle of curriculum reform, largely confined to moving hours around the spectrum of courses, simply does not address the substantive issues. Crowell's frustration, expressed in his letter, is fully justified by my own experience in watching the Air War College from within and without over the past decade, as it has moved hours around. But a start must be made at bringing some intellectual clarity and purpose to the curriculum; Stansfield Turner dared to do that in 1972. Until the other war colleges follow in his steps the prospect of substantive changes at the other war colleges is bleak.

Crowell's comments on the matter of the faculty are perceptive but need further amplification. He is quite right to have considerable suspicion of the quality and depth of understanding in military matters in the civilian academic world. The problem then is how the services can fill out a faculty at the War College level from their own officer corps. For the Air Force that represents a most difficult problem. It is not that there are not plenty of intelligent, intellectually curious Air Force officers; the problem lies rather in an institutional *contempt* for those who have turned to the serious academic study of war during their Air Force careers. In fact the Air Force landscape is littered with passed over lieutenant colonels whose criteria for non-selection to colonel seems to have been their higher academic degree. As Crowell knows, we have added a third military historian to the faculty at Ohio State: John Guilmartin, *two* silver stars, Princeton University Ph.D., Cambridge University Press book, and a *pass-over* to full colonel in the USAF. There are numerous other examples. When the Air Force finds itself capable of absorbing heretics like Guilmartin into its structure, it will get the military faculty that it needs at the war college.

One final comment needs to be made on Crowell's letter. The issue of the length of reading assignments is irrelevant. What matters really is the intellectual rigor of the educational process, and to put it bluntly without a graded, evaluated curriculum that *ranks* the students the war colleges are not in the business of education. In fact, they are placing themselves firmly in the midst of the educational reforms that destroyed American higher eduction in the 1960s and 1970s. If they want to place themselves on the level of Brown University that is their choice, but they should have no illusions about what they are doing. The Naval War College does at least possess such a grading system; the others will not come close to Newport's excellence until they are willing to *judge* the performance of their students in a comparative sense. I would extend this point one step farther; if we are going to take the process of senior level education seriously, then the performance of officers at the War Colleges *should* play an essential role in the promotion system.

I think very highly of Martin van Creveld as a military historian. Unfortunately his letter exhibits none of the sophistication of his scholarly work. In fact, it appears to reflect the worst sort of academic irresponsibility:

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"Gee whiz, we have bright students at the war college who are so wise and perceptive, so how can we academics teach them." He reflects a 1960s educational approach that led to the current sorry state of American higher education. His letter addresses virtually none of the issues involved in an effort at serious war college reform. And his final suggestion of letting officers wander through the National Gallery looking at Chinese art (or whatever) as an attempt to *educate* them hardly deserves comment. Education can occur at the War Colleges, but it must be rigorous, focused, and demanding. I believe it is at Newport; it can happen at the other war colleges. I stand by my article.

Williamson Murray
Ohio State University

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The INF Debate: The *NOs* Have It

Robert W. Tucker

FROM THE DAY the Soviet General Secretary announced that the USSR was ready for a separate agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF), it was reasonably clear that an agreement would be reached. In breaking the link between INF related issues and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Soviets reversed the position they had earlier taken at the Reykjavik meeting. By doing so, they removed the major obstacle in the way of an agreement on INF. Having taken the big step, their subsequent acceptance of the complete elimination of medium range as well as of shorter range missiles was not unexpected.

Although the impending agreement would eliminate only a modest fraction (3–4 percent) of the world's stockpile, it represents the first time that the two nuclear superpowers have been able to agree on abolishing weapons rather than limiting their growth. For this reason alone, it is hailed by supporters as a considerable achievement. Moreover, there are the provisions dealing with verification, provisions that are also represented as a breakthrough in that they allow for on-site inspection. Finally, in agreeing to scrap all of their medium range missiles along with the shorter range missiles, the Soviet Union will give up some 1,300 warheads, more than three times the number the United States is required to yield. In the bargain, Moscow will also forego what has been to date a monopoly in shorter range missiles.

These features of the agreement have been repeatedly called to the public's attention by the treaty's supporters. The campaign on behalf of the treaty shows every promise of success. The public, despite a residual skepticism, is favorably disposed. Arms control is not yet the opiate of the people as some critics fear, but then it does not need to be to attract the public to the present agreement. The public has been told by its government that INF represents a substantial victory for the West, if only for the reason that the Soviet government has finally accepted a principle—the zero option—it contemptuously rejected six years ago. It has also been told that this first agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms foreshadows further such agreements. The prospect of a nuclear free world has even been held out.

The INF negotiations have not gone forward without criticism. Indeed, the de-

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bate between supporters and critics of the negotiations has been quite sharp and has involved some unexpected alignments. Perhaps the most telling criticism has come from quarters that have by no means been identified in the past as congenitally opposed to arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union. Among the opponents of this particular arrangement are the principal architects of the arms control agreements of the 1970s. Their opposition to INF is not based on a general animus toward arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, but on the dangers they see in this particular agreement. The same must be said of a number of critics who, though opposing this agreement, are not generally hostile to arms control efforts.

What is it that has so exercised critics? They are persuaded that the effect of the agreement will be to weaken deterrence by eroding the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, the rock on which the Atlantic Alliance has always rested. Credibility, they insist, depends on our being able to meet the threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe with the graduated application of nuclear power. By removing the medium range missiles, however, we will no longer be in a position to fulfill this requirement. With the missiles gone, we will have once again opened a gap in the continuum of deterrence. For if we put aside battlefield (tactical) nuclear weapons, there will remain only the strategic nuclear forces to redress the conventional imbalance. But the threat to employ strategic forces to redress the conventional imbalance is less credible than the threat to employ medium range missiles that, by virtue of their location, must either be used in response to a Soviet attack or be lost. Thus Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have urged that: "If we eliminate American medium- and short-range forces in Europe without redressing the conventional imbalance, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe will remain, and the gap in deterrence of conventional attack will be reopened." And the former commander of NATO forces, Bernard Rogers, has written that the INF agreement would "eliminate a crucial escalatory option. The result would be a reduction in the credibility of NATO's deterrence."

Nor is this the only serious danger posed by the agreement, critics insist. Still another presumably results from the effect the treaty must have in creating zones of unequal or differential security. Once the medium range missiles are gone, the serious prospect must arise of a war that is confined to Central Europe. For the nuclear weapons of the Alliance that will be left in Central Europe are battlefield weapons of very short range. If these weapons are used, they will in all likelihood be used in Germany. Yet the prospect of a war that begins and ends in Germany can only serve to demoralize the Germans.

EUROPEANS generally, and Germans particularly, have always sought reassurance in deterrence arrangements that blur the distinction between a war that is confined to Europe and one that is global. The reasoning is as simple as it is critical. A war that is confined to Europe is one that might just happen. A war that is global will not happen, since it would destroy the superpowers along with Europe. Safety, then, has always consisted in the assurance of a common fate. But the INF agreement raises the distinct possibility that Europe—and, above all, Germany—may now have a separate fate. In the words of a candid German observer, Josef Joffe, the argument violates the "unwritten law of NATO . . . that Germany must not be what geography has condemned it to be: the venue and victim of East-West war in Europe." Joffe adds that: "In their classic nightmare the Germans play host and target for weapons that will devastate Germany only, and that nightmare presents diplomatic opportunities for the Russians that hardly need laboring." Faced with the prospect of a war confined to German soil and fought with nuclear weapons, Germany will be increasingly driven to move either to neutralism (and denuclearization) or to demanding that it have its own nuclear

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force. Should the former, and more likely, course be taken, the Alliance will be at an end.

This, in brief, is the core of the indictment drawn up by critics of the agreement. Although it has not gone unanswered by the administration, it has not been persuasively answered. The administration's position is that since the American medium range missiles were put in Europe in response to the Soviet SS-20s, the removal of the SS-20s also removes the major reason for the presence of our missiles. At least, it is held to do so in the absence of other compelling reasons for keeping the missiles in place. But the critics respond that there are other such reasons for keeping them, that these reasons should have governed the initial decision to put them in Europe, and that the same reasons will continue to prove valid until such time that the Soviet Union agrees to a substantial reduction of its conventional forces. The compelling reason for putting the Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, the argument goes, was not to balance the Soviet missiles, as the Reagan administration contended at the time, but to close the gap in deterrence and, by doing so, to restore the credibility of the threat of nuclear retaliation. Having failed to see the principal reason for placing the medium range missiles in Western Europe, critics contend, the administration now fails to see the unchanged and compelling reason for keeping them there.

Against this criticism the administration's invariable reply has been that flexible response remains, that the INF agreement opens no gap in deterrence because there are several nuclear weapons systems that remain at our disposal, and that to insist upon linking INF with conventional force reductions would be to resort to the Soviet tactic that has impeded progress in the past.

These were the points made by the secretary of state in replying to the strictures of Nixon and Kissinger. But whether a gap in deterrence has been reopened cannot be determined by adding up numbers of weapons and pointing to the different systems for delivering them. It can only be determined by identifying weapons systems that fill the same role and function as the medium range missiles. Yet none of the substitutes do. Certainly, the battlefield nuclear weapons do not, given their range. The one system that does appear to do so is the submarine launched missile force committed to NATO. Technical considerations apart, however, it may be recalled that several NATO governments protested in the late 1970s against using a weapon system they viewed as strategic for theater nuclear purposes. There is the added, and perhaps critical, consideration that an invisible submarine launched missile is simply not the same thing as a visible ground launched missile that either must be used or destroyed by the enemy.

Nor is this consideration met by asking, as administration officials have asked, that if medium range missiles are required for deterrence how did we manage to get along without them until four years ago. One answer is that deterrence is not an either/or proposition. It may be more or less credible. The critics' contention is simply that before the medium range missiles were introduced, deterrence was *less* credible. While there is room for differences over how much less credible previous arrangements were, it seems difficult to contest the proposition that they were so. Nor is this all. Even if it is granted for the sake of argument that the added credibility conferred by the medium range missiles was of modest dimensions, this does not provide assurance that the removal of the missiles will have an equal, though opposite, effect. It may or it may not. The fears of the critics, and particularly their fears about the effects of removal on allies, may not prove exaggerated. Given the apocalyptic nature of nuclear war, the credibility required for allies is very different from the credibility required for adversaries. Adversaries may need only a threat of modest credibility to be deterred. But allies seem to need a form of assurance that approaches certainty.

The conclusion is hard to resist that the critics of the agreement have had the better of

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this debate. This is so, at any rate, if it is agreed that the debate is primarily about nuclear deterrence. One may, of course, dispute that this is primarily what the debate is, and should be, about. The man who initially proposed the zero option in 1980 has done precisely that. "The flexible response strategy has long been obsolete," Helmut Schmidt has recently written. "For the West, the only function nuclear weapons can serve is to deter the East from contemplating a first nuclear strike." Schmidt is a no–first–use man, and perhaps even a no-use man. As such he has little difficulty in defending the INF agreement against the charge that it weakens deterrence. But the administration is in a very different position. While now intent on withdrawing the missiles, it is also insistent that the credibility of the nuclear deterrent has not been further impaired. The reconciliation of these positions is no easy task.

IF THE CRITICS have had the better of the debate, they have nevertheless exaggerated the case against the agreement. In doing so, they have also been less than candid about the implications of their own position. It is excessive to claim, as some have claimed, that eliminating the medium range missiles will make Europe safe for conventional war. It is hardly less an exaggeration to insist, as Brent Scowcroft has insisted, that the agreement means Gorbachev "will leave us the choice of a conventional defeat or using strategic weapons to defend Europe." If the prospect that we might have used the missiles in West Germany rather than lose them reflected something more than a mindless threat of apocalyptic proportions, it presumably did so because of the very great interest we have in protecting Europe from a Soviet attack. Surely that interest will not disappear, however, simply because the missiles are removed. Nor is it reasonable to argue that the Russians will think it has disappeared. They may well interpret removal as signalling a marginal weakening of the American commitment—it would be surprising if they did not—but that is a quite different matter.

The emphasis critics place on the importance for deterrence of maintaining a flexible response capability has led them to view medium range missiles as weapons that are somehow equidistant from both conventional and strategic weapons. But if the continuum of deterrence is broken by the removal of these missiles, this is not because the missiles hold out a distinctive third way of waging war. To the extent the missiles preserved a continuum of deterrence, they did so because of where they were placed and not because of the targets they could have destroyed. Judged from the latter perspective, they might just as well have been based in the United States, or at sea. But although the critics are set on insisting that the missiles preserve the continuum of deterrence, they misrepresent the character of the continuum. Many of them appear to entertain the curious idea that the character of missiles, as well as the kind of war in which they are used, is determined by where they come from rather than where they land. But a missile that destroys Kiev might just as well be fired from Montana as from West Germany. In either case, it is strategic by virtue of its target.

These criticisms apart, the effectiveness of the case made against the INF agreement is largely dependent on viewing the matter from the perspective of deterrence and deterrence alone. From a broader perspective, one that encompasses the possible use of the weapons, the outcome of the debate is far from clear. What seems a desirable arrangement from the perspective of deterrence, holds out supreme danger should deterrence ever fail. By agreeing to remove the missiles we cannot help but send a message to Western Europe—particularly to West Germany—that we are not necessarily committed to the physical sacrifice of this nation should deterrence once fail.

Henry Kissinger is persuaded that this message cannot but give rise—indeed, has already given rise—to a grave crisis of confidence. But the realization that America may

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not be willing to sacrifice itself for Europe is not novel. Nor did the medium range missiles ever really succeed in banishing a persistent and gnawing skepticism. What the missiles did was to increase somewhat the plausibility that the deterrent would be employed in response to a Soviet attack. They did not establish the necessity of its employment. While their withdrawal now is unlikely to precipitate a grave crisis of confidence, it will appear to Europe as one more object lesson that, rhetoric notwithstanding, the two continents do not literally share a community of fate.

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